These Sections teach the divine law of marriage as to incest and as to divorce.

1st. Incest consists of sexual intercourse between parties forbidden by the divine law to marry, because of their relationship. Marriage between these parties is impossible; and no matter what may be the provisions of human laws or the decisions of human courts, such pretended marriages are void ab initio — invalid in essence as well as improper and injurious. Since the degrees of relationship within which marriage is excluded differ in nearness, so the crime of incest differs, according to these varying degrees, from the highest to the least measure of criminality. The obligation to avoid intermarriage between near blood-relations is a dictate of nature as well as of the word of God.

The only law on this subject in the Scriptures is the Levitical law recorded in Lev. xx. 10-21. If this law is still binding, it carries with it the principle that it is incest for a man to cohabit with any one of his deceased wife^s relations nearer in blood than it is lawful for him to do of his own. If this law is not binding now, there is no other law of God remaining on the subject of incest except the law of nature.

The Greek and Roman Catholic churches agreed in holding that this law is still binding, since the reason of the law rests upon permanent relationships, and not

upon any special circumstances peculiar to society among the Jews. All branches of the Protestant Church — Episcopal, Lutheran and Presbyterian — have maintained the same principle in their Confessions of Faith or canons of discipline. It is asserted in these Sections of our Confession. But a great diversity of sentiment and practice prevails in different parts of our Church on this subject, and for the most part the enforcement of this rule has been left to the discretion of the majority of each local church court. Several efforts have been made, in 1826 and 1827 and 1843, 1845 and 1847,* to have this Section of this Chapter changed, but without effect.

2d. The divine law as to divorce is, that marriage is a contract for life between one man and one woman, and that it is, ipso facto , dissolved only by death (Rom. vii. 2, 3), and that the only causes upon which any civil authority can dissolve the union of those whom God has joined together are (a) adultery, (6) wilful, causeless and incurable desertion.

(1.) The only causes upon which it is lawful to grant a divorce are — (a) adultery ; this is explicitly allowed by Christ (Matt. v. 31, 32 ; xix. 9) ; and (6) wilful, causeless and incurable desertion. This is allowed by Paul to the Christian husband or wife deserted by their heathen partner. 1 Cor. vii. 15. The reason in the case is also self-evident, since such desertion, being total and incurable, makes the marriage an empty name, void of all reality, and, being causeless, leaves the deserting party without remaining rights to be defended.

(2.) Such causes, however, do not, ipso facto y dissolve * See Baird's Digest, pp. 163-168.

the marriage bond, but only give the right to the innocent party, if they so elect, to demand that it shall be dissolved by competent authority. And if they do demand the dissolution, they are not left to their own discretion in the case, but they must seek for the vindication of their rights at the hands of the public authorities and according to the law of the land.

(3.) The civil law, however, has no authority to grant divorces upon any other grounds than those above defined as allowed by the law of God. Whenever they do so, as is constantly done in fact, the civil authorities put themselves into direct conflict with the law of God in the case. Hence all Christians and church courts are bound in such cases to disregard the judgment of the civil authority, and to regard and treat such unlawful divorces as null and void. And if the parties to a marriage unrighteously dissolved marry again, they are to be regarded and treated by those who fear God as living in those new marriages in the sin of adultery. Matt. xix. 8,9; Actsiv. 19; v. 29.

In the Mosaic law marriage was expressly forbidden within certain degrees of consanguinity or affinity (Lev. xviii.); and by the laws of our country the prohibition is extended to the same degrees. Marriages contracted within these degrees are in themselves justly deemed invalid, and may properly be dissolved.

Moses permitted the Jews, " because of the hardness of their hearts," to put away their wives, to prevent greater evils; but in the ^'ew Testament a divorce is only permitted in case of adultery, or of wilful and obstinate desertion. There can be no question that adultery is a just ground for " the innocent party to sue out a divorce, and, after the divorce, to raarry another, as if the offending party were dead ;" for Christ

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258 CONFESSION OF FAITH. QcHAP. XXV.

has plainly decided this case (Matt. v. 32): " I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery; and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced, committeth adultery." But whether the wilful and obstinate desertion of one of the parties sets the other party at liberty to marry again, may admit of dispute. Many divines of great name have maintained the affirmative, and have thought the case to be expressly determined by the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. vii. 15) : " If the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases." At verse 11, the apostle plainly declares, that the party who wilfully and obstinately deserted the other, was not at liberty to marry again during the other's life. But at verse 15, he appears to declare that the party who was deserted, after using due means for the return of the party deserting, was free to marry again.* And the decision seems just; for by irreclaimable desertion the marriage bond is broken, and the ends for which marriage was appointed are effectually defeated ; and it is not reasonable that the innocent party should be denied all relief. Our Confession, accordingly, teaches that not only adultery, but also " such wilful desertion as can no way be remedied by the Church or civil magistrate, is cause sufficient for dissolving the bond of marriage ;" and the law of Scotland also allows of divorce in case of wilful and irreclaimable desertion. It ought to be observed, however, that even adultery does not, ipso factOf dissolve the bond of marriage, nor may it be dissolved by consent of parties. The violation of the marriage vow only invests the injured party with a right to demand the dissolution of it by the competent authority; and if he chooses to exercise that right, the divorce must be effected " by a public and orderly course of proceeding."