Quest. XII., XIII.

QUEST. XII. What are the decrees of God?

ANSW. God’s decrees are the wise, free, and holy acts of the counsel of his will; whereby, from all eternity, he hath, for his own glory, unchangeably fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass in time; especially concerning angels and men.

QUEST. XIII. What hath God especially decreed concerning angels and men?

ANSW. God, by an eternal and immutable decree out of his mere love, for the praise of his glorious grace, to be manifested in due time, hath elected some angels to glory, and, in Christ, hath chosen some men to eternal life, and the means thereof; and also, according to his sovereign power, and the unsearchable counsel of his own will (whereby he extendeth, or with-holdeth favour, as he pleaseth) hath passed by, and fore-ordained the rest to dishonour and wrath, to be for their sin inflicted, to the praise of the glory of his justice.

Having considered the perfections of the divine nature, and the Personal glories of the Father, Son, and Spirit, the next thing to be insisted on is, what God has purposed to do from eternity, or does, or will do, in pursuance thereof; the former we call his decrees; the latter, the execution of them. The object of his decree is whatever comes to pass, which is the most large and comprehensive sense of his purpose: but whereas his determinations, in a particular manner, respect angels and men, or the intelligent part of the creation, and more especially the eternal happiness of some, or the display of his righteous judgments against others; in these respects, they being taken in a more limited sense, are called as relating to the former, election, and, with respect to the latter, reprobation, which is the subject matter of these two answers. And, before we proceed to insist on this sublime and difficult subject, it may not be inexpedient for us to premise some things concerning it in general.

1. It is well known that there is no doctrine, contained in scripture, which is more contested than this, which lies before us; and it is not only denied by some, but treated with the utmost dislike or detestation, and that to such a degree, that we must either wholly forbear to mention it in public discourses, or writings, or else must be liable to the hard fate of being censured by those who will not do that justice to the argument, to consider what may be advanced in defence thereof, as though it were to be taken for granted that we are maintaining a doctrine that is not only indefensible, but injurious to mankind, and subversive of all religion.

2. If there be any who give just occasion to these prejudices, by the methods which they have used in explaining, as well as the weakness of their arguments in defending it, or by laying themselves open to those popular objections, which are usually brought against it, we cannot but conclude that they are highly to blame; and therefore we are far from approving of any unguarded expressions, which are to be met with in some writings, whereby a stumbling-block is laid in the way of those who are disposed to make men offenders for a word, rather than to judge impartially of the main drift of their discourse: it is to be owned, that this has done dis-service to the cause, which might have been better defended.

3. If these prejudices against this doctrine are ill grounded, and the objections only founded on the popular cry, by which it is endeavoured to be run down, and condemned with reproach and censure; and if persons know not, nor desire to know what may be said in defence thereof, how such-like objections may be answered; the disgust and opposition is both unreasonable and uncharitable, and contains a capricious resolution not to be undeceived, and consequently renders the person thus prejudiced, highly culpable in the sight of God, especially if there be any ground to conclude that his cause is therein maintained.

4. Let it be farther considered, that it is not a new doctrine, or such as was altogether unheard of in the world before; nor has it been only defended by the more ignorant or licentious part of mankind, or those who have been bold and presumptuous in affirming that for truth, which they had not duly weighed, or been convinced of, from the strongest evidence. Whether it be as ancient as scripture, and, indeed, founded upon it, we shall leave others to judge, when we have considered what may be said from it in defence thereof.

5. It was generally asserted, and publicly owned in most of the confessions of faith of the reformed churches in the last age, and, in particular, in the church of England, as contained in one of the articles thereof, and there is no apparent ambiguity in the words themselves, however, some have endeavoured, of late, to strain the sense thereof, and put such a meaning on them, as is very different from the writings of those who compiled them, which might serve as a comment on them.

And to this we may add, that it was maintained by far the greatest number of divines, in their public discourses and writings in the last century, how much soever the contrary doctrines are maintained at this day: however, we do not insist on this as a proof of the truth thereof, as though it needed to be supported by numbers of advocates for it, or were founded thereon; nor do we suppose, that when it has been most strenuously, and almost universally defended, there were not at the same time, others who opposed it. This I only mention, that I may, if possible, remove those prejudices that are inconsistent with persons judging impartially of it.

Since we are considering the head of prejudices against this doctrine, we think it necessary to add, that we shall endeavour to vindicate it, from the reproach that is generally cast on it, by those who suppose that it cannot be defended, without asserting God to be the author of sin, or supposing him to be severe, cruel, and unjust to his creatures, as some conclude we represent him to be, by unjust consequences deduced from it. We are far from asserting, as will hereafter appear, that God from all eternity, purposed to damn a great part of the world, as the result of his mere sovereign will, without the foresight of sin, which would render them liable to that condemnation.

Moreover, we shall endeavour to make it appear, in opposition to the calumnies of some, that the decree of God does not destroy, or take away, the liberty of man’s will, with respect to things, within its own sphere; or that considered in itself, it doth not lay a natural necessity on him, to rush into inevitable damnation, as though the destruction of sinners were only to be resolved into the divine purpose, and not their own wickedness. In considering which, we shall maintain, that the decree of God does not lay any force on the will of man, nor preclude the means of grace, as ordained by him, for the salvation of them that do, or shall hereafter, believe unto life everlasting; nor does it obstruct the preaching of the gospel, and therein proclaiming the glad tidings of salvation, to those who set under the sound thereof, as an ordinance for their faith.

And inasmuch as many are prejudiced against this doctrine, as being influenced by that popular out-cry, which is made by some, as though it were of a very pernicious tendency, either, on the one hand, to lead men to presumption, as giving occasion to persons to conclude that they may be saved as being elected though they live as they list; or, on the other hand, that it leads to despair, as supposing, that if there be such a decree, as that of reprobation, they must necessarily be included in it, and, by this means, instead of promoting holiness of life, it is inconsistent therewith: if we cannot maintain this doctrine, without giving just ground for such exceptions, we shall not only think our labour lost, but condemn it as pernicious and unscriptural, as much as they do, as it must of necessity be, if it cannot be defended from such-like exceptions; which, I hope, we shall be able to do, and at the same time, make it appear, that it is not only consistent with, but a very great motive and inducement to practical godliness: and, if this can be made to appear, the greatest part of the censorious prejudices, that are entertained against it, will be removed, and persons will be better able to judge whether truth lies on that side of the question, which we shall endeavour to defend, or the contrary.

I could not but premise these things in our entrance on this subject, as being sensible that such-like reproaches, as these we have mentioned, are brought by many, without duly weighing whether they are well grounded or no; so that this doctrine is often opposed, in such a way of reasoning, that the premises, as well as the conclusions drawn from them, are rather their own than ours; or, at least, if some ideas thereof may be found in the writings, or taken from the unguarded expressions, which some who have defended this doctrine, have made use of; yet they have appeared in such a dress that even they, who are supposed to have advanced them, would have disowned and rejected them. If persons who are in another way of thinking, resolve not to lay aside these misrepresentations, it plainly appears that they are not disposed to lie open to conviction, and then all attempts to defend this doctrine will be to no purpose; the preventing whereof has rendered these prefatory cautions needful.

We shall only add, to what has been said, some rules, by which we desire that the truth, either of this or the opposite doctrine, may be judged of.

1. If we do not confirm what we assert, by proofs taken from scripture, let it not be received; but if we do, whatever may be said of our method of managing this controversy, the greatest deference ought to be paid to the sacred oracles: But since it is very common for persons to answer the arguments taken from one scripture, by producing other scriptures, which seems to assert the contrary, as desirous to shift aside in the dispute, and put us upon solving the difficulties which they suppose to be contained in them; though this is not to be declined, yet a more direct answer must be given before the doctrine itself is overthrown. Whether our explication of those scriptures, on which our faith therein is founded, be just, we shall leave others to judge; and also whether the sense we give of other scriptures that are brought as objections against it, be not equally probable with that of those that bring them; which is all that need be insisted on in such cases.

2. Let that doctrine be received, and the contrary rejected, on which side of the question soever it lies, that is most agreeable to the divine perfections, and explains those scriptures, brought in defence of it, most consistently therewith; which is a fair proposal; and such as ought not only to be applied to this particular head of doctrine, but to the whole of religion, as founded on scripture, which is far from overthrowing the divine glory, the advancement whereof is the great end of it.

3. Let that doctrine be rejected, as inconsistent with itself, and not worthy to be believed or embraced, whether it be ours, or the contrary thereunto, that shall detract from the harmony of the divine perfection, or pretend to set up, or plead for one, and, at the same time militate against the glory of another; and I desire nothing more than that our whole method of reasoning on this subject may be tried by these rules, and be deemed true or false, agreeably to what is contained therein.

In considering this subject, relating to the decrees of God, as in the two answers, which we are explaining, we shall proceed in the following method; and shew,

I. What we are to understand, by God’s fore-ordaining whatever comes to pass, according to the counsel of his own will; wherein we shall compare the decree with the execution thereof, and observe how one exactly answers to the other, and is to be a rule for our judging concerning it.

II. We shall prove the truth of that proposition, that God hath fore-ordained whatever shall come to pass, either in time, or to eternity.

III. We shall then particularly consider intelligent creatures, such as angels and men, and that both good and bad, with respect to their present, or future state, as the objects of God’s eternal decree or purpose, and so shall proceed to speak concerning the decree of election, and reprobation, as contained in the latter of these answers.

IV. We shall lay down some propositions concerning each of these, tending to explain and prove them, and that more especially as to what respects the election and reprobation of men.

V. We shall consider the properties thereof, and how the divine perfections are displayed therein, and endeavour to make it appear, in various instances, that the account we shall give thereof is agreeable thereunto, as well as founded on scripture.

VI. We shall enquire whether the contrary doctrine defended by those who deny election and reprobation, be not derogatory to, and subversive of the divine perfections, or, at least, inconsistent with the harmony thereof; or whether it doth not, in many respects, make God altogether such an one as ourselves.

VII. We shall endeavour to prove that their reasoning from scripture, who maintain the contrary doctrine, is not sufficiently conclusive; and that the sense they give of those scriptures, generally brought to support it, does not so well agree with the divine perfections, as it ought to do, but that they may be explained in a different way, more consistent therewith.

VIII. We shall endeavour to answer the most material objections that are usually brought against the doctrine that we are maintaining. And,

IX. Shew how it is practically to be improved by us, to the glory of God, and our spiritual good and advantage.

I. What we are to understand by God’s fore-ordaining whatever comes to pass, according to the counsel of his own will.

1. By God’s fore-ordaining whatever comes to pass, we do not understand barely his fore-knowledge of all things, that are, or shall be done in time, and to eternity, although this be included in, and inseparably connected with his eternal purpose, since no one can purpose to act without the foreknowledge thereof; yet more than this is certainly contained therein; therefore,

2. God’s pre-determining, or fore-ordaining whatsoever comes to pass, includes not only an act of the divine understanding, but an act of his sovereign will: It is not only his knowing what shall come to pass, but his determining, by his own agency, or efficiency, what he will produce in time, or to eternity. Accordingly, some call the decrees of God his eternal providence, and the execution thereof his actual providence; by the former, he determines what he will do; by the latter, he brings his determinations to pass, or effects what he before designed to do. It follows therefore,

3. That God’s fore-ordaining whatsoever shall come to pass, is vastly different from his bringing things to pass: the one is an internal act of his will; the other, an external act of his almighty power: He fore-ordained that they should come to pass, and therefore, till then, they are considered as future; though this determination necessarily secures the event, unless we suppose it possible for his eternal purpose to be defeated, which is disagreeable to the divine perfections, as will farther appear under some following heads. And, on the other hand, when we consider him, as bringing all things to pass, or producing them by his power, this renders what was before future, present. With respect to the former, he decrees what shall be; and, with respect to the latter, his decree takes effect, and is executed accordingly.

They who treat of this matter, generally consider things, either as possible or future. Things are said to be possible, with respect to the power of God, as every thing that he can do, is possible to be done, though some things, which he could have done, he never will do. As for instance: He could have made more worlds, had he pleased; or have produced more men upon earth, or more species of creatures; or have given a greater degree of perfection to creatures, than he has done, or will do; for it is certain, that he never acted to the utmost of his power, accordingly he could have done many things that he will never do; and those things are said to be possible, but not future.

Moreover, things future are rendered so, by the will of God, or his having fore-ordained, or determined to produce them; this is what we call the decree of God, which respects the event, or determines whatever shall come to pass.

We are now to consider, what we are to understand by God’s fore-ordaining all things, according to the counsel of his will; which is a mode of speaking used in scripture, in Eph. i. 11. Being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.

1. We are not hereby to understand that the decrees of God are the result of deliberation, or his debating matters within himself, as reasoning in his own mind about the expediency, or inexpediency of things, or calling in the advice of others, as creatures are said to do, when acting with counsel; for he must not be supposed to determine things in such a way, since that would argue an imperfection in the divine mind; With whom took he counsel, and who instructed him, and taught him in the paths of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and shewed to him the way of understanding? Isa. xl. 14. But,

2. It implies, that his decrees are infinitely wise. As what is done with counsel is said, according to human modes of speaking, to be done advisedly, in opposition to its being done rashly, or with precipitation; accordingly all the works of God are done with wisdom, therefore all his purposes and determinations to do what is done in time, are infinitely wise, which, according to our way of speaking, is called the counsel of his will: thus it is said, He is wonderful in counsel, and excellent in working, chap. xxviii. 29.

We are now to consider the object of God’s decree; This, as has been before observed, is every thing that has, or shall come to pass, and it may be considered in different respects. There are some things which he has determined to effect, namely, such as are the objects of his power; or all things, which have a natural or moral goodness in them, which are becoming an infinitely holy God to produce: and this includes in it every thing but sin, which God does not produce, it not being the object of power: Nevertheless, this must be supposed to be committed by his permission, and therefore it is the consequence of his decree to permit, though not, as other things, of his decree to effect; it is one thing to suffer sin to be committed in the world, and another thing to be the author of it. But this we shall have occasion to enlarge on, under a following head.

II. We shall now proceed to prove the truth of what is laid down in this answer, namely, that God hath fore-ordained whatever comes to pass. This will evidently appear, if we consider the five following propositions in their due connexion.

1. Nothing comes to pass by chance, with respect to God, but by the direction of his providence, which we are bound to assert against the Deists, who speak of God, as though he were not the Governor of the world. This cannot be denied by any, who think, with any degree of modesty, concerning, or pay a due deference to the divine perfections, since God may as well be denied to be the Creator as the Governor of the world.[183]

2. It follows from hence, that nothing is done without the divine influence, or permission. The former (as was before observed) respects things that are good, which are the effects of his power; the latter, sin. That nothing comes to pass without the divine influence, or permission, is evident; for if any thing came to pass, which is the object of power, without the divine influence, then the creature would be said to exist, or act independently on the power of God; and, if so, then it would follow, that it would exist, or act necessarily; but necessary existence is a perfection appropriate to God.

As to what respects the latter, namely, sins being committed by divine permission, it is evident, that if it might be committed without the divine permission, it could not be restrained by God: and to suppose that he could not hinder the commission of sin, is to suppose that sin might proceed to the greatest height, without any possible check or controul, which would argue a great defect in the divine government of the world, as it is also contrary to daily experience, as well as scripture. Certainly he who sets bounds to the sea, and says to its proud waves, Hitherto shall ye come, and no farther, must be supposed to set bounds to the corrupt passions of wicked men: thus the Psalmist says, Surely the wrath of men shall praise thee; the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain, Psal. lxxvi. 10.

Notwithstanding, this does not argue his approbation of sin, or that he is the author of it; since it is one thing to suffer, or not to hinder, and another thing to be the author of any thing. Thus it is said, These things hast thou done, and I kept silence, Psal. l. 21. that is, I did not restrain thee from doing them, as I could have done; so it is said, in times past he suffered all nations to walk in their own ways. Acts xiv. 16.

3. God never acts or suffers any thing to be done, but he knows, beforehand, what he will do or suffer. This an intelligent creature, acting as such, is said do, therefore it must not be denied of him, who is omniscient, and infinitely wise: He who knows all things that others will do, cannot but know what himself will do, or what others will do by the interposition of his providence, or what he will suffer to be done, before it is acted.

4. Whatever God does, and consequently knows before-hand that he will do it, that he must be supposed to have before determined to do: This must be allowed, or else it argues him defective in wisdom. As no wise man acts precipitantly or without judgment, much less must the wise God be supposed to do so; concerning whom it is said, that all his ways are judgment, Deut. xxxii. 4.

5. It therefore appears, even to a demonstration, that God before determined, or fore-ordained, whatever comes to pass, which was the thing to be proved.

And inasmuch, as he never began to determine, as he never began to exist, or as he never was without purposes of what he would do; therefore it is evident, that he before ordained, from eternity, whatever should come to pass, either in time, or to eternity.

It farther appears, that God fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass, otherwise he did not determine to create all things before he gave being to them; and then it could not be said, O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all, Psal. civ. 24. There are, indeed, many admirable discoveries of wisdom, as well as power, in the effects produced; but to suppose that all this was done without fore-thought, or that there was no eternal purpose relating thereunto, would be such a reflection on the glory of this perfection, as is inconsistent with the idea of a God. Moreover, if herein he designed his own glory, as he certainly did, since every intelligent being designs some end, and the highest and most excellent end must be designed by a God of infinite wisdom; and, if he did all this for his own glory, then it must be allowed, that it was the result of an eternal purpose: all which, I am persuaded, will not be denied by those on the other side of the question, who defend their own cause with any measure of judgment.

To this we may farther add, that to deny that God fore-ordained whatever comes to pass, is, in effect, to deny a providence, or, at least, that God governs the world in such a way, as that what he does therein was pre-concerted. And herein we expect to meet with no opposition from any but the Deists, or those who deny a God; and if it be taken for granted that there is a providence, or that God is the Governor of the world, we cannot but conclude from hence, that all the displays of his glory therein, are the result of his eternal purpose. This is also agreeable to what is said concerning him, that he doth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, Dan. iv. 35. the meaning of which is not barely this, (which is a great truth) that he acts without controul, inasmuch as his power is infinite: But that all he does is pursuant to his will; and, indeed, it cannot be otherwise, if we suppose that the divine power, and will, are so inseparably connected, that he cannot be said to produce any thing, but by the word of his power; or when he willeth that any thing should come to pass, it is not in an efficacious will, as ours is, for want of power, to effect what we have done. Therefore for God to will the present existence of things, is to effect them, which seems to be the reason of that mode of speaking, which was used when he produced all things at first; he said, let them exist in that form, or perfection, which he had before designed to give them, and the effect immediately followed, Gen. i. 3, 6, 9, &c.

Hitherto, I presume, our argument will not be much contested; for the main thing in controversy is what relates to the divine determination respecting intelligent creatures, which will be considered under a following head: What I have hitherto attempted to prove is, the proposition in general, namely, that whatever God brings to pass, or is the effect of power, is the result of his determinate purpose. And herein, I think, I have carefully distinguished between God’s will to effect, and his will to permit; but that will be farther explained, when we speak of the decrees of God, with a particular application to angels and men, under the head of election.

Having endeavoured to prove that God hath fore-ordained whatever comes to pass, we shall lay down the following propositions relating to his end and design in all his purposes, together with the nature of things, as coming to pass pursuant thereunto, and the method in which we are to conceive of the decree, when compared with the execution thereof.

1. God cannot design any thing, in his eternal purpose, as the highest end, but his own glory, which is here assigned, as the end of his decrees. As this is the principal motive, or reason, inducing him to produce whatever comes to pass; so it must be considered as the end of his purpose relating thereunto: This is very evident; for since the divine glory is the most excellent of all things, he cannot, as an infinitely wise God, design any thing short of it, as the great motive or inducement for him to act; therefore, whatever lower ends are designed by him, they are all resolved into this as the principal, to wit, the advancement of his divine perfections. Though God designs his own glory as the highest end, yet he has purposed not only that this should be brought about, by means conducive thereunto, but that there should be a subserviency of one thing to another, all which are the objects of his decree, as well as the highest end, namely, his own glory. As, for instance, he determines that the life and health of man shall be maintained by the use of proper means and medicine, or that grace shall be wrought instrumentally by those means, which he has ordained, in order thereunto: thus his purpose respects the end and means, together with the connexion that there is between them.

2. According to the natural order of things, the divine purpose is antecedent to the execution thereof. Therefore it seems very absurd to distinguish the decree of God, as some do, into antecedent and consequent, one going before the use of means, the other following, of which more hereafter: It is certain, that every intelligent being first determines to act, and then executes his determinations; so that nothing can be more absurd, than to say, that a person determines to do a thing which is already done. Therefore we conclude, that God first decreed what shall come to pass, and then brings it to pass: Accordingly he first determined to create the world, and then created it; he first determined to bestow the means of grace on men, and to render them effectual to the salvation of all who shall be saved, and then he does this accordingly; so, with respect to his judicial actings, he first determined by a permissive decree, not to prevent the commission of sin, though infinitely opposite to his holiness, and then, knowing the consequence of this permissive decree, or that men, through the mutability or corruption of their nature, would rebel against him, he determined to punish sin after it should be committed. Thus the decree of God is, in all respects, antecedent to the execution of it; or his eternal providence, as his decrees are sometimes called, is antecedent to, and the ground and reason of, his actual providence.

3. Though the purpose of God be before the execution thereof, yet the execution of it is first known by us; and so it is by this that we are to judge of his decree and purpose, which is altogether secret, with respect to us, till he reveals it; therefore we first observe the discoveries thereof, as contained in his word, or made visible in his actual providence, and from thence we infer his eternal purpose relating thereunto. Every thing that is first in the order of nature, is not first with respect to the order of our knowing it: thus the cause is before the effect, but the effect is often known before the cause; the sun is, in the order of nature, before the enlightening the world by it; but we first see the light, and then we know there is a sun, which is the fountain thereof: or, to illustrate it by another similitude, which comes nearer the matter before us; A legislator determines first to make a law, which determination is antecedent to the making, and that to the promulgation of it, whereby his subjects come to the knowledge thereof, and act in conformity thereunto; but, according to our method of judging concerning it, we must first know that there is such a law, and from thence we conclude, that there was a purpose relating to it, in him that gave it; Thus we conclude, that though the decree of God be the ground and reason of the execution thereof, yet we know that there was such a decree by its execution, or, at least, by some other way designed to discover this to us.

These things being duly considered, may obviate an objection, which is no other than a misrepresentation of the doctrine we are maintaining, as though we asserted, that our conduct of life, and the judgment we are to pass concerning ourselves, relating to our hope of future blessedness, were to be principally, if not altogether regulated, by God’s secret purpose or decree; as though we were first to consider him as determining the event, that is, as having chosen or rejected us, and, from this supposition, to encourage ourselves to attend upon the means of grace; or otherwise that we should take occasion to neglect them; since it is a preposterous thing for a man, who considers himself as reprobated, to attend on any of those means, which are ordained to salvation.

What has been said under the foregoing heads, is sufficient to take away the force of this objection; but this will be more particularly considered, when we come to answer several objections against the doctrine of election: Therefore all I shall add at present is, that since our conduct and hope is to be governed by the appearances of things, and not by God’s secret purpose relating to the event thereof, we are to act as those who have not, nor can have, any knowlege of what is decreed, with relation thereunto, till it is evinced by the execution thereof; or, at least, those graces wrought in us, which are the objects of God’s purpose, as well as our future blessedness; and our right to one is to be judged of by the other.

This leads us to consider the properties of these decrees of God, as mentioned in the former of the answers we are now considering; in which it is said, they are wise, free, and holy. This is very evident, from the wisdom, sovereignty, and holiness, which appear in the execution of them; for whatever perfections are demonstrated in the dispensations of providence, or grace, these God designed to glorify in his eternal purpose; therefore if his works, in time, are wise, free, sovereign, and holy, his decree, with respect thereunto, which is fulfilled thereby, must be said to be so likewise. These things we shall have occasion to speak more particularly to, under a following head, when we consider the properties of election, and particularly that it is wise, sovereign, and holy; I shall therefore, at present, only add, that whatever perfections belong to the nature of God, they are demonstrated by his works, since he cannot act unbecoming himself; for that would give occasion to the world to deny him to be infinitely perfect, that is, to be God. If we pass a judgment on creatures by what they do, and so determine him to be a wise man, who acts wisely, or a holy man, who acts holily, or a free and sovereign agent, who acts without constraint, certainly the same must be said of the divine Majesty; and consequently, since whatever he does has the marks of infinite wisdom, holiness, and sovereignty, impressed upon it, it is evident that these properties, or perfections, belong to all his purposes. If all his works are performed in wisdom, as the Psalmist observes, Psal. civ. 24. then we have reason to admire that wisdom which appears, from hence, to be contained in all his purposes relating thereunto, as the apostle doth, Rom. xi. 33. O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! If he be righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works, Psal. cxlv. 17. and therein demonstrates a divine sovereignty, as acting without any obligation, or constraint laid upon him to bestow the favours he confers on mankind; then we must certainly conclude, that his eternal purpose which is executed hereby, is free and sovereign. This leads us to consider,

III. That intelligent creatures, such as angels and men, with respect to their present or future state, are the objects of God’s eternal decree, or purpose, which is generally called predestination. And this, as it relates to the happiness of some, or misery of others, is distinguished into election or reprobation, which is a very awful subject, and ought never to be thought of, or mentioned, but with the utmost caution and reverence, lest we speak those things that are not right concerning God, and thereby dishonour him, or give just occasion to any to deny or reproach this doctrine, as though it were not founded on scripture.

Hitherto we have considered the purpose of God, as including in it all things future, as the objects thereof; and now we are to speak of it in particular, as it relates to angels and men. When we confine the objects of God’s purpose to those things that come to pass, which have no dependence on the free-will of angels or men, we do not meet with much opposition from those, who are in other respects, in the contrary scheme of doctrine; for most of them, who are masters of their own argument, and consider what may be allowed without weakening their cause, do not deny that God fore-ordained whatever comes to pass, nor that he did this from all eternity, if we except what respects the actions of free agents. Thus they will grant that God, from all eternity, determined to create the world, and then to govern it, and to give laws to men, as the rule of government, and a free-will, or power to yield obedience thereunto: but when we consider men’s free actions, as the objects of a divine decree, and the final state of men, as being determined by it, here we are like to meet with the greatest opposition, and therefore must endeavour to maintain our ground in the following part of this argument.

The decree of God, respecting intelligent creatures, is to be considered as containing in it two branches, namely, election and reprobation: the former of which is contained in those words, that God, out of his mere love, for the praise of his glorious grace, hath elected some to glory in Christ, and also to the means thereof; and as for reprobation, that is described in the following words; that according to his sovereign power, and the unsearchable counsel of his own will, he hath passed by, and fore-ordained the rest to dishonour and wrath, to be, for their sin, inflicted, to the praise of the glory of his justice. Both these are to be considered; and,

First, What respects the doctrine of election. To elect, or choose, according to the common use, or acceptation of the word, signifies the taking a small number out of a greater, or a part out of the whole; and this is applied, either to things or persons.

(1.) To things. As when a person has a great many things to choose out of, he sets aside some of them for his own use, and rejects the others, as refuse, that he will have nothing to do with.

(2.) To persons. As when a king chooses, out of his subjects, some whom he will advance to great honours; or when a master chooses, out of a number of servants offered to him, one, or more, whom he will employ in his service; this from the nature of the thing, implies, that all are not chosen, but only a part, in which there is a discrimination, or a difference put between one and another.

But we are more particularly to consider the meaning of the word election, as we find it in scripture, wherein it is used in several senses.

To elect or choose, according to the acceptation of the word, does not connote the particular thing that a person is chosen to, but that is to be understood by what is farther added to determine the sense thereof; as sometimes we read of persons being chosen to partake of some privileges, short of salvation; at other times, of their being chosen to salvation; sometimes it is to be understood as signifying their being chosen to things of a lower nature, at other times their being chosen to perform those duties, and exercise those graces that accompany salvation; and we may, very easily, understand the sense of it by the context.

Again, it is sometimes taken for the execution of God’s purpose, or for his actual providence, making choice of persons to fulfil his pleasure, in their various capacities; at other times, as we are here to understand it, for his fixing his love upon his people, and purposing to bring them to glory, making choice of some out of the rest of mankind, as the monuments of his discriminating grace; we have instances of all these senses of the word in scripture; and,

1. It is sometimes taken for God’s actual separation of persons, for some peculiar instances of service, which is a branch of his providential dispensation, in time: thus we sometimes read in scripture, of persons being chosen, or set apart, by God, to an office, and that either civil or sacred: thus, upon the occasion of Saul’s being made king, by God’s special appointment, Samuel says, See ye him whom the Lord hath chosen, 1 Sam. x. 24. so it is said elsewhere, He chose David also his servant, and took him from the sheep-fold; from following the ewes great with young, he brought him to feed Jacob, his people, and Israel his inheritance. Psal. lxxviii. 70, 71.

It also signifies his actual appointment of persons to perform some sacred office: thus it is said, concerning the Levites, that the Lord had chosen them to carry the ark, and to minister unto him, 1 Chron. xv. 2. and our Saviour says, to his disciples, Have not I chosen you, namely, to be my disciples, and as such to be employed in preaching the gospel, and one of you is a devil, John vi. 70.

2. It is sometimes taken for God’s providential designation of a people, to be made partakers of those external privileges of the covenant of grace, which belong to them as a church, which, as such, is the peculiar object of the divine regard: thus the people of Israel are said to have been chosen, or separated, from the world, to enjoy the external blessings of the covenant of grace, as Moses tells them, Because the Lord loved your fathers, therefore he chose their seed after them, Deut. iv. 37. and elsewhere, Thou art an holy people unto the Lord thy God; the Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself, above all people that are upon the face of the earth, chap. vii. 6, 7. And, in many other places in the Old Testament, the word election is taken in this sense, though something more than this seems to be included in some particular scriptures in the prophetic writings, in which the Jews are described, as God’s chosen people, as we shall endeavour to shew under a following head.

3. It also signifies God’s bestowing special grace on some, who are highly favoured by him, above others, as having called, or set them apart for himself, to have communion with him, to bear a testimony to him, and to be employed in eminent service, for his name and glory in the world. Thus it seems to be taken, in 1 Cor. i. 26, 27. where the apostle speaks of their calling, which imports some special privileges, that they were made partakers of, as the objects of divine power, and grace, to whom Christ was made wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption; which therefore signifies the powerful, internal, effectual call, and not barely the external call of the Gospel, as appears, by the foregoing and following verses, ver. 24. compared with 30. and they, whose calling he speaks of, are said to be chosen: You see your calling, how that not many wise men, &c. are called, but God hath chosen the foolish things of this world, &c. so that to be chosen, and effectually called there, seem to import the same thing.

And sometimes it is taken, for some peculiar excellency, which one Christian has above another; as that hospitable, or public-spirited person, to whom the apostle John directs his second epistle, is called by him, The elect lady, ver. 1. as an excellent person is sometimes styled a choice person.

But, though the word is taken, in scripture, in these various senses above mentioned, yet it is not confined to any, or all of them; for we shall endeavour to make it appear, that it is often taken, in scripture, as it is expressed in this answer; for God’s having fore-ordained particular persons, as monuments of his special love, to be made partakers of grace here, and glory hereafter, as it is styled, their being chosen to eternal life, and the means thereof. This is what we shall endeavour to prove, and accordingly shall consider the objects thereof, namely, angels and men, and that it is only a part of mankind that is chosen to salvation, to wit, that remnant which shall be eventually saved; and that these are chosen to the means thereof, as well as the end; and how this is said to be in Christ.

The objects of election are angels and men. A few words may be said concerning the election of angels, as being particularly mentioned in this answer; we have not, indeed, much delivered concerning this matter in scripture, though the apostle calls those who remain in their state of holiness and happiness, in which they were created, elect angels, 1 Tim. v. 21. But, had we no mention of their election in scripture, their being confirmed in their present state of blessedness, must, from the foregoing method of reasoning, be supposed to be the result of a divine purpose, or the execution of a decree relating thereunto; though there is this difference between their election, and that of men, in that the latter are chosen unto salvation, which the angels are not subjects capable of, inasmuch as they were never in a lost, undone state; neither are they said to be chosen in Christ, as men are.

But we shall proceed, to that which more immediately concerns us, to consider men as the objects of election. This is variously expressed in scripture; sometimes it is called their being appointed to attain salvation, or being ordained to eternal life or their names being written in the book of life; and it is also called, the purpose of God, according to election, or his having loved them before the foundation of the world, or his having predestinated them, (who have been blessed with all spiritual blessings, in heavenly places in Christ) unto the adoption of children, by him, according to the good pleasure of his will. That the scriptures speak of persons as elect, and that this is always represented as a great instance of divine favour and goodness, is not denied: But the main thing in controversy is, whether this relates to the purpose of God, or his providence; and whether it respects particular persons, or the church of God in general, as distinguished from the world; and, if it be supposed to relate to particular persons, how these are considered in God’s purpose, or what is the order and reason of his determination to save them.

That election sometimes respects the disposing providence of God, in time, has been already considered, and some particular instances thereof, in scripture, referred to; but when they, on the other side of the question, maintain, that this is the only, or principal sense in which it is used therein, we must take leave to differ from them. There is a late writer[185], who sometimes misrepresents, and at other times, opposes this doctrine, with more assurance and insult, than the strength of his reasoning will well allow of; and his performance on this head, and others, that have some affinity with it, is concluded, by many of his admirers, to be unanswerable; and the sense that he has given of several scriptures therein, as well as in his paraphrase on the New Testament, in which he studiously endeavours to explain every text, in conformity to his own scheme, has tended to prejudice many in favour thereof; and therefore we shall take occasion sometimes to consider what he advances against the doctrine that we are maintaining; and particularly, as to this head of election, he supposes, “1. That the election, mentioned, in scripture, is not of particular persons, but only that of churches and nations, or their being chosen to the enjoyment of the means of grace, rather than a certainty of their being saved by those means; that it does not contain any absolute assurance of their salvation, or of any such grace, as shall infallibly, and without any possibility of frustration, procure their salvation. 2. That the election to salvation, mentioned in scripture, is only conditional, upon our perseverance in a life of holiness[186]; and he attempts to prove, that election, in the Old Testament, belongs not to the righteous and obedient persons only, but the whole nation of the Jews, good and bad; and that, in the New Testament, it is applied to those who embrace the Christian faith, without any regard had to their eternal happiness.” These things, ought to be particularly considered, and therefore we shall endeavour to prove,

1. That though election oftentimes, in the Old Testament, respects the church of the Jews, as enjoying the external means of grace, yet it does not sufficiently appear that it is never to be taken in any other sense; especially when, there are some of those privileges which accompany salvation mentioned in the context, and applied to some of them, who are thus described; or when there are some promises made to them, which respect more than the external means of grace; therefore if there were but one scripture that is to be taken in this sense, it would be a sufficient answer to the universal negative, in which it is supposed, that the Old Testament never intends by it, any privilege, but such as is external, and has no immediate reference to salvation. Here I might refer to some places in the evangelical prophecy of Isaiah, which are not foreign to our purpose; as when it is said, Thou Israel, art my servant, Jacob, whom I have chosen; and I have chosen thee, and not cast thee away, Isa. xli. 8, 9. that this respects more than the continuance of their political and religious state, as enjoying the external means of grace, seems to be implied in those promises that are made to them, in the following words, which not only speak of their deliverance from captivity, after they had continued sometime therein, but their being made partakers of Gods special love, which had an immediate reference to their salvation: thus it is said, in the following, Fear not, for I am with thee; be not dismayed, for I am thy God; I will strengthen thee, yea, I will help thee; yea, I will uphold thee with the right hand of my righteousness; and elsewhere God, speaking to the Jews, says, I, even I, am he that blotteth out thy transgressions for mine own sake, and I will not remember thy sins, chap. xliii. 25. and, Israel shall be saved in the Lord, with an everlasting salvation; ye shall not be ashamed nor confounded, world without end, chap. xlv. 17. There are also many other promises, which seem to import a great deal more than the external privileges of the covenant of grace, which many very excellent Christians have applied to themselves, as supposing that they contain those blessings which have a more immediate reference to salvation; and it would detract very much from the spirituality and usefulness of such-like scriptures, to say that they have no relation to us, as having nothing to do with the Jewish nation, to whom these promises were made.

Object. To this it may be objected, that these promises are directed to the church of the Jews, as a chosen people; and therefore to suppose that there were a number elected out of them to eternal salvation, is to extend the sense of the word beyond the design of the context, to destroy the determinate sense thereof, and to suppose an election out of an election.

Answ. Since the word election, denotes persons being chosen to enjoy the external means of grace, and to attain salvation by and under them, it may, without any impropriety of expression, be applied in these different senses, in the same text; so that Israel may be described as a chosen people in the former sense, and yet there might be a number elected out of them, who were chosen to eternal life, to whom this promise of salvation more especially belonged, who are distinguished from the general body of the Jewish nation, who are called, in the other sense, God’s elect; as when it is said, I will leave in the midst of thee an afflicted and poor people, and they shall trust in the name of the Lord; the remnant of Israel shall not do iniquity, nor speak lies, &c. Zeph. iii. 12, 13. So that as Israel was an elect people, chosen out of the world to enjoy the external privileges conferred upon them, as a church, which they are supposed to have mis-improved, for which they were to be carried captive into Babylon; there was a remnant chosen out of them to be made partakers of the blessings that accompany salvation, such as are here promised; these are not considered as a church, governed by distinct laws, from those that Israel was governed by; and therefore not as a church selected out of that church, but as a number of people among them whom God had kept faithful, as having chosen them to enjoy better privileges than those which they had as a professing people; or as a number elected to be made partakers of special grace, out of those which had been made partakers of common grace, which they had miserably abused, and were punished for it.

2. Our Saviour speaking concerning the final destruction of Jerusalem by the Roman army, and a great time of distress that should ensue hereupon, tells them, in Matt. xxiv. 22. that those days should be shortened for the elect’s sake, that is, those who were chosen to eternal life, and accordingly should be converted to the Christian faith, not from among the heathen, but out of the Jewish nation; for it is to them that he more particularly directs his discourse, forewarning them of this desolating judgment; and he advises them to pray that their flight be not on the Sabbath-day, ver. 20. intimating thereby, that that nation deemed it unlawful to defend themselves from the assaults of an enemy on the Sabbath-day, though their immediate death would be the consequence thereof; therefore this advice was suited to the temper of the Jews, and none else: No people in the world, except them, entertained this superstitious opinion concerning the prohibition of self-defence on the Sabbath-day; from whence it may therefore be inferred, that our Saviour speaks of them in particular, and not of the Christians, which were amongst them; upon which account it seems probable, that these are not intended by the elect, namely, that small number for whose sake those days of distress and tribulation were to be shortened;[187] therefore there were an elect people whom God had a peculiar regard to, who should afterwards be converted to Christianity, namely, a number elected to eternal life out of that people, who were elected to the external privileges of the covenant of grace. And this farther appears from what follows, where our Saviour speaks concerning false Christs, and false prophets, that should shew great signs, and wonders, insomuch that, if it were possible, they should deceive the very elect, Matt. xxiv. 24. Now it cannot be supposed of them that are called false Christs, that they would attempt to pervert the Christians, by pretending to be the Messiah; for that would be impracticable, inasmuch as they did not expect any other to come with that character since our Saviour; whereas the Jews did, and many of them were perverted thereby to their own ruin; but it is intimated here, that the elect people, which was among them, should be kept from being deceived by them, inasmuch as they were chosen to obtain salvation, and therefore should believe in Christ by the gospel.

There is also another scripture, which seems to give countenance hereunto, where the apostle shews, that God had not cast away his people, Rom. xi. 2. to wit, the Jews, that is, he had not rejected the whole nation, but had made a reserve of some who were the objects of his special love, as chosen to salvation; and these are called, A remnant according to the election of grace, ver. 5. and this seems still more plain from what follows, ver. 7. What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for, that is, righteousness and life, which they sought after, as it were, by the works of the law, which, as is mentioned in the foregoing verse, is inconsistent with the attaining it by grace; but the election, that is, the elect among that people have obtained it; for they sought after it in another way, and the rest were blinded, that is, the other part of the Jewish nation, which were not interested in this privilege, were left to the blindness of their own minds, which was their ruin.

To this let me add one scripture more, Rom. ix. 6, 7. where the apostle, speaking concerning the nation of the Jews, distinguishes between the natural and spiritual seed of Abraham, when he says, All are not Israel that are of Israel, that is, there was a remnant according to the election of grace, who were chosen to eternal life out of that people, who were in other respects, chosen to be made partakers of the external privileges that belonged to them, as God’s peculiar people. The sum of this argument is, that though, it is true, there are some scriptures that speak of the church of the Jews, as separated from the world, by the peculiar hand of divine providence, and favoured with the external means of grace, yet there are others in which they are said to be chosen to partake of privileges of an higher nature, even those which accompany salvation; therefore election, in the Old Testament, sometimes signifies God’s purpose, relating to the salvation of his people.

2. We shall proceed to consider how election is taken in the New Testament, in opposition to those who suppose that it is there used only to signify God’s bringing persons to be members of the Christian church, as being instructed in the doctrines relating thereunto by the apostles:[188] The principal ground of this opinion is, because sometimes whole churches are said to be elected, as the apostle speaks of the church at Babylon, as elected together with them, to whom he directs his epistle, 1 Pet. i. 2. compared with chap. v. 13. by which it is supposed that nothing is intended, but that they were both of them Christian churches. If this be the sense of every scripture in the New Testament, that treats of election, then we must not pretend that the doctrine we are maintaining is founded on it: But on the other hand, we think we have reason to conclude, that when we meet with the word in the New Testament, it is to be understood, in most places, for God’s eternal purpose relating to the salvation of his people. I will not pretend to prove an universal negative, viz. that it is never taken otherwise, but shall refer to some scriptures, in which it is plainly understood so, and endeavour to defend this sense thereof.

The first scripture that we shall refer to, is in Eph. i. 4. He hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy, and without blame before him in love; and, in ver. 5. he speaks of their being predestinated to the adoption of children by Jesus Christ; that this respects not the external dispensation of God’s providence, in constituting them a Christian church, or giving them the knowledge of those doctrines, on which it was founded; but their being chosen to salvation and grace, as the means thereof, according to God’s eternal purpose, will very evidently appear from the context, if we consider that they who are thus chosen, are called faithful in Christ Jesus, which implies much more than barely to be in him by external profession: they are farther described, as blessed with all spiritual blessings in Christ, in ver. 3. or blessed with all those blessings which respect heavenly things; grace, which they had in possession, and glory, which they had in expectation; and they are farther described, as having obtained redemption through the blood of Christ, and forgiveness of sins; and all this is said to be done, according to the riches of his grace, and the good pleasure of his will, who worketh all things after the counsel thereof; and certainly all this must contain much more than the external dispensation of providence relating to this privilege, which they enjoyed as a church of Christ.

Again, in 1 Thess. i. 4. the apostle says concerning them, to whom he writes, that he knew their election of God. That this is to be understood of their election to eternal life, is very evident; and, indeed, he explains it in this sense, when he says, God hath, from the beginning, chosen you unto salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and the belief of the truth, Whereunto he called you by our gospel, to the obtaining the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ, 2 Thess. ii. 13, 14. the gospel is considered as the means of their attaining that salvation, which they are said to be chosen to; so that their election contains more than their professed subjection thereunto as a church of Christ: Besides, the apostle gives those marks and evidences of this matter, which plainly discover that it is their election to salvation that he intends; accordingly he speaks of their work of faith, labour of love, and patience of hope, in our Lord Jesus Christ, and of the gospel’s coming not in word only, but also in power, 1 Thess. i. 3, 5. by which he means not the power that was exerted in working miracles, for that would be no evidence of their being a church, or of their adhering to the doctrines that were confirmed thereby, since every one, who saw miracles wrought, did not believe; therefore he means, that by the powerful internal influence of the Holy Ghost, they were persuaded to become followers of the apostles, and the Lord, and were ensamples to others, and public-spirited, in endeavouring to propagate the gospel in the world. Certainly this argues that they were effectually called by the grace of God, and so proves that they were chosen to be made partakers of this grace, and of that salvation, that is the consequence thereof.

There is another scripture, in which it is very plain that the apostle speaks of election to eternal life inasmuch as there are several privileges connected with it, which the Christian church, as such, cannot lay claim to: thus, in Rom. viii. 33. Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God’s elect? It is God that justifieth. Now if justification or freedom from condemnation, accompanied with their being effectually called here, which shall end in their being glorified hereafter, be the result of their election, as. in ver. 30. then certainly this includes in it more than the external privileges of the covenant of grace, which all who adhere to the Christian faith are possessed of, and consequently it is an election to salvation that the apostle here intends.

Object. It is objected, that it is more than probable, when we find, as we sometimes do, whole churches styled elect in the New testament, that some among them were hypocrites; particularly those to whom the apostle Peter writes, who were converted from Judaism to Christianity, whom he calls elect, according to the fore-knowledge of God the Father: notwithstanding they had some in communion with them, concerning whom it might be said, that they had only a name to live, but yet were dead; and he advises them, to lay aside all malice, guile, and hypocrisy, envies, and evil speaking, and, as new born babes, to receive the word, if so be they had tasted that the Lord is gracious, 1 Pet. ii. 1. which makes it more than probable, that there were some among them who had not, in reality, experienced the grace of God; so when he says, that there should be false teachers among them, whose practice should be as vile as their doctrine, and that many amongst them should follow their pernicious ways. 2 Pet. ii. 1, 2. it seems to argue that the whole church he writes to, were not chosen to salvation; therefore their election only signifies their being chosen to enjoy the privileges, which they had, as a professing society of Christians.

Answ. It is certain that there was a very considerable number among them who were not only Christians in name; but they were very eminent for the exercise of those graces, which evinced their election to eternal life; and particularly he says concerning them, Whom having not seen, ye love; and in whom believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable, and full of glory; receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls, 1 Pet. i. 8, 9. which agrees very well with the other character given them of their being elect, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ, ver. 2. Therefore the only thing that seems to affect our argument is, that this character did not belong to every individual. But supposing this should be allowed, might not the church be here described as chosen to salvation, inasmuch as the far greater number of them were so? Nothing is more common, in scripture, than for a whole body of men to be denominated from the greatest part of them, whether their character be good or bad; thus when the greatest part of the Jewish church were revolted from God, and guilty of the most notorious crimes, they are described as though their apostacy had been universal, They are all grievous revolters, walking with slanders, Jer. vi. 28. whereas it is certain, there were some who had not apostatized: some of them were slandered and reproached for the sake of God, and therefore were not included in the number of them that walked with slanders, though their number were very small; as God says by the prophet Ezekiel, I sought for a man among them that should make up the hedge, and stand in the gap before me for the land that I should not destroy it, but I found none, Ezek. xxii. 30. whereas at that time, in which the people were most degenerate, there were found some who sighed and cryed for all the abomination that were done in the midst of them, chap. ix. 4. So on the other hand, when the greater number of them kept their integrity, and walked before God in holiness of life, the whole church is thus characterized, I remember the kindness of thy youth, the love of thine espousals, when thou wentest after me in the wilderness; Israel was holiness to the Lord, Jer. ii. 2, 3. whereas it is certain, that, at that time, there were a great many who rebelled, murmured, and revolted from God, and were plagued for their iniquities; yet because the greater number of them were upright and sincere, this character is given in general terms, as if there had been no exception. And the prophet looked back to some age of the church, in which a great number of them were faithful; and therefore he speaks of the people in general, at that time, as such, and accordingly calls them, The faithful city, Isa. i. 21. and the prophet Jeremiah calls them, The precious sons of Zion, comparable to fine gold, Lam. iv. 2. yet there never was a time when there were none among them that rebelled against God. Therefore may not this be supposed concerning the first gospel churches that were planted by the apostles; and accordingly, when they are styled elect, to whom the apostle Peter writes, 1 Pet. v. 13. as well as the church at Babylon, why may not this be supposed to signify, that the greatest part of them were really sanctified, and therefore chosen to sanctification? And consequently their character, as elect, does not barely signify their being chosen to be made partakers of the external privileges of the gospel. We might also consider, that it is very agreeable to our common mode of speaking, to denominate a city, or a kingdom, from the greater number thereof, whether we call them a rich, or a wise or a valiant people, we never suppose there are no exceptions to this character; therefore why may we not, in this instance, conclude, that the apostle Peter, when he describes this church as elected, intends their election to salvation? Thus we have endeavoured to prove that election, in scripture, is not always taken, in the Old Testament, for the external privileges which the Jewish nation had, as a church; nor in the New Testament for those who belonged to the churches, namely, such as professed the Christian faith. And probably that learned author, before mentioned, was apprehensive that this observation of his would not hold universally true; and therefore he has another provisionary objection against the doctrine of particular election of persons to eternal life, and says, as Arminius and his contemporaries before did, that all those scriptures, which speak of this doctrine, contain nothing more than God’s conditional purpose, that if a person believes, he shall be saved. It is necessary for us to consider what may be said in answer hereunto; but inasmuch as we shall have occasion to speak to this when we consider the properties of election, under a following head, we shall rather chuse to reserve to that place, than be obliged to repeat what might be here said concerning it.

Thus having premised something concerning election in general, and the sense in which it is to be understood, in scripture, we shall briefly mention a matter in dispute, among divines relating to the objects thereof, as they are considered in God’s eternal purpose: and here we shall take notice of some different opinions relating thereunto, without making use of those scholastic modes of speaking, which render this subject much more difficult, than otherwise it would be: and shall take occasion to avoid, and fence against those extremes, which have only had a tendency to prejudice persons against the doctrine in general.

The object of election is variously considered by divines, who treat of this subject.

1. There are some who, though they agree in the most material things in their defence of this doctrine yet they are divided in their sentiments about some nice metaphysical speculations, relating to the manner how man is to be considered, as the object of predestination: accordingly some, who are generally styled Supralapsarians, seem to proceed in this way of explaining it, namely that God from all eternity, designed to glorify his divine perfections, in some objects out of himself, which he could not then be said to have done, inasmuch as they did not exist; and the perfections, which he designed to glorify, were, more especially, his sovereignty and absolute dominion, as having a right to do what he will with the work of his hands; and also his goodness, whereby he would render himself the object of their delight; and, as a means conducive to this end, he designed to create man an intelligent creature, in whom he might be glorified; and since a creature, as such, could not be the object of the display of his mercy, or justice, he farther designed to permit man to fall into a state of sin and misery, that so, when fallen, he might recover some out of that state, and leave others to perish in it: the former of which are said to be loved, the other hated; and when some extend the absoluteness of God’s purpose, not only to election but reprobation, and do not take care to guard their modes of speaking, as they ought to do, but conclude reprobation, at least predamnation, to be, not an act of justice, but rather of sovereignty; they lay themselves open to exception, and give occasion to those, who oppose this doctrine, to conclude, that they represent God as delighting in the misery of his creatures, and with that view giving being to them. It is true, several, who have given into this way of thinking, have endeavoured to extricate themselves out of this difficulty, and denied this and other consequences of the like nature, which many have thought to be necessary deductions from this scheme; whether they have done this effectually, or no, may be judged of by those who are conversant in their writings[189]. I cannot but profess myself to set a very high value on them in other respects, yet I am not bound to give into some nice speculations, contained in their method of treating this subject, which renders it exceptionable; particularly, I cannot approve of any thing advanced by them, which seems to represent God as purposing to create man, and then to suffer him to fall, as a means by which he designed to demonstrate the glory of his vindictive justice, which hath given occasion to many to entertain rooted prejudices against the doctrine of predestination, as though it necessarily involved in it this supposition, that God made man to damn him.

There are others, who are generally styled Sublapsarians[190], who suppose, that God considered men as made and fallen, and then designed to glorify his grace in the recovery of those who were chosen, by him, to eternal life; and his justice in them, whom he designed to condemn, as a punishment for their sins, which he foreknew that they would commit, and purposed not to hinder; and he designed to glorify his sovereignty, in that one should be an object of grace, rather than another, whereas he might have left the whole world in that state of misery, into which he foresaw they would plunge themselves.

That which is principally objected, by those who are in the other way of thinking, against this scheme, is, that the Sublapsarians suppose that God’s creating men, and permitting them to fall, was not the object of his eternal purpose. But this they universally deny, and distinguish between God’s purpose to create and suffer men to fall; and his purposes being considered as a means to advance his sovereignty, grace, and justice, in which the principal difference between them consists. We shall enter no farther into this controversy, but shall only add, that whatever may be considered, in God’s eternal purpose, as a means to bring about other ends; yet it seems evident, from the nature of the thing, that God cannot be said to choose men to salvation, without herein considering them as fallen; for as no one is a subject capable of salvation, but one who is fallen into a state of sin and misery; so when God purposed to save such, they could not be considered as to be created, or created and not fallen, but as sinners.

2. There are others who deny particular election of persons to eternal life, and explain those scriptures, which speak of it, in a very different way: these suppose, that God designed, from all eternity, to create man, and foreknew that he would fall, and, that, pursuant to this eternal foreknowledge, he designed to give him sufficient means for his recovery, which, by the use of his free will, he might improve, or not, to the best purposes; and also, fore-knowing who would improve, and who would reject, the means of grace, which he purposed to bestow, he determined, as the consequence thereof, to save some, and condemn others. This method of explaining God’s eternal purpose is exceptionable, as will farther appear, in the method we shall take, in prosecuting this subject, in two respects.

(1.) As they suppose that the salvation of men depends on their own conduct, or the right use of their free will, without giving the glory which is due to God, for that powerful, efficacious grace, which enables them to improve the means of grace, and brings them into a state of salvation,

(2.) As the result of the former, they suppose that nothing absolute is contained in the decree of God, but his fore-knowledge, which is rather an act of his understanding, than his will; and therefore it seems to militate against his sovereignty and grace, and, to make his decrees depend on some conditions, founded in the free-will of man, which, according to them, are not the object of a peremptory decree. Thus having considered intelligent creatures, and more particularly men, as the objects of predestination.

IV. We proceed to the farther proof and explication of this doctrine; and, in order thereto, shall insist on the following propositions.

1. That it is only a part of mankind that were chosen to salvation.

2. That they who were chosen to it, as the end, were also chosen to sanctification, as the means thereof, And,

3. That they were chosen in Christ; which propositions are contained in that part of this answer, in which it is said, that God has chosen some men to eternal life, and the means thereof.

1. That some were chosen to salvation; not the whole race of mankind, but only those that shall be eventually saved: that the whole world is not the object of election appears from the known acceptation of the word, both in scripture, and in our common modes of speaking; since to choose, as has been before observed, is to take, prefer, or esteem, one thing before another, or to separate a part from the whole, for our own proper use, and what remains is treated with neglect and disregard: accordingly it is not a proper way of speaking, to say that the whole is chosen; and therefore it follows, that if all mankind had been fore-ordained to eternal life, which God might have done if he had pleased, this would not have been called a purpose, according to election.

But there are other arguments more conclusive, than what results barely from the known sense of the word, which we shall proceed to consider, and therein make use of the same method of reasoning, which we observed, in proving that God fore-ordained whatever comes to pass, with a particular application thereof to the eternal state of believers. As we before observed, that the decree of God is to be judged of by the execution of it, in time; so it will appear, that those whom God in his actual providence and grace, prepares for, and brings to glory, he also before designed for it. Were I only to treat of those particular points in controversy, between us and the Pelagians, I would first consider the method which God takes in saving his people, and prove that salvation is of grace, or that it is the effect of the power of God, and not to be ascribed to the free-will of man, as separate from the divine influence; and then I would proceed to speak concerning the decree of God relating hereunto, which might then, without much difficulty, be proved: but being obliged to pursue the same method in which things are laid down, in their respective connexion, we must sometimes defer the more particular proof of some doctrines, on which our arguments depend, to a following head, to avoid the repetition of things; therefore, inasmuch as the execution of God’s decree, and his power and grace manifested therein, will be insisted on in some following answers, we shall, at present, take this for granted, or shall speak but very briefly to it.

(1.) It appears that it is only a part of mankind that are chosen to be made partakers of grace and glory, inasmuch as these invaluable privileges are conferred upon, or applied to no more than a part of mankind: if all shall not be saved, then all were not chosen to salvation; for we are not to suppose that God’s purpose, relating hereunto, can be frustrated, or not take effect; or if there be a manifest display of discriminating grace in the execution of God’s decree relating thereunto, there is, doubtless, a discrimination in his purpose, and that is what we call election. This farther appears from some scriptures, which represent those who are saved as a remnant: thus when the apostle is speaking of God’s casting away the greatest part of the Jewish nation, he says of some of them notwithstanding, that at this present time also there is a remnant according to the election of grace, Rom. xi. 5. that is, there are some among them who are brought to embrace the faith of the gospel, and to be made partakers of the privileges that accompany salvation: these are called a remnant; as when it is said, in Rom. ix. 27. Though the number of the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, it is no more than a remnant of them that shall be saved. He doubtless speaks in this and other scriptures, concerning the eternal salvation of those who are described as a remnant, according to the election of grace.

Here it will be necessary for us to consider, that this remnant signifies only a small part of the Jewish church, selected, by divine grace, out of that nation, of whom the greater number were rejected by God; and that the salvation, here spoken of, is to be taken not for any temporal deliverance, but for that salvation which the believing Jews should be made partakers of in the gospel day, when the rejection of the others had its full accomplishment. That this may appear, we shall not only compare this scripture with the context, but with that in Hosea, from whence it is taken: as to what respects the context, the apostle, in ver. 2. expresses his great heaviness, and continual sorrow of heart, for the rejection of that nation in general, which they had brought upon themselves; but yet he encourages himself, in ver. 6. with this thought, that the word of God, that is, the promise made to Abraham relating to his spiritual seed, who were given to expect greater blessings, than those which were contained in the external dispensation of the covenant of grace, should not take none effect, since, though the whole nation of the Jews, who were of Israel, that is, Abraham’s natural seed, did not attain those privileges; yet a part of them, who are here called Israel, and elsewhere a remnant, chosen out of that nation, should be made partakers thereof; the former are called The children of the flesh, in ver. 8. the latter, by way of eminence, The children of the promise; these are styled, in ver. 23, 24. The vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory, to whom he designed to make known the riches of his glory, namely, those whom he had called; not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles, which he intends by that remnant, which were chosen out of each of them, for so the word properly signifies.[191] And this sense is farther confirmed, by the quotation out of the prophecy of Hosea, chap. i. 10. compared with another taken out of the prophecy of Isaiah, chap. x. 22. both which speak only of a remnant that shall be saved, when the righteous judgments of God were poured forth, on that nation in general; and the prophet Hosea adds another promise relating to them, which the apostle takes notice of, namely, that in the place where it was said unto them, Ye are not my people, there it shall be said unto them, Ye are the sons of the living God, which plainly respects this remnant; for he had before prophesied concerning the nation in general, Ye are not, that is, ye shall not be my people, and I will not be your God; so that here is a great salvation foretold, which, they, among the Jews, should be made partakers of, who were fore-ordained to eternal life, when the rest were rejected.

Object. The prophet seems to speak, in this scripture, of a temporal salvation, inasmuch as it is said, in the words immediately following, Then shall the children of Judah, and the children of Israel, be gathered together, and shall appoint themselves one head, and they shall come up out of the land, viz. of Babylon, for great shall be the day of Jezreel. Therefore this remnant, here spoken of, which should be called the sons of the living God, respects only such as should return out of captivity, and consequently not the election of a part, to wit, the believing Jews, to eternal life: for it is plain, that, when this prediction was fulfilled, they were to appoint themselves one head, or governor, namely, Zerubbabel, or some other, that should be at the head of affairs, and help forward their flourishing state, in, or after their return from captivity.

Answ. It seems very evident, that part of this prophecy, viz. chap. iii. 5. respects the happiness of Israel, at that time, when they should seek the Lord their God, and David their King, and should fear the Lord and his goodness, in the latter days; therefore why may not this verse also, in chap. i. in which it is said, that they shall be called the sons of the living God, have its accomplishment in the gospel-day, when they should adhere to Christ, who is called, David their King? The only difficulty which affects this sense of the text is, its being said, that they shall return to their own land, under the conduct of a Head, or governor, whom they should appoint over them, which seems to favour the sense contained in the objection: but the sense of the words would be more plain, if we render the text, instead of [THEN] And the children of Judah, &c. as it is rendered in most translations, and is most agreeable to the sense of the Hebrew word.[192] According to our translation, it seems to intimate, that the prophet is speaking of something mentioned in the foregoing verse; and inasmuch as the latter respects their return from the captivity, therefore the former must do so; whereas if we put and, instead of then, the meaning of both verses together is this: there are two blessings which God promised, namely, that a part of the Jewish nation should be made partakers of the saving blessings of the covenant of grace, which was to have its accomplishment when they were brought to believe in Christ, by the gospel, or when this remnant, taken out from them, should be saved; and there is also another blessing promised to the whole nation, which should be conferred upon them, when they returned from the Babylonish captivity.

If it be objected, to this sense of the text, that their return from captivity is mentioned after that promise, of their being called the sons of the living God, therefore it cannot be supposed to relate to a providence that should happen before it; I need only reply to this, that it is very usual, in scripture, for the Holy Ghost, when speaking concerning the privileges which the church should be made partakers of, not to lay them down in the same order in which they were to be accomplished; and therefore, why may we not suppose, that this rule may be applied to this text? And accordingly the sense is this: the prophet had been speaking, in the tenth verse, of that great salvation, which this remnant of the Jews, converted to Christianity, should be made partakers of in the gospel-day; and then he obviates an objection, as though it should be said, How can this be, since the Jews are to be carried into captivity, and there broken, scattered, and, as it were ruined? In answer to this, the prophet adds, that the Jews should not be destroyed in the captivity, but should be delivered, and return to their own land, and so should remain a people, till this remnant was gathered out of them, who were to be made partakers of these spiritual privileges under the gospel-dispensation, as mentioned in the foregoing words.

Thus having endeavoured to prove, that this remnant, spoken of in Rom. xi. are such as should be made partakers of eternal salvation, we may now apply this to our present argument. If that salvation, which this remnant was to be made partakers of, be the effect of divine power, as the apostle says, in Rom. ix. 16. It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God, that sheweth mercy; and if it be the gift of divine grace, as he says elsewhere, in Eph. ii. 8. By grace are ye saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God; then it follows from hence, that God designed, before-hand, to give them these blessings; and if he designed them only for this remnant, then it is not all, but a part of mankind, to wit, those that shall be eventually saved, that were chosen to salvation.

(2.) The doctrine of election may be farther proved, from God’s having foreknown whom he will sanctify and save. It will be allowed, that God knows all things, and consequently that he knows all things that are future, and so not only those whom he has saved, but whom he will save. We need not prove that God fore-knew all things, for that is not denied by those who are on the other side of the question, or, at least, by very few of them; and, indeed, if this were not an undoubted truth, we could not depend on those predictions, which respect things that shall come to pass; and these not only such as are the effects of necessary causes, or things produced according to the common course, or laws of nature, but those which are contingent, or the result of the free-will of man, which have been foretold, and consequently were fore-known by God; and if it be allowed that he fore-knew whatever men would be, and do, let me farther add, that this foreknowledge is not barely an act of the divine mind, taking a fore-view of, or observing what others will be, or do, without determining that his actual providence should interest itself therein; therefore it follows, that if he fore-knew the salvation of those who shall be eventually saved, he fore-knew what he would do for them, as a means conducive thereunto; and if so, then he determined, before-hand, that he would bring them to glory; but this respects only a part of mankind, who were chosen by him to eternal life.

In this sense we are to understand those scriptures that set forth God’s eternal purpose to save his people, as an act of fore-knowledge: thus, in Rom. xi. 2. God hath not cast away his people, whom he fore-knew, that is, he hath not cast them all away, but has reserved to himself a remnant, according to the election of grace. That he either had, or soon designed, to cast away the greatest number of the Jewish nation, seems very plain, from several passages in this chapter: thus, in verses 17, 19. he speaks of some of the branches being broken off, and ver. 22. of God’s severity, by which we are to understand his vindictive justice in this dispensation: But yet we are not to suppose, says the apostle, that God has cast them all away, as in ver. 1. and so he mentions himself, as an instance of the contrary, as though he should say, I am called, and sanctified, and chosen, though I am an Israelite.

Moreover, God’s not casting away his remnant of the Israelites, being the result of his fore-knowledge, does not barely respect his knowing what they should be, or do, whom he had chosen to eternal life, for it is represented as a discriminating act of favour; whereas, in other respects, they, who are rejected by him, are as much the objects of his knowledge, as any others, since the omniscience of God is not the result of his will; but it is a perfection founded in his nature, and therefore not arbitrary, but necessary.

Again, the apostle, in 1 Pet. i. 2. speaks of some who were elected, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, unto obedience, &c. that is, not chosen, because of any obedience performed by them, which God foreknew; for this is considered, as the result of his fore-knowledge, not the cause of it; and this word is yet farther explained in another place, where it is used, when the apostle says, in 2 Tim. ii. 19. The Lord knoweth them that are his. He had before been speaking of the faith of some, who professed the gospel, being overthrown; nevertheless, says he, that foundation of hope, which God has laid in the gospel, is not hereby shaken, but stands sure; the faithful shall not be overthrown, for the Lord knoweth them that are his, that is, he knows who are the objects of his love, who shall be kept by his power, through faith, unto salvation; so that God’s fore-knowledge, considered as a distinguishing privilege, is not to be understood barely of his knowing how men will behave themselves, and so, taking his measures from thence, as though he first knew what they would do, and then resolved to bestow his grace; but he knows whom he has set apart for himself, or designed to save, and, with respect to them, his providence will influence their conduct, and prevent their apostasy.

God’s knowledge, in scripture, is sometimes taken for his approving, or loving, those who are the objects thereof: thus he says unto Moses, in Exod. xxxiii. 17. Thou hast found grace in my sight, and I know thee by name, where one expression explains the other, and so it imports a knowledge of approbation; and, on the other hand, when our Saviour says to some, in Matt. vii. 23. I will profess unto you, I never knew you, it is not to be supposed that he did not know they would behave themselves, or what they would do against his name and interest in the world; but I never knew you, that is, I never approved of you, and accordingly, it follows, Depart from me, ye that work iniquity; and when it is said concerning knowledge, as applied to man, in John xvii. 3. This is life eternal, that they may know thee, the only true God; no one supposes that a speculative knowledge of divine truths will give any one ground to conclude his right to eternal life; therefore to know God, is to love, to delight in him: and the same is applied, by the apostle, to God’s loving man, when he says, in 1 Cor. viii. 3. If any man love God, the same is known of him, that is, beloved by him. Now if God’s knowing his people signifies his loving them, then his fore-knowing them must signify his determining to do them good, and to bestow grace and glory upon them, which is the same as to choose them to eternal life: he fore-knew what he designed to confer upon them; for he prepared a kingdom for them, from the foundation of the world, Matt. xxv. 34. which is the same with his having, from the beginning, chosen them to salvation.

Object. As all actions, performed by intelligent creatures, as such, suppose knowledge, so their determinations are the result of fore-knowledge, for the will follows the dictates of the understanding; therefore we must suppose God’s fore-knowledge, to be antecedent to, and the ground and reason of his determinations. This the apostle seems to intimate, when he says, in Rom. viii. 29. Whom he did fore-know, he did predestinate, that is, he had a perfect knowledge of their future conduct, and therefore determined to save them.

Answ. I do not deny that, according to the nature of things, we first consider God as knowing, and then as willing: but this does not hold good, with respect to his knowing all things future; for we are not to suppose that he first knows that a thing shall come to pass, and then wills that it shall. It is true, he first knows what he will do, and then does it; but, to speak of a knowledge in God, as conversant about the future state, or actions of his people, without considering them as connected with his power and providence, (which is the immediate cause thereof) I cannot think consistent with the divine perfections.

As for this scripture, Whom he did fore-know, them he did predestinate, we are not to suppose, that the meaning is, that God fore-knew that they, whom he speaks of, would be conformed to the image of his Son, and then as the result hereof, determined that they should; for their being conformed to Christ’s image, consists in their exercising those graces which are agreeable to the temper and disposition of his children, or brethren, as they are here called; and this conformity to his image is certainly the result of their being called: but their calling as well as justification and glorification, is the consequence of their being fore-known; therefore God’s fore-knowing here, must be taken in the same sense as it is in the scriptures, but now referred to; for his having loved them before the foundation of the world, or chosen them to enjoy those privileges which are here mentioned.

(3.) It farther appears, that there is a number chosen out of the world to eternal life, from the means which God has ordained for the gathering a people out of it, to be made partakers of the blessings which he has reserved for them in heaven. This is what we generally call the means of grace; and from hence it appears, that there is a chosen people, whose advantage is designed hereby. For the making out of this argument, let it be considered,

1st. That there always has been a number of persons, whom God, by his distinguishing providence, has separated from the world, who have enjoyed the ordinances, or means of grace, and to whom the promises of eternal life have been made. We do not say that these are all chosen to eternal life; but it appears, from the design of providence herein, that there have been some, among them who were ordained to eternal life. If God gives the means of grace to the church, it is an evident token that some are designed to have grace bestowed upon them, and consequently brought to glory.

2dly. They who have been favoured with these means of grace, have had some peculiar marks of the divine regard to them. Thus we read, in the early ages of the world, of the distinction between those, who had the special presence of God among them, and others, who were deprived of it; as Cain is said, to go out from the presence of the Lord, Gen. iv. 16. as one, who, together with his posterity, was deprived of the means of grace, and also of God’s covenant, in which he promised to be a God to some, from which privilege others were excluded: thus he was called the God of Shem, chap. ix. 16. and afterwards of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Exod. iii. 6. whose descendants were hereby given to expect the ordinances and means of grace, and many instances of that special grace, which a part of them should be made partakers of: and would he have made this provision, for a peculiar people, in so discriminating a way, if there had not been a remnant among them, according to the election of grace, to whom he designed to manifest himself here, and bring to glory hereafter? No, he would have neglected, or over-looked them as he did the world; whereas both they and their seed had the promises of the covenant of grace made to them which argues, that there was a remnant among them, whom God designed hereby to bring into a state of grace and salvation, and, in this respect, they are said to be the objects of divine love.

This leads us to consider the meaning of that text, which is generally insisted on, as a very plain proof of this doctrine, in Rom. ix. 11, 12, 13. The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election, might stand; not of works, but of him that calleth: It was said unto her, the elder shall serve the younger; as it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. Here is an express mention of the purpose of God, according to election, and Jacob is, pursuant thereunto, said to be the object of divine love. For the understanding of which, let us consider the sense that is given of it, by those on the other side of the question; and how far it may be allowed of, and what there is in the words to prove this doctrine, and wherein our sense of them differs from their’s.

It is supposed, by those who deny particular election, that Jacob and Esau are not here considered in a personal capacity, but that the apostle speaks of their respective descendants, as referring to two divine predictions; in one of which, Gen. xxv. 23. God told Rebekah, before her two sons were born, that two nations were in her womb; and the elder, that is, the posterity of Esau, should serve the younger, namely, that of Jacob; and in the other, Mai. i. 2, 3. he says, I loved Jacob, and hated Esau, and laid his mountains waste; so that if, in both these scriptures, referred to by the apostle, nothing else be intended but the difference that should be put between them as to the external dispensations of providence, or that Jacob’s family, in future ages should be in a more flourishing state than that of Esau, we must not suppose that he designed thereby to represent them as chosen to, or excluded from eternal life.

This seems a very plausible sense of the text; but yet the apostle’s words may very well be reconciled with those two scriptures, cited to enervate the force of the argument taken from it; and at the same time, it will not follow from thence, that there is no reference had to the doctrine of eternal election therein. Therefore,

1. We will not deny, when it is said, Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated, that their respective descendants were intended in this prediction, yet it will not follow from hence, that Jacob and Esau, personally considered, were not also included. Whoever reads their history, in the book of Genesis, will evidently find in one the marks and characters of a person chosen to eternal life; whereas, in the other, we have no account of any regard which he expressed to God or religion, therefore he appears to have been rejected; yet,

2. So far as it respects the posterity of Jacob and Esau we are not to suppose that God’s having loved the one, and rejected the other, implies nothing else, but that Jacob’s posterity had a better country allotted for them, or exceeded Esau’s in those secular advantages, or honours, which were conferred upon them. This seems to be the principal sense, which they, on the other side of the question, give of the apostle’s words; when comparing them with those of the prophet Malachi, who, speaking concerning Esau’s being hated, explains it, as relating to his lands being laid waste for the dragons of the wilderness. This had been foretold by some other prophets, Jer. xlix. 17, 18. Ezek. xxxv. 7, 9. Obed. ver. 10. and had its accomplishment soon after the Jews were carried captive into Babylon, from which time they ceased to be a nation; but, certainly, though this be that particular instance of hatred, which the prophet Malachi refers to, yet there is more contained in the word, as applied to them by the apostle Paul. It is true, the prophet designs, in particular to obviate an objection which the Jews are represented as making, against the divine dispensations towards them, as though they had not such an appearance of love, as he supposes them to have had, therefore they are brought in as speaking to this purpose: how canst thou say, that God has loved us, who have continued seventy years captives in Babylon, and since our return from thence, have been exposed to many adverse dispensations of providence? The prophet’s reply is to this effect: that, notwithstanding, they still remained a nation, and therefore were in this respect, more the objects of the divine regard, than the posterity of Esau were, which is represented as hated, for they never returned unto their former state; or what attempts soever they made to recover it, they were all to no purpose. This the prophet alleges, as a sufficient answer to the Jews’ objection, in the same sense in which they understood the words, love or hatred; but, doubtless more than this was contained in the prediction before Jacob and Esau were born, and in the apostle’s application of it, in the text before-mentioned. If nothing were intended but outward prosperity, or their vying with each other in worldly grandeur, Esau’s posterity, in this respect, might be concluded to have been preferable to Jacob’s; thus when they are reckoned, by their genealogies, Gen. xxxvi. they are many of them described as dukes and kings who made a considerable figure in the world. When Jacob’s posterity were few in number, and bondmen in the land of Egypt, and when the Israelites were carried captive into Babylon, the Edomites are represented by the prophet, as looking on, and rejoicing in their destruction, as being, at that time, in all appearance, secure, and enjoying their former liberty.

Neither could this love or hatred signify nothing else but the descendants of Jacob being planted in a more fruitful soil; for there is little difference put between them, in this respect, in the patriarchal benediction pronounced by their father, who tells Jacob, that God would give him the dew of heaven, and the fatness of the earth, and plenty of corn and wine; and to Esau he says, Thy dwelling shall be the fatness of the earth, and the dew of heaven from above, chap. xxvii. 28, compared with 39. therefore, when one is described, in the prediction, as loved, and the other as hated, we are not to suppose, that outward prosperity on the one hand, or adversity on the other, are, principally intended thereby, for that might be said of both of them by turns; therefore let me add,

3. That God’s loving or hating, as applied to the posterity of Jacob or Esau, principally respects his determining to give or deny the external blessings of the covenant of grace, or the means of grace, and therewith many special tokens of his favour. In Jacob’s line the church was established, out of which, as has been before observed, there was a remnant chosen, and brought to eternal life; how far this may be said of Esau’s, is hard to determine.

Object. 1. But to this it will be objected, that Job and his friends were of Esau’s posterity, as is more than probable; but these were far from being rejected of God.

Answ. To this it may be replied, that a few single instances are not sufficient to overthrow the sense we have given of this divine oracle, since the rejection of Esau’s posterity may take its denomination from the far greater number thereof, without including in it every individual, as it is very agreeable to the sense of many scriptures. Moreover, we may consider, that these lived, as we have sufficient ground to conclude, before the seed of Jacob were increased, and advanced to be a distinct nation, as they were after their deliverance from the Egyptian bondage; as also before that idolatry, which first overspread the land of Chaldea, in Abraham’s time, had universally extended itself over the country of Idumea, where Esau’s family was situate; so that it doth not follow from hence, because this prediction did not take place in a very considerable degree, in the first descendants from him, that therefore it does not respect their rejection, as to what concerns the spiritual privileges of that people afterwards. And, indeed, idolatry seems to have had some footing in the country where Job lived, even in his time, which gave him occasion to exculpate himself from the charge thereof, when he signifies, that he had not beheld the sun when it shineth, or the moon walking in brightness, and his heart had not been secretly enticed, or his mouth kissed his hand, Job xxxi. 26, 27. alluding to some modes of worship, practised by idolaters in his day, who gave divine honour to the sun and moon; and, soon after his time, before Israel had taken possession of Canaan, there seems to have been an universal defection of the Edomites from the true religion, otherwise, doubtless, Moses might, without any difficulty, have got leave to have passed through their country, in his way to the land of Canaan, which he requested in a most friendly and obliging manner, but to no purpose, Numb. xx. 14-21. especially considering they had no reason to fear that they would do any thing against them in a hostile manner; therefore the unfriendly treatment they met with from them, proceeded from the same spring with that of the Amalekites, and other bordering nations, namely, they had all revolted from the God and religion of their father Abraham; so that this prediction seems to have been fulfilled, before the promise, respecting Jacob’s posterity, in any considerable degree, began to take place.

Having briefly considered this objection, we return to the argument, namely, that God’s loving or hating, in this scripture, as it has a relation to the distinct nations that descended from Jacob and Esau, includes in it his determining to give or deny the external privileges of the covenant of grace, which we generally call the ordinances, or means of grace. These were the spiritual and more distinguishing instances of divine favour, which Jacob was given to expect, when he obtained the blessing. As for the double portion, or the greatest part of the paternal estate, that descended with it, together with the honour of having dominion over their brethren, or a right (as it is probable they had) to act as civil magistrates in their respective families, these were all small things, if compared with those spiritual privileges, wherein God’s love to Jacob, and his posterity, was principally expressed; it was this which is so often signified by God’s being the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: In other respects, Esau was blessed as well as Jacob; for the apostle, speaking concerning that part of Isaac’s prediction, which respected the temporal advantage of their posterity, says, that he blessed Jacob and Esau, concerning things to come, Heb. xi. 20. yet Esau was rejected, as to what concerns the spiritual part of the blessing, which was his birth-right, that he is said to have despised, Gen. xxv. 34. and, for this reason, he is styled, by the apostle, a profane person, Heb. xii. 16. If it had been only a temporal privilege that he contemned, it might have been a sin; but it could not then have been properly said to have been an instance of profaneness, for that has respect only to things sacred; therefore it evidently appears, that the blessings which Esau despised, and God had before designed to confer on Jacob, and his seed, as a peculiar instance of his love, were of a spiritual nature.

Object. 2. It will be farther objected, that men’s enjoying the external privileges of the covenant of grace, has no immediate reference to their salvation, or election to it.

Answ. Since salvation is not to be attained, but by and under these means of grace, we must conclude, that whenever God bestows and continues them, to a church or nation, he has a farther view therein, namely, the calling some, by his grace, to partake of those privileges that accompany salvation. If there were no such blessings to be conferred on the world, there would be no means of grace, and consequently no external dispensation of the covenant of grace; for it is absurd to suppose that any thing can be called a means, where all are excluded from the end which they refer to; therefore the sum of this argument is, that God had a peculiar love to the posterity of Jacob, and accordingly he designed to give them those privileges which were denied to others, namely, the means of grace, which he would not have done, had he not intended to make them effectual to the salvation of some of them; and this purpose, relating hereunto, is what is called election, which, though it be not applicable to all the seed of Jacob; for all, as the apostle says elsewhere, are not Israel who are of Israel; yet, inasmuch as there was a remnant of them, to whom it was applied, they are that happy seed, who are represented, by the apostle, as the objects of God’s compassion, or vessels unto honour, in whom he designed to make known the riches of his glory, having, in this respect, afore prepared them unto glory, Rom. ix. 15, 21, 23.

Thus having considered that God has chosen a part of mankind to salvation, we may, without being charged with a vain curiosity, enquire whether this privilege belongs to the greater or smaller part of mankind, since the scripture goes before us in this matter. If we judge of the purpose of God by the execution thereof, it must be observed, that hitherto the number of those, who have been made partakers of the special privileges of the gospel, has been comparatively small. If we look back to those ages before our Saviour’s incarnation, what a very inconsiderable proportion did Israel bear to the rest of the world, who were left in darkness and ignorance! And, after this, our Saviour observes, that many were called, in his time, but few were chosen, Matt. xx. 16. and he advises to enter in at the strait gate, chap. vii. 13, 14. by which he means the way to eternal life, concerning which he says, that there are, comparatively, few that find it. And when the gospel had a greater spread, and wonderful success attended the preaching thereof, by the apostles, and many nations embraced the Christian faith, in the most flourishing ages of the church, the number of Christians, and much more of those who were converted, and effectually called, was comparatively small. Whether the number of true believers shall be greater, when there is a greater spread of the gospel, and a more plentiful effusion of the Spirit, to render it more successful, as we hope and pray for that time, and that not altogether without scripture-warrant; I say, whether then the fewness of those who have hitherto been chosen and sanctified, shall not be compensated, by a far greater number, who shall live in that happy age of the church, it is not for us to be over-curious in our enquiries about: However, we may determine this from scripture, that, in the great day, when all the elect shall be gathered together, their number shall be exceeding great, if what the apostle says refers to this matter, as some suppose it does, when he speaks of a great multitude, which no man could number, of all nations, and kindreds, and people and tongues, who stood before the throne, and before the Lamb, clothed with white robes, and palms in their hands, Rev. vii. 9. But these things are no farther to be searched into, than as we may take occasion, from thence, to enquire whether we are of that number; and, if we are, we ought to bless God for his discriminating grace, which he has magnified therein. And this leads us to consider,

2. That they who are chosen to salvation, are also chosen to sanctification, as the means thereof: As the end and means are not to be separated in the execution of God’s decree, so they are not to be separated in our conception of the decree itself; for, since God brings none to glory, but in a way of holiness, the same he determined to do from all eternity, that is, to make his people holy, as well as happy; or first to give them faith and repentance, and then, the end of their faith, the salvation of their souls.

There are many scriptures, in which the purpose of God, relating hereunto, is plainly intended; as when it is said, He hath chosen us that we should be holy, and without blame, before him in love, Eph. i. 4. and elsewhere the apostle tells others, that God had, from the beginning, chosen them unto salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth, 2 Thes. ii. 13. and the apostle James saith, that God hath chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom, James ii. 5. and elsewhere the apostle Paul speaks of persons being predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son, which he explains of their being called, justified, and glorified, Rom. viii. 29. and it is also said, speaking of those who were converted under the apostle Paul’s ministry, as many as were ordained unto eternal life believed, Acts xiii. 48. accordingly they were ordained to one as well as the other.

The argument, which seems very plainly contained in these, and such-like scriptures, is, that God’s eternal purpose respects the grace that his people are made partakers of here, as well as the glory that they expect hereafter, which are inseparably connected; this cannot reasonably be denied by those who are not willing to give into the doctrine of election: But if the inseparable connexion between faith and salvation be allowed, as having respect to the execution of God’s purpose, it will be no difficult matter to prove that this was determined by him, or that his purpose respects faith, as well as salvation. Therefore the main thing in controversy between us is, whether this grace, that accompanies salvation, is wrought by the power of God, or whether it depends on the free-will of man. That which induces them to deny that God has chosen persons to faith, is this supposition; that that which is the result of man’s free-will, cannot be the object of God’s unchangeable purpose, and consequently that God has not chosen men to it. This is the hinge on which the whole controversy turns, and if the doctrine of special efficacious grace be maintained, all the prejudices against that of election would soon be removed; but this we must refer to its proper place, being obliged to insist on that subject in some following answers;[193] and, what may be farther considered, concerning the absoluteness of election, as one of the properties that belong to it, under a following head, will add some strength to our present argument. All that we shall do, at present, shall be to defend our sense of the scriptures, but now referred to, to prove that election respects sanctification, as well as salvation; and that it does so, is plain from the first of them, in Eph. i. 4. which proves that holiness is the end of election, or the thing that persons are chosen to, as appears from the grammatical construction of the words: It is not said he had chosen us, considered as holy, and without blame, but that we should be holy;[194] that which is plainly intended, as the result of election, cannot be the cause and reason of it.

As to what the apostle says, in 2 Thess. ii. 13. God hath, from the beginning, chosen you unto salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth, that plainly intimates, that sanctification is the end of election; and therefore the principal answer that some give to it, which appears to be an evasion, is, that the apostle does not speak of eternal election, because God is said to have done this from the beginning, that is, as one explains the words, from the beginning of the apostle’s preaching to them: But if we can prove that there is such a thing as a purpose to save, it will be no difficult matter to prove the eternity of the divine purpose; and this is not disagreeable to the sense, in which the words, From the beginning, are elsewhere used.[195]

As for that other scripture, in James ii. 5. where it is said, God hath chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom; here the words, That they may be,[196] (which are inserted by the apostle, in the scripture but now mentioned) may, without any strain on the sense thereof, be supplied, and so the meaning is, God hath chosen them, that they might be rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom: But if it will not be allowed, that these words ought to be supplied, the sense is the same, as though they were these, “God has chosen the poor of this world, who are described as rich in faith, to be heirs of the kingdom;” and so we distinguish between election’s being founded upon faith, and faith’s being a character by which the elect are described; and, if faith be a character by which they are described, then he who enabled them to believe, purposed to give them this grace, that is, he chose them to faith, as well as to be heirs of the kingdom.

As for that other text, in Rom. viii. 29. He hath predestinated us to be conformed to the image of his Son; these words, to be, are supplied by our translators, as I apprehend they ought, for the reason but now mentioned, taken from the parallel scripture, in Eph. i. 4. But, to evade the force of the argument, to prove that we are predestinated to grace, as well as to glory, they who deny this doctrine, give a very different turn to the sense of this text, as though the apostle only intended hereby, that the persons, whom he speaks of, were predestinated to an afflicted state in this life, a state of persecution, in which they are said to be conformed to the image of Christ;[197] But though it is true that believers are said to be made partakers of the sufferings of Christ, and, by consequence, are predestinated thereunto, yet that does not appear to be the sense of this text, as not well agreeing with the context; for the apostle had been describing those, whom he speaks of, as loving God, and called according to his purpose, and then considers them as predestinated, to be conformed to the image of his Son, which must be meant of their being made partakers of those graces, in which their conformity to Christ consists, as well as in sufferings; and then he considers them, in the following verse, as called, justified, and glorified; and all this is the result of their being predestinated.

As for that scripture, in Acts xiii. 48. As many as were ordained to eternal life believed; their faith is here considered as the result of their being ordained to eternal life, or they are represented as predestinated to the means, as well as the end.

Object. 1. But it will be objected by some, that this is not agreeable to the sense of the Greek word here used;[198] partly, because it is not said they were fore-ordained to eternal life, but ordained; and the genuine sense thereof is, that they were disposed to eternal life, and consequently to faith, as the means thereof. And this is also taken in a different sense; some suppose that it imports a being disposed, by the providence of God, or set in order, or prepared for eternal life; others, agreeably to the exposition which Socinus, and some of his followers, give of the text, (which sense a late learned writer falls in with[199]) understand the words, as signifying their having an internal disposition, or being well inclined, as having an earnest desire after eternal life, for which reason they believed; or were fitted and prepared for eternal life, by the temper of their minds, and accordingly they believed.

Answ. 1. If the word, which we render ordained, be justly translated, the thing which they were ordained to, being something that was future, it is, in effect, the same, as though it were said they were fore-ordained to it, as Beza observes.[200]

2. Suppose the word ought rather to be translated, they were disposed unto eternal life; that seems to contain in it a metaphor, taken from a general’s disposing, or ordering his soldiers to their respective posts, or employments, to which he appoints them, and so it is as though he should say, as many as God had, in his providence, or antecedent purpose, intended for salvation, believed, inasmuch as faith is the means and way to attain it; and that amounts to the same thing with our translation. But,

3. As to that other sense given of it, viz. their being internally disposed for eternal life, it seems very disagreeable to the import of the Greek word; and those texts, that are generally brought to justify this application thereof, appear to be very much strained and forced by them, to serve their purpose;[201] and, indeed, if the word would bear such a sense, the doctrine contained therein, namely, that there are some internal dispositions in men, antecedent to the grace of God, whereby they are fitted and prepared for it, does not well agree with the sense of those scriptures, which set forth man’s natural opposition to the grace of God, before he is regenerate and converted, and his enmity against him; and others that assert the absolute necessity of the previous work of the Spirit, to prepare for, as well as excite the acts of faith.

Object. 2. It is farther objected, that it cannot respect their being ordained, or chosen to eternal life, who believed, inasmuch as none that plead for that doctrine suppose that all, who are elected in one place, believe at the same time; had it been said, that all, who believed at that time, were ordained to eternal life, that would be agreeable to what is maintained by those who defend the doctrine of election; but to say, that all, who are elected to eternal life, in any particular city, are persuaded to believe at the same time, this is what they will not allow of: besides, it is not usual for God to discover this to, or by, the inspired writers, that, in any particular place, there are no more elected than those who are, at any one time, converted; and, indeed, it is contrary to the method of God’s providence, to bring in all his elect at one time, therefore we cannot suppose that this was revealed to the inspired writer, and consequently something else must be intended, and not eternal election, namely, that all those that were prepared for eternal life, or who were disposed to pursue after it, believed.[202]

Answ. When the apostle says, as many as were ordained to eternal life believed, we are not hereby led into this hidden mystery of the divine will, so as to be able to judge, whether more than they that then believed, were ordained to it in that place; but the meaning is, that there were many that believed, and that all of them were ordained to eternal life; and so it is as though he should say, that God has a people in this place, whom he has ordained to eternal life, who were to be converted, some at one time, others at another: some of them were converted at this time, to wit, a part of those who were ordained to eternal life, if more were ordained to it; so that the objection supposes that the words, which we render, as many as, imports the whole number of the elect in that place; whereas, we think that the meaning is, that there were many who believed, and these were only such who were ordained to eternal life, of which there might be many more, who then did not believe, but hereafter should; but this remained a secret, which the inspired writer was not led into, nor we by him.

Object. 3. There is another objection, which the learned author,[203] (whose paraphrase on the New Testament, and discourse on election, I am sometimes obliged to refer to in considering the objections that are made against this doctrine) proposes with a great deal of warmth; and if no reply can be given to it, it will be no wonder to find many prejudiced against it; his words are these: “If the reason why these men believed be only this, that they were men ordained to eternal life, the reason why the rest believed not, can be this only, that they were not ordained by God to eternal life: and, if so, what necessity could there be that the word of God should be first preached to them, as we read, ver. 46. was it only that their damnation might be the greater? This seems to charge that Lover of souls, whose tender mercies are over all his works, with the greatest cruelty, seeing it makes him determine, from all eternity, not only that so many souls as capable of salvation as any other, shall perish everlastingly; but also to determine, that the dispensations of his providence shall be such towards them, as necessarily tends to the aggravation, of their condemnation; and what could, even their most malicious and enraged enemy, do more? What is it the very devil aims at, by all his temptations, but this very end, viz. the aggravation of our future punishment? And therefore to assert that God had determined that his word should be spoken to these Jews, for this very end, is to make God as instrumental to their ruin, as the very devil, and seemeth wholly irreconcileable with his declarations, that he would have all men to be saved, and would not that any man should perish.”

Answ. According to this author, we must either quit the doctrine we are maintaining, provided it be the same as he represents it to be, or else must be charged by all mankind, with such horrid blasphemy, as is shocking to any one that reads it, as charging the Lover of souls with the greatest cruelty, and with acting in such a way, as their greatest enemy is said to do; determining, that the dispensations of his providence should tend to aggravate their condemnation, and that the gospel should be preached for this end, and no other. But let the blasphemy rest on his misrepresentation, and far be it from us to advance any such doctrine; therefore that which may be considered, in answer to it, is,

1. The immediate reason why men believe to eternal life, is, because God exerts the exceeding greatness of his power, whereby he works faith; and the reason of his exerting this power, is, because he determined to do it, as it is the execution of his purpose.

2. It does not follow, from hence, that the only reason why others do not believe, is, because they were not ordained to eternal life. It is true, indeed, that their not having been ordained to eternal life, or God’s not having purposed to save them, is the reason why he does not exert that power that is necessary to work faith: and unbelief will certainly be the consequence thereof, unless man could believe without the divine energy; yet the immediate spring and cause of unbelief, is the corruption and perverseness of human nature which is chargeable on none else but man himself. We must certainly distinguish between unbelief’s being the consequence of God’s not working faith, whereby corrupt nature takes occasion to exert itself, as being destitute of preventing grace; and its being the effect hereof. Is God’s denying the revengeful person, or the murderer, that grace, which would prevent his executing his bloody designs, the cause thereof? Or his denying to others the necessary supply of their present exigencies, the cause of their making use of unlawful means, by plundering others to subsist themselves? No more is his denying special grace, which he was not obliged to give to any, the cause of men’s unbelief and impenitency; for that is to be assigned only to that wicked propensity of nature, which inclines us to sin, and not to the divine efficiency; and how farsoever this may be the result of God’s determining to deny his grace, it is not to be reckoned the effect of that determination.

3. The design of the word’s being preached, is not to aggravate the damnation of those that shall not believe, according to this vile suggestion; but that men might be hereby led to know their duty and that the sovereignty of God, and the holiness of his law, which requires faith and repentance, as well as man’s obligation hereunto might be made known to the world. I do not deny, but that unbelief, and the condemnation consequent thereupon, is aggravated by the giving of the gospel, for that appears from many scriptures, Matt. xi. 21. Luke x. 13. as when our Saviour upbraids Chorazin, Bethsaida, Capernaum, and other places, amongst whom he was conversant, with their unbelief, and represents their condemnation as greater than, that of others, who were destitute of those privileges: But yet it is a malicious insinuation, to suppose we conclude that the gospel was given for this end; and we must still distinguish between the greater aggravation of condemnation’s being the result of giving the gospel, or the remote consequence thereof, and its being the effect of it in those that reject the gospel, and much less the design of God in giving it.

4. God’s denying that grace, which would have enabled men to believe, is not to be charged as an instance of cruelty, any more than his denying it to fallen angels, but it is rather a display of his justice. He was not obliged to give grace to any of the apostate race of man; shall therefore his denying the grace of faith be reckoned an instance of cruelty, when we consider the forfeiture that was before made thereof, and man’s propensity to sin, which is chargeable only on himself?

5. God’s purpose to deny the grace of faith to those whom he has not ordained to eternal life, is not inconsistent with that scripture, 1 Tim. ii. 4. in which it is said, that he will have all men to be saved; so that, as will be farther observed elsewhere,[204] it respects either God’s determining that salvation should be applied to all sorts of men, or else his declaring by his revealed will, that it is the duty of all men to believe, and to acknowledge the truth, as made known to them in the gospel.

6. They who are elected to salvation, are chosen in Christ: thus it is expressly said, in Eph. i. 4. He hath chosen us in him, before the foundations of the world. We are not to suppose that the apostle intends hereby, that we are chosen for the sake of Christ, as though any of his mediatorial acts were the ground and reason thereof; for election is an act of sovereign grace, or is resolved into the good pleasure of the will of God, and is not to be accounted a purchased blessing; therefore when we speak of the concern of the Mediator, with relation hereunto, this is to be considered as a means ordained by God, to bring his elect to salvation rather than the foundation of their election. This proposition necessarily follows from the former; for if they, who are chosen to the end, are chosen to the means, then Christ’s mediatorial acts being the highest and first means of salvation, God’s eternal purpose respects this, as subservient thereunto.

There are some very considerable divines,[205] who distinguish between our being chosen in Christ, as an Head, and being chosen in him as a Redeemer; and accordingly, they conclude, that there are two distinct relations, in which the elect are said to stand to Christ, both which are mentioned by the apostle, when he says, Christ is the Head of the church, and the Saviour of the body, Eph. v. 23. and they are also mentioned distinctly elsewhere, He is the Head of the body, the church, and then it follows, that he made peace through the blood of the cross, Col. i. 18, 19, 20. and they add, that the elect are considered as his members, without any regard had to their fallen state; and that the blessings contained therein, are such as render their condition more honourable and glorious, than otherwise it would have been, had they been only considered as creatures, without any relation to him as their Head; and this Headship of Christ they extend not only to men, but to the holy angels, whom they suppose to be chosen, in this respect, in Christ, as well as men, and that it is owing hereunto that they have the grace of confirmation conferred upon them; and it also follows, from hence, that Christ would have been the Head of the election of grace, though man had not fallen, and that our fallen state rendered that other relation of Christ to his elect necessary; so that as they are chosen to salvation, they are chosen in him as a Redeemer, designed to bring about his great work for them, and, for this end, set up, as it is expressed, from everlasting, Prov. viii. 23.

This distinction of Christ’s double relation to the elect, is, doubtless, designed by those who thus explain this doctrine to advance his glory; notwithstanding it remains still a matter of doubt to me, whether Christ’s Headship over his church be not a branch of his Mediatorial glory; and, if so, it will be very difficult to prove that a Mediator respects any other than man, and him more particularly considered as fallen; and accordingly, God did not design hereby to advance him to an higher condition, than what was barely the result of his being a creature, but to deliver him from that state of sin and misery, into which he foresaw that he would plunge himself. Therefore, in considering the order of God’s eternal purpose, relating to the salvation of his people, we must suppose that he first designed to glorify all his perfections in their redemption and salvation; and, in order hereunto, he fore-ordained, or appointed Christ to be their great Mediator, in whom he would be glorified, and by whom this work was to be brought about: He appointed him to be their Head, Surety, and Redeemer; first, to purchase salvation for them; and then, to make them meet for it, in the same order in which it is brought about by him in the execution thereof; so that, as the glory of God, in the salvation of the elect, was the end, Christ’s redemption was the means more immediately conducive thereunto, and, as such, he is said to be fore-ordained, to wit, to perform those offices that he executes as Mediator, 1 Pet. i. 20. and as Christ, when he was manifested in the flesh, did all things for his people, that were necessary to bring them to glory, he is, in God’s purpose, considered as the great Mediator, by whom he designed this work should be brought about: thus he is set forth in the gospel, as a propitiation for sin; and the apostle seems to speak of it, as what was the result of God’s purpose, in Rom. iii. 25. whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation; the Greek word[206] properly signifies, as it is observed in the marginal reference, fore-ordained so to be; and accordingly, we must consider him as from all eternity in God’s purpose, appointed to be the federal Head of those who are said to be chosen in him, and to have all the concerns of the divine glory, relating to their salvation, committed to his management.

V. We shall now consider the properties of election, and how the divine perfections are displayed therein, agreeably to what is said concerning it in scripture.

1. As it is taken for the purpose of God, relating to the sanctification or salvation of men, as distinguished from the execution thereof, it is eternal: This is evident, because God is eternal, his purposes must be concluded to be of equal duration with his existence; for we cannot suppose that an infinitely wise and sovereign Being existed from all eternity, without any fore-thought, or resolution what to do, for that would be to suppose him to have been undetermined, or unresolved, when he first gave being to all things; nor is it to be supposed that there are any new determinations in the divine will, for that would argue him to be imperfect, since this would be an instance of mutability in him, as much as it would be for him to alter his purpose; but neither of these are agreeable to the idea of an infinitely perfect Being.

Moreover, if God’s purpose, with respect to the salvation of men were not eternal, then it must be considered as a new after-thought arising in the divine mind, which, as to its first rise, is but, as it were, of yesterday, and consequently he would have something in him that is finite. If it be contrary to his omniscience to have new ideas of things, it is equally contrary to the sovereignty of his will to have new determinations, therefore all his purposes were eternal.

2. God’s purpose relating to election, is infinitely wise and holy. This appears from the footsteps of infinite wisdom, and holiness, which are visible in the execution thereof, namely, in bringing men to grace and glory; nothing is more conspicuous than the glory of these perfections in the work of redemption, and the application thereof; as hereby the salvation of man is brought about in such a way, that the glory of all the divine perfections is secured, and the means made use of, as conducive thereunto, the most proper that could have been used, therefore it is a work of infinite wisdom. And inasmuch as herein God discovers the infinite opposition of his nature to sin, and thereby advances the glory of his holiness, it follows from hence, that these perfections of the divine nature had their respective concern, if we may so express it, in the purpose relating hereunto; for whatever glory is demonstrated in the execution of his purpose, that was certainly before included in the purpose itself.

3. The purpose of God, relating to the final state of man, is secret, or cannot be known, till he is pleased to discover it. Nothing is more obvious than this; for even the purposes or resolutions of creatures are secret, till they are made known by them: thus the apostle says, What man knoweth the things of a man, that is, what he designs to do, save the spirit of a man, which is in him? and infers, in the following words, so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God, 1 Cor. ii. 12. and elsewhere he says, Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his councellor? Rom. xi. 34. And, for this reason, it is called, The mystery of his will, Eph. i. 9. and this also follows from its being eternal, therefore it was hid in God, from before the foundation of the world, and consequently would for ever have been so, had he not, by his works, or word, made some discoveries thereof, to those whom he first brought into being, and then gave some intimations of his purpose to them.

Therefore it could not have been known that God had purposed to save any, had he not revealed this in the gospel: much less have any particular persons ground to conclude themselves to be elected, without first observing those intimations which God has given, whereby they may arrive at the knowledge thereof. This head ought to be duly considered, by those who deny, and are prejudiced against this doctrine, though it be generally neglected in the methods they take to oppose it; for they will not consider the distinction we make between God’s having chosen a person to eternal life, and a person’s having a right to conclude that he is thus chosen; but take it for granted, that if there be such a thing as election, that we must necessarily determine ourselves to be the objects thereof, and ought to regulate our future conduct accordingly. It is from thence they conclude, that the doctrine of election leads men to presumption, or gives them occasion to say, that they may live as they list; whereas we suppose that it is an instance of presumption in any one to determine that he is elected, unless there be some discovery hereof made to him; and this discovery cannot take its rise from God, unless it be accompanied with that holiness, which is, from the nature of the thing, inconsistent with our being led hereby to licentiousness. And here we take occasion to consider, that God does not make known his secret purpose, relating to this matter, to any, by inspiration, especially since that extraordinary dispensation of providence is ceased; and, indeed, it never was his ordinary way to discover it hereby to those, who, in other instances, were favoured with the gift of inspiration. The means therefore by which we come to the knowledge hereof, is, by God’s giving certain marks, or evidences of grace, or by shewing us the effects of the divine power, in calling and sanctifying us, whereby we have a warrant to conclude that we were chosen to eternal life; and, whilst we make a right improvement thereof, and conclude that our judgment, concerning our state, is rightly founded, or not, by the holiness of our lives, we are in no danger of abusing this great and important doctrine, to the dishonour of God, or our own destruction.

This leads us to consider a distinction, which we are often obliged to make use of, when we speak concerning the will of God, as secret or revealed, by which we account for the sense of many scriptures, and take occasion from it to answer several objections that are brought against this doctrine. I am sensible that there is nothing advanced in defence thereof, which they, who are in the other way of thinking, are more prejudiced against, than this distinction, which they suppose to contain a reproachful idea of the divine Majesty, and is the foundation of many popular prejudices against the doctrine we are defending, as though we hereby intended that God has a secret meaning, different from what he reveals; or that we are not to judge of his intentions by those discoveries which he makes thereof, which it would be the highest reproach to charge any creature with, and contrary to that sincerity which he cannot be destitute of, but he is hereby rendered the object of detestation; therefore no one, who conceives of an holy God, in such a way as he ought to do, can entertain a thought, as though the least appearance thereof were applicable to him. However, this is the common misrepresentation that is made of this distinction. Whether it arises from its being not sufficiently explained by some; or a fixed resolution to decry the doctrine of election, and render it odious, as it must certainly be, if supported by a distinction, understood in so vile a sense, I will not determine. However, that we may remove this prejudice, and consider how it is to be understood, in a sense more agreeable to the divine perfections, we shall proceed to explain it; and here we may observe,

First, That the will of God is sometimes taken, in scripture, for that which he has, from all eternity, determined, which is unchangeable, and shall certainly come to pass, which is impossible for any creature to disannul, resist, or render ineffectual; and it is such a branch of divine sovereignty, that to deny it, would be, in effect, to deny him to be God. This the apostle intends, when he represents the malicious and obstinate sinner as replying against God, and defending himself in his bold crimes, by saying, Why doth he yet find fault; for who hath resisted his will? Rom. ix. 19, 20, 21, 22. In answer to which, he asserts the sovereignty of God, and that he is not accountable to any for what he does, nor to be controuled by them; and this is also intended in another scripture, in Eph. i. 11. where it is said, that God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will; and elsewhere he says, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure, Isa. xlvi. 10. This will of God is the rule of his own acting, and, as it determines the event of things, it is impossible for him to act contrary to it; and it is equally disagreeable to his perfections, to signify to his creatures, that he determines to do one thing, but will do another; therefore, in this sense, we are far from asserting that there is a revealed will of God, which contradicts his secret.

Secondly, We often read, in scripture, of the will of God, as taken for what he has prescribed to us, as a rule of duty; and also of our judging concerning the apparent event of things.

(1.) The will of God may be considered as a rule of duty, which is a well-known and proper sense of his revealed will: thus our Saviour teaches us to pray, Let thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven; by which he principally intends his revealed will, or law. Enable us to yield obedience to thy law, in our measure, as thou art perfectly obeyed in heaven. So our Saviour says, Whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and my sister, and mother, Mark iii. 35. which can be meant of no other than his revealed will, or of his law, in which it is contained; because no one can act contrary to God’s determination, which is that sense of his will, contained in the foregoing head; and, consequently, a doing his will, in that sense, would not have been laid down as a distinguishing character of those whom Christ preferred above all, who were related to him in the bonds of nature.

Again the apostle understands the will of God in this sense, when he says, Thou knowest his will, Rom. ii. 18. where he speaks to the Jews, who were instructed out of the law, in which it is contained; and elsewhere, Eph. vi. 6. he speaks of his will, as what is to be obeyed, and therefore gives this description of faithful servants, that they do the will of God, namely, what he has commanded, from the heart. And there are many other scriptures thus to be understood; and this we call his revealed will, as it is the rule of duty and obedience.

(2.) The revealed will of God may be considered as a rule which he has given us, whereby we are to judge of the apparent event of things. I make this a branch of God’s revealed will, inasmuch as sometimes he condescends to discover future events to his creatures, which otherwise they could never have known; but yet there is a difference, as to the manner of their judging thereof, pursuant to the intimations which he has given them. Accordingly, when God has told us expressly, that this or that particular thing shall come to pass, then we are infallibly sure concerning the event, and need no other rule to judge of it, but by considering it as revealed: As when God has said, that there shall be a general resurrection of the dead, and that Christ shall come to judgment, and receive his redeemed, and sanctified ones, to heaven, to behold his glory, we are infallibly assured of these events, because they are expressly revealed; and, when we speak of the secret and revealed will of God, as applicable to things of this nature, we intend nothing else hereby but what all will allow of, viz. that what would have been for ever a secret, had it not been discovered, is now revealed, and therefore ceases to be so; and in that sense, the revealed will of God, in all respects, agrees with his secret; in this case, we suppose that God expressly revealed the event.

But there are other instances, in which the event of things is not expressly revealed; as when God has only discovered to us what is the rule of our duty. Nevertheless, since it is natural for man, when any duty is commanded, to pass some judgment concerning the event thereof; and, inasmuch as we suppose the event not expressly revealed, it follows, that the judgment, which we pass concerning it, is only what appears to us, or what, according to our rule of judging, seems to be the probable event of things. In this case we are not infallibly assured concerning it; and when we pass a judgment relating thereunto, we may conclude that some consequences may attend our present duty, which, perhaps, will never come to pass. As if a general of an army gives forth a command to his soldiers, to march towards the enemy, they will readily conclude, that he designs, by this command, that they should enter on some action, which, had he expressly told them, he must either change his purpose, or else the event must certainly happen; but, inasmuch as he has not discovered this to them, all the judgment that they can form, at present, concerning it, is only such, as is founded on the appearance of things, and the event might probably afterwards shew, without any impeachment of his veracity or conduct herein, that his only design was to try whether his soldiers would obey the word of command, or not. Or if a king should order a number of malefactors to the place of execution, without discovering the event thereof, the apparent event is their immediate death; but if, pursuant to his secret purpose, he resolved, there to give forth a pardon to them, it cannot be supposed that he changed his purpose; but the event makes it appear, that his purpose was not then known; whatever the apparent event might be, his real design was to humble them for their crimes, and afterwards to pardon them.

It is only in such-like instances as these, that we apply this distinction to the doctrine that we are maintaining; and therefore it must be a very great stretch, of malicious insinuation, for any one to suppose, that hereby we charge God with insincerity in those declarations of his revealed will, by which we pass a probable judgment concerning the event of things. But to apply this to particular instances. God commanded Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, Gen. xxii. 2. whereas it is certain, unless we suppose that he altered his purpose, that he intended, not that he should lay his hand upon him, but, when Isaac was upon the altar, to forbid him to do it. Here was a great and a difficult duty, which Abraham was to perform pursuant to God’s revealed will, which was the rule of his obedience; had Abraham known, before this, that God designed to hold his hand, and prevent him from striking the fatal blow, it had been no trial of his faith; for it would have been no difficult matter for him to have done every thing else. The holy patriarch knew well enough that God could prevent him from doing it; but this he had no ground to conclude, because he had no divine intimation concerning it; therefore that which appeared to him to be the event, was the loss of his son, and he reconciled this with the truth of the promise before given him, that in Isaac his seed should be called, by supposing that God, at some time or other, would raise him from the dead, as the apostle observes, Heb. xi. 19. therefore that which Abraham concluded as judging, not by an express revelation, but by the voice of providence, was, that Isaac must be slain by his hand: But this was contrary to the real event, as is evident, from the account thereof in scripture; and, consequently since the real event was agreeable to the divine determination, as all events are, it follows, that there is a difference between the will of God, determining the event of things, which shall certainly come to pass accordingly; and the revelation of his will, relating to what is the creatures present duty, which may, at the same time, appear to them, when judging only by the command, which is the rule of duty, and some circumstances that attend it, to be contrary to what will afterwards appear to have been the real design of God therein. God’s real design was to try Abraham’s faith, and to prevent him from slaying his son, when he had given a proof of his readiness to obey him; but this remained, at first, a secret to Abraham, and the apparent design was, that he should slay him. Therefore there is a foundation for this distinction, as thus explained, concerning the secret and revealed will of God; the former belongs not to us, nor are we to take our measures from it, as being unknown: and, when the latter appears contrary to it, we must distinguish between two things, that are contrary in the same, and different respects; or between the judgment which we pass concerning events, which are apparent to us, and, at most, are only probable and conjectural, as we judge of the consequence of a duty commanded; and those events, which, though they are infallibly certain, yet are not revealed, nor can be known, till they come to pass. In this sense we understand the distinction between God’s secret and revealed will, when they seem to oppose each other; which it was necessary for us thus to explain, inasmuch as we shall frequently have occasion to mention, and apply it, when we account for the difference that there seems to be, between the purpose of God, relating to the event of things, and our present views thereof, whereby we may understand and account for the difficulties contained in several scriptures, which I would have mentioned in this place, for the farther illustration hereof, had it been necessary. But this is sufficient to explain and vindicate it from the prejudices entertained against it, by those who are disposed to misrepresent what is said in defence of this doctrine.

From what has been said, concerning God’s secret and revealed will, we may infer,

1st, That it is a great boldness, and unwarrantable instance of presumption, for any one to enter into, or judge of God’s secret purpose, so as peremptorily to determine, beyond the present appearance of things, that this or that shall certainly come to pass, till he makes them known; for secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong unto us, and to our children forever, Deut. xxiv. 29. Therefore no one ought to determine that he is elected to salvation, before the work of grace is wrought, and, some way or other, made visible to him; or, on the other hand, to determine that he is rejected or reprobated, when he has no other ground to go upon, but uncertain conjecture, which would be a means to drive him to despair: that some are, indeed, elected, and others rejected, is no secret because God has revealed this in his word; so that we may assert it as a proposition, undoubtedly true, when we do not apply it to particular persons; and therefore this doctrine has not that pernicious tendency, which many pretend that it has.

2dly, The first act of saving faith does not consist in our believing that we are elected; neither is it the duty of unregenerate persons, as such to apply this privilege to themselves any more than to conclude themselves rejected: But our business, is, so long as the purpose of God remains a secret to us, to attend on the means of grace, hoping and waiting for the display of divine power, in effectually calling us; and afterwards for the Spirit’s testimony, or seal, to be set to it, whereby he discovers his own work; and then it may, in some measure, be reckoned a branch of his revealed will and will afford us matter of thanksgiving and praise to him, and a foundation of peace and comfort in our own souls. But this may be farther insisted on, when we come to consider the improvement we ought to make of this doctrine. We proceed to consider the next property of election.

4. It is free, and sovereign, or absolute, and unconditional; for that which would be a reflection on the divine perfections, if applied to God’s method of working, is, by no means, to be said concerning his purpose to work, or, (which is the same) his decree of election; therefore if there are no obligations laid on him by his creatures, to display or perform any of his works of grace, but they are all free and sovereign, then it follows, that the fore-sight of any thing that shall be done by them, in time, could not be the motive, or reason of his purpose, or decree, to save them, or of his choosing them to salvation.

This may be farther argued, from the independence of the divine nature: if his nature and perfections are independent, his will must be so. But more particularly,

(1.) The displays of God’s grace, in time, are expressly resolved into his sovereign pleasure, in scripture, in Rom. ix. 15. He saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. And there are many other scriptures, which might be referred to, where all merit, or motives, taken from the creature, which might be supposed to induce him to bestow spiritual and saving blessings, are entirely excluded, and the whole is resolved in to the glory of his own name, and in particular, of those perfections which he designed herein to illustrate. This is applied, even to the common blessings of providence; Nevertheless, he saved them for his name’s sake, that he might make his mighty power to be known, Psal. cvi. 8. and it is also applied to sparing mercy, or the exercise of God’s patience, For my name’s sake will I defer mine anger, and for my praise will I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not off, Isa. xlviii. 9. and to pardoning mercy, For thy name’s sake, O Lord, pardon mine iniquity, for it is great, Psal. xxv. 11. And when he is represented as doing great things for his people, he puts them in mind, at the same time, of their own vileness and unworthiness, that the freeness and sovereignty of his grace, to them, might be more conspicuous: Thus, when he tells them how he delivered Israel out of Egypt, he puts them in mind of their idolatry in that land; therefore no motive could be taken, from their behaviour towards him, which could induce him to do this for them; as it is said, But they rebelled against me, and would not hearken unto me; they did not every man cast away the abominations of their eyes, neither did they forsake the idols of Egypt; then I said, I will pour out my fury upon them, to accomplish my anger against them, in the midst of the land of Egypt. But I wrought, for my name’s sake, that it should not be polluted before the heathen, among whom they were, in whose sight I made myself known unto them, in bringing them forth out of the land of Egypt, Ezek. xx. 8, 9.

(2.) If the grace of God, and consequently his purpose relating thereunto, were not absolute, free, and sovereign, then all the glory thereof could not be attributed to him, neither would boasting be excluded; but as the creature might be said to be a worker together with God, so he would lay claim to a share, if not to the greatest part of the honour, that will redound to him from it; which is directly contrary to the divine perfections, and the great design of the gospel. This will farther appear, if we consider,

1st. That a conditional purpose to bestow a benefit, cannot take effect till the condition be performed, and accordingly it is said to depend on it. This is obvious, from the known idea affixed to the word condition, and the common signification thereof; it follows therefore,

2dly. That the performance of the condition is the next, or immediate cause of a conditional purpose’s taking effect; and, to apply this to the case before us,

3dly. If, on our performing the condition of God’s purpose to save us, it be rendered effectual, which otherwise it would not have been, (agreeably to the nature of a conditional purpose) then we are more beholden to our own conduct, than the divine purpose, and so the glory thereof will be due to ourselves; which would not only cast the highest dishonour on the divine perfections, but it is contrary to the design of the gospel, which is to stain the pride of all flesh, and take away all occasions of glorying, from the creature. Thus the prophet Isaiah, fore-telling the glory of the gospel-state, considers its tendency to humble the pride of man, when he says, The loftiness of man shall be bowed down, and the haughtiness of men shall be made low, and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day, Isa. ii. 17. and the apostle, describing the nature of faith, considers its tendency to exclude boasting; Rom. iii. 27. and our Saviour, speaking concerning the discriminating grace of God, that appears in election, either in his purpose relating to it, or in the execution thereof, says, Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, John xv. 16. that is, you have done nothing that has laid any obligation on me to choose you by that act of faith, whereby you are inclined to prefer me to all others; for this is the consequence and result of my discriminating grace.

We shall now proceed to consider those arguments, which are generally made use of by those, who are in the other way of thinking, to support the conditionality of God’s purpose, as well as of his works of grace, in opposition to what has been said concerning the freeness and sovereignty thereof. They generally allege those scriptures for that purpose, that are laid down in a conditional form; as when the apostle speaks of such a confession of Christ with the mouth, as is attended with believing in the heart, that God raised him from the dead, and calling on the name of the Lord, as connected with salvation, Rom. x. 9, 13. and our Saviour says, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life, John iii. 15. and that he that believeth shall be saved, Mark xvi. 16. and elsewhere, Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish, Luke xiii. 3. and many other scriptures of the like nature; from whence they argue, that since the dispensations of God’s providence, the gifts of his grace, and the execution of his purpose are all conditional, the purpose itself must be so. Were it but allowed that election is conditional whether it respects the purpose or providence of God, we should meet with no opposition from those who are on the other side of the question; but as such a purpose to save, as is not absolute, peremptory, or independent on the will of man, has many absurd consequences attending it, which are derogatory to the glory of the divine sovereignty, as has been already considered; so this cannot be the sense of those scriptures, that are laid down in a conditional form, as those and such-like are, that we have but now mentioned; for no sense of scripture can be true or just, that has the least tendency to militate against any of the divine perfections; so that there may without any strain or violence offered to the sense of words, be another sense put upon these, and all other scriptures, in which we have the like mode of speaking, whereby they may be explained, agreeably to the analogy of faith; therefore let us consider,

1. That all such scriptures are to be understood as importing the necessary connexion of things, so that one shall not be brought about without the other; accordingly, repentance, faith, and all other graces, are herein no otherwise considered, than as inseparably connected with salvation; which depends upon one of those propositions, which was before laid down, viz. that God having chosen to the end has also chosen to the means. We are far from denying that faith and repentance are necessary to salvation, as God never gives one without the other, and consequently they are inseparably connected in his eternal purpose relating thereunto. If nothing else were intended by a conditional purpose than this, we would not offer any thing against it; but certainly this would be to use words without their known or proper ideas; and the word condition, as applicable to other things, is never to be understood in this sense. There is a necessary connection between God’s creating the world, and his upholding it, or between his creating an intelligent creature, and his giving laws to him; but none ever supposed one to be properly a condition of the other: so a king’s determining to pardon a malefactor, is inseparably connected with his pardoning him, and his pardon given forth, with his having a right to his forfeited life; but it is not proper to say, one is a condition of the other; so a person’s seeing is inseparably connected with his opening his eyes; and speaking, with the motion of his lips; but we do not say, when he determines to do both of them, that one is a condition of the other. A condition, properly speaking is that which is not only connected with the privilege that follows upon the performance thereof, but it must be performed by a subject acting independently on him who made the conditional overture, or promise.

If it be said, that a duty, which we are enabled to perform by God, who promised the blessing connected with it, is properly a condition, we will not contend about the propriety, or impropriety, of the word; but inasmuch as it is taken by many, when applied to divine things, in the same sense as in matters of a lower nature, and so used to signify the dependence of the blessings promised, or the efficacy of the divine purpose, relating thereunto, on our performance of the condition, which is supposed to be in our own power, whereby we come to have a right and title to eternal life; it is this that we principally militate against, when we assert the absoluteness of God’s purpose.

2. Whatever ideas there may be contained in those scriptures, which are brought to support the doctrine we are opposing, that contain in them the nature of a condition, nothing more is intended thereby, but that what is connected with salvation is a condition of our claim to it, or expectation of it: In this sense, we will not deny faith and repentance to be conditions of salvation, inasmuch as it would be an unwarrantable instance of presumption, for impenitent and unbelieving sinners, to pretend that they have a right to it, or to expect the end without the means, since these are inseparably connected in God’s purpose, as well as in all his dispensations of grace. This being laid down, as a general rule for our understanding all those scriptures, which are usually brought to prove that God’s purposes are sometimes conditional, we shall farther illustrate it, by applying it to three or four other scriptures, that are often brought in defence thereof, which we shall endeavour to explain, consistently with the doctrine we are maintaining.

One is taken from Gen. xix. 22. where the angel bade Lot escape to Zoar, telling him, that he could not do any thing till he came thither. If we suppose this to have been a created angel, as most divines do, yet he must be considered as fulfilling the purpose of God, or acting pursuant to his commission; and therefore it is all one, to our present argument, as though God had told Lot, that he could do nothing till he was gone from that place. It is plain, that he had given him to understand, that he should be preserved from the flames of Sodom, and that, in order thereunto, he must flee for his life; and adds, that he could do nothing, that is, he could not destroy Sodom, consistently with the divine purpose to save him, till he was escaped out of the place; for God did not design to preserve him alive (as he did the three Hebrew captives, in Daniel) in the fire, but by his escaping from it; one was as much fore-ordained as the other, or was designed as a means conducive to it; and therefore the meaning of the text is, not that God’s purpose, relating to Sodom’s destruction, was founded on Lot’s escape, as an uncertain and dubious condition, depending on his own will, abstracted from the divine determination relating to it; but he designed that those two things should be connected together, and that one should be antecedent to the other; and both of them, as well as their respective connection, were the object of God’s absolute and peremptory determination.

There is another scripture, sometimes brought to the same purpose, in Gen. xxxii. 26. where the angel says to Jacob, Let me go, for the day breaketh; and Jacob replies, I will not let thee go, except thou bless me, which does not infer, that God’s determinations were dependent on Jacob’s endeavour to detain him, or his willingness to let him depart; but we must consider Jacob as an humble, yet importunate suppliant, as it is said elsewhere, Weeping and making supplication, Hos. xii. 4. Let me go, says God, appearing in the form of an angel, and speaking after the manner of men, that he might give occasion to Jacob to express a more ardent desire of his presence and blessing, as well as to signify how unworthy he was of it; not as though he was undetermined before-hand what to do, but since the grace which Jacob exercised, as well as the blessing which he received, was God’s gift, and both were connected in the execution of his purpose, we must conclude that the purpose itself was free, sovereign, and unconditional.

Again, there is another scripture, in which God condescends to use a mode of speaking, not much unlike to the other, in which he says to Moses, speaking concerning Israel, in Exod. xxxii. 10. This is a stiff-necked people; now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them; we are not to suppose that the whole event was to turn upon Moses’s prayer, as though God’s purposing to save his people were dependent on it; or that that grace, which inclined him to be importunate with God, did not take its rise from him. Moses, indeed, when first he began to plead with God, knew not whether his prayer would be prevalent or no; however, he addresses himself, with an uncommon degree of importunity, for sparing mercy; and, when God says, Let me alone, it signifies, that his people were unworthy that any one should plead their cause; and, if God should mark iniquity, then Moses’s intercession would be altogether in vain, and so he might as well let him alone, in that respect, as ask for his mercy. He does not, indeed, at first, tell him what he designed to do, that he might aggravate their crime, but afterwards he answers his prayer in Israel’s favour, and signifies that he would work, not for their sakes, but for his own name’s sake; so that he takes occasion, on the one hand, to set forth the people’s desert of punishment; and, on the other, the freeness of his own grace.

There is but one scripture more that I shall mention, among many that might have been brought, and that is what is said concerning our Saviour, in Matt. xiii. 58. that he could not do many mighty works there, at that time, in his own country, because of their unbelief? where he speaks either of their not having a faith of miracles that was sometimes required, in those for whom they were wrought: or else of the unaccountable stupidity of that people, who were not convinced, by many others that he had wrought before them; therefore he resolves to put a stop to his hand, and not, for the present, to work so many miracles amongst them, as otherways might have been expected: If we suppose that their want of faith prevented his working them, this is not to be considered as an unforeseen event. And as he had determined not to confer this privilege upon them, or to continue to work miracles amongst them, if those, which he had already wrought, were disregarded and despised by their unbelief, we must conclude that he had a perfect knowledge of this before-hand, and that his determinations were not dependent on uncertain conditions, though he had resolved to act in such a way, as was most for his own glory; and that there should be an inseparable connexion between that faith, which was their duty, and his continuing to exert divine power, as an ordinance adapted to excite it.

5. God’s purpose concerning election is unchangeable; this is the result of his being infinitely perfect. Mutability is an imperfection that belongs only to creatures: As it would be an instance of imperfection, if there were the least change in God’s understanding, so as to know more or less than he did from all eternity; the same must be said with respect to his will, which cannot admit of any new determinations. There are, indeed, many changes in the external dispensations of his providence, which are the result of his will, as well as the effects of his power; yet there is not the least appearance of mutability in his purpose. We have before considered, in speaking concerning the immutability of the divine nature[207], that whatever may be a reason obliging men to alter their purposes, it cannot, in the least, take place, so that God hereby should be obliged to alter his: No unforeseen occurrence can render it expedient for him to change his mind, nor can any superior power oblige him to do it; nor can any defect of power, to bring about what he had designed, induce him to alter his purpose.

If it be objected to this, that the obstinacy of man’s will may do it; that is to suppose his will exempted from the governing influence of divine providence, and the contrary force, that offers resistance, superior to it, which cannot be supposed, without detracting from the glory of the divine perfections. It would be a very unworthy thought for any one to conclude that God is one day of one mind, and another day forced to be of the contrary; how far this is a necessary consequence from that scheme of doctrine that we are opposing, let any one judge. It will be very hard to clear it of this entanglement, which they are obliged to do, or else all the absurdities that they fasten on the doctrine of election, which are far from being unanswerable, will not be sufficient to justify their prejudices against it.

They who are on the other side of the question, are sensible that they have one difficulty to conflict with, namely, the inconsistency of God’s infallible knowledge of future events, with a mutability of will relating thereunto; or how the independency of the divine fore-knowledge is consistent with the dependence and mutability of his will. To fence against this, some have ventured to deny the divine prescience; but that is to split against one rock, whilst endeavouring to avoid another. Therefore others distinguish concerning the objects of the divine prescience, and consider them, either as they are necessary or contingent, and accordingly suppose that God has a certain foreknowledge of the former; but his knowledge of the latter, (from the nature of the things known) is uncertain, and consequently the determination of his will is not unalterable. But this is to set bounds to the fore-knowledge of God, with respect to its object, and, indeed, to exclude the free actions of the creature from being the objects thereof, which is a limiting and lessening of this perfection, and is directly contrary to the idea of omniscience; and therefore we must insist on their proving this to be consistent with the infinite perfection of God, which they will find it very difficult to do; and to suppose, on the other hand, that any thing is the object of God’s certain fore-knowledge, about which his will is no way conversant, or only so, in such a way, as that it is subject to change, according to the mutability of things, is altogether as indefensible, and equally subversive of the independency, wisdom, and sovereignty thereof.

Object. The most material objection against this doctrine, is take from some scriptures, which seem to represent God as repenting, and therein, as it is supposed, changing his purpose. Thus he is sometimes said to repent, that he had bestowed some blessings upon men, when he perceives how they have been abused by them, and accordingly he purposes to bring evil on them; as we read, in Gen. vi. 6, 7. It repented the Lord that he had made man, and it grieved him at his heart; and the Lord said, I will destroy man, whom I have created; and, at other times he is said to repent of the evil that he designed to bring upon them, and alter his purpose in their favour; thus it is said, in Deut. xxxii. 36. The Lord shall judge his people, and repent himself for his servants; when he seeth that their power is gone, and there is none shut up, or left; and in Joel ii. 13. Rend your hearts, and not your garments, and turn unto the Lord your God; for he is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth him of the evil; and in Psal. xc. 13, Return, O Lord, how long? and let it repent thee concerning thy servants; and in Jer. xviii. 8. If that nation, against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I have thought to do unto them. And we have a very remarkable instance of this, in God’s sparing Nineveh, on their repentance, after he had threatened, by the prophet Jonah, that within forty days they should be destroyed.

Answ. It is true, there are many scriptures, in which repentance is ascribed to God, which, if we consider nothing else but the grammatical sense of the words, seem to favour the objection; but we are bound to conclude, that such a sense of repentance, as that on which it is founded, is inconsistent with the divine perfections, and therefore those scriptures, referred to therein, cannot imply a change in God’s purpose. And, indeed, there are other scriptures, which assert what is directly contrary thereunto; as when it is said, in Numb, xxiii. 19. God is not a man, that he should lye, neither the son of man, that he should repent; hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good? And elsewhere, in 1 Sam. xv. 29. it is said, The strength of Israel will not lye, nor repent; for he is not a man that he should repent.

But we must have recourse to some methods to reconcile this seeming contradiction, and so consider the sense thereof, in different respects, as applicable to them both; in some scriptures, God is said to repent; in others, it is said that he cannot repent. That these may not appear inconsistent with one another, nor either of them infer any imperfection in God, let it be considered, that God is sometimes represented, in scripture, in condescension to our common mode of speaking, as though he had human passions, as in others, he is described, as though he had a body, or bodily parts: But such expressions are always to be taken in a metaphorical sense, without the least supposition, that he is subject to any such imperfections; and particularly we must not conclude, that repentance is ever ascribed to God in the same sense as it is to men, viz. as implying a change in his purpose, occasioned by an unforeseen occurrence, which is the sense contained in the objection. Such a repentance, as this, is a passion peculiarly belonging to the creature, and therefore in this sense we must understand those words; God is not a man, that he should lye, nor the son of man, that he should repent; accordingly, he is said to repent, not by changing his purpose, but by changing his work. Thus when it is said, that he repented that he had made man, nothing is meant by it, but that he determined to destroy him, as he did afterwards by the flood. And this was no new determination arising from any thing in the creature, which God did not foresee; he knew before-hand that all flesh would corrupt their way, and therefore his determination to punish them for it, was not a new resolve of the divine will, after the sin was committed; but God determined things in their respective order, first to permit sin, and then knowing what would be the consequence thereof, namely, that they would rebel against him, he determined to punish it, or to destroy the old world, which is, in effect, the same, as though he had repented that he made it. He cannot be said to repent as we do, by wishing that he had not done that which he is said to repent of, but by denying us the advantage, which we might have otherwise expected from it. In this sense we are to understand all those scriptures that speak of God, as repenting of the good that he had bestowed on man.

And, on the other hand, when he is said to repent of the evil which he threatened to bring on men, as in the case of Nineveh, this does not argue any change in his purpose; for he determined that Nineveh should be destroyed, provided they did not repent, and it was not uncertain to him whether they would repent or no; for, at the same time, he determined to give them repentance, as appears by the event, and so not to inflict the judgment threatened; and therefore when Jonah was sent to make a public proclamation to the people, that in forty days they should be destroyed, it is plain that they understood the threatening in this sense, that they had no ground to expect any thing else, except they repented, which accordingly they did, and so were spared, without having any reason to conclude that God changed his purpose relating thereunto.

If it be objected hereunto, that this is nothing less than to establish a conditional purpose in God, and so overthrows the argument that we are maintaining; the reply that may be made to it, is, that we distinguish between a conditional purpose, in God’s secret will, and a conditional proposition, which was to be the subject of the prophet’s ministry: The prophet, it is plain, was not told, when he received his commission to go to Nineveh, that God would give them repentance, but only, that, without repentance, they should be destroyed; whereas God, as the event makes it appear, determined that they should repent, and therefore that they should not be destroyed; and, consequently, we must not suppose, that, when God sent him, he was undetermined, in his own purpose, whether to destroy them or not, or that there was any thing conditional in the divine mind, that rendered the event uncertain to God, though there was a condition contained in the subject-matter of the prophet’s message, which the Ninevites very well understood, namely, that they had no ground to expect deliverance without repentance, and therefore they repented, in hope of obtaining mercy, which they supposed would be connected with their repentance; and it is evident, that Jonah himself suspected that this might be the event, though God had not told him that it would be so, and therefore says, in chap. iv. 2. For I knew that thou art a gracious God, and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repentest thee of the evil.

6. The purpose of God, in choosing men to eternal life, renders their salvation necessary; so that nothing shall defeat, or disannul it. What God says concerning Israel’s deliverance from the Babylonish captivity, may be applied to all his other determinations, and particularly to what relates to the eternal salvation of his people; My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure; yea, I have spoken it, I will also bring it to pass; I have purposed it, I will also do it, Isa. xlvi. 10, 11. The purposes of God, indeed, are distinguished from his bringing them to pass; it is one thing to design to bring his people to glory, and another thing to bring them to it. It is not to be supposed that the decree of God has, in itself, a proper efficiency to produce the thing decreed:[208] for then there would be no difference between an eternal decree, and an eternal production of things; whereas the apostle plainly distinguishes between man’s being predestinated to glory, and brought to it, when he says, Those whom he predestinated, them he glorified, Rom. viii. 30.

The purpose of God, is, indeed, the internal moving cause, or the first ground and reason of the salvation of those who are elected to it; but his power is the more immediate cause of it, so that his purpose is the reason of his exerting this power, and both concurring to the salvation of men, render it certain and necessary. Therefore some distinguish, for the explaining of this, between the determining and powerful will of God; the latter of which, is sometimes called the word of his power, and renders the former effectual; this it must certainly do, otherwise God would be said to will the existence of things, that shall never have a being. In this respect, the purpose of God renders things necessary, which are in themselves contingent, or arbitrary, and would otherwise never come to pass.[209]

This is a great encouragement to those who are enabled to make their calling and election sure; for their perseverance in grace, notwithstanding all the opposition that they meet with, is the necessary consequence of their election to eternal life. Thus, as we before distinguished predestination into election and reprobation, we have considered the former of these, and we proceed,

Secondly, To speak concerning the doctrine of reprobation;[210] which is become obnoxious to those on the other side of the question, almost to a proverb; so that if any doctrine is considered as shocking, and to be answered no otherwise than by testifying their abhorrence of it, it is compared to this of reprobation; and, indeed, if it were not a consequence from the doctrine of election to eternal life, that doctrine would not be so much opposed by them. How far some unguarded expressions, or exceptionable methods of explication, may have given occasion for this prejudice, it is not to our present purpose to enquire; but we shall take occasion, from thence, to explain it in such a way, as that a fair and unprejudiced disputant will not see just reason to except against it, at least to reproach it, as though it were a doctrine subversive of the divine glory, and to be defended by none but those who seem to have a design to raise prejudices, in the minds of men, against religion in general.

And here we shall take occasion to consider the meaning of the word, as it is contained in, or deduced from scripture, where the same word that is used to signify the execution of this decree, may be applied to express the decree itself. Thus we read of God’s rejecting, or disregarding men, as a punishment of their rebellion against him: and these are compared by the prophet Jeremiah, chap. vi. 30. To reprobate silver, because the Lord hath rejected them; or, as it is in the margin, The refuse of silver; and, in the New Testament, the same word[212] is sometimes translated reprobates; at other times, disapproved or rejected, 1 Cor. iv. 27. 2 Cor. xiii. 5. Heb. vi. 8. and when this disapprobation, or rejection, respects not only their actions, as contrary to the holy nature of God, but their persons, as punished for their iniquities; and when this punishment is considered as what respects their eternal state, as the objects of vindictive justice, the purpose of God, relating hereunto, is what we call reprobation.

But, that we may more particularly consider the sense of the word, it seems, in scripture, to contain in it two ideas.

1. God’s determining to leave a part of the world in that state of sin and misery, which he from all eternity, fore-knew that they would bring themselves into, or his decreeing not to save them; and, since all will allow that a part of mankind shall not be saved, it cannot reasonably be denied that this was determined by him before-hand; and this is what divines generally call preterition.

2. There is another idea in the word reprobation, which is also contained in scripture, or deducible from it, and that respects the purpose of God to punish those for their iniquities, whom he will not save. Not to be saved, is the same as to be punished with everlasting destruction, from the presence of the Lord, and the glory of his power. And God’s purpose, relating hereunto, is expressed in scripture by his appointing them to wrath, 1 Thess. v. 9. for those sins which he fore-saw they would commit. This is what some call pre-damnation, as taken from that expression of the apostle, Jude, ver. 4, 13. concerning some who had crept into the church unawares, whom he describes as ungodly men, that is, notoriously so, who turned the grace of God into lasciviousness, for whom is reserved the blackness of darkness forever; of these he says, that they were before of old, ordained to this condemnation, where God is represented as punishing sinners, in proportion to their crimes; and this is considered as the result of that eternal purpose, which was founded on his fore-sight of their contracting that guilt whereby they would render themselves liable to it.

If this doctrine be thus explained, it will appear agreeable, not only to scripture, but to the divine perfections, and therefore too great a truth to be treated with that abhorrence, with which it generally is, without explaining, distinguishing or fairly entering into the merits of the cause. It is a very easy matter to render any doctrine odious, by misrepresentation, as they on the other side of the question, have done this of reprobation, which we shall briefly consider, and therein take leave to explain it in a different manner, whereby it will appear not only worthy to be defended, as redounding to the glory of God, but a plain and evident truth, founded on scripture.

If this doctrine were to be considered no otherwise, than as it is often represented by them, we should dislike it, as much as they do; for when they pretend that we herein suppose God to be severe and cruel to his creatures, delighting himself in, and triumphing over them, in their misery: and that he decreed, from all eternity, to damn the greatest part of mankind, without any consideration of their sin, as the result of his arbitrary will, or dominion, as he has a right to dispose of his creatures, according to his pleasure, and that as a means to attain this end, as though it were in itself desirable, he leaves them to themselves, blinds their minds, and hardens their hearts, and offers these occasions of, and inducements to sin, which are as stumbling-blocks in their way, and that he determined that his providence should be so conversant about the will of man, as that it should be under a natural necessity, or kind of compulsion, to what is evil, without considering the corruption and depravity of nature, as a vicious habit, which they had contracted; and that all this is done in pursuance of this decree of reprobation.

It is very probable that many who give this account of this doctrine, have no other foundation for it, but the popular outcry of those who are not apprised of the methods that are generally taken to explain and defend it; or else they suppose that it cannot be defended, without being exposed to those exceptions which are contained in the account they give of it. But we shall take no farther notice of this, but proceed to explain and defend it another way. And,

1. As to the former branch thereof, namely, preterition, or God’s passing by, or rejecting those whom he hath not chosen to salvation, let it be premised; that God, in his eternal purpose, considered all mankind as fallen, which must be supposed to have been foreknown by him, otherwise he would not be said to be omniscient, and the result of his fore-knowledge is his determining to leave a part of them in their fallen state, in which he might have left the whole world to perish without being liable to the least charge of injustice. This is what we call his rejecting them, and accordingly it is opposed to his having chosen the rest to eternal life. These terms of opposition are plainly contained in scripture: thus it is said, The election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded, Rom. xi. 7. not by God’s leading them into mistakes, or giving them false ideas of things, but they were left to the blindness of their minds, which was the result of their apostasy from God; and elsewhere our Saviour says, Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes, Matt. xi. 25. Thou hast hid, that is, not revealed them; and that either objectively, as respecting those who are destitute of the light of the gospel; or subjectively, as he did not effectually, or savingly enlighten them with the light of life, by revealing Christ in them, as the apostle calls it, Gal. i. 16. and therefore it is as though he had said, thou hast determined not to give to some the means of grace, nor to others the saving efficacy thereof, such as they are partakers of, who are chosen to salvation. Accordingly, he is said to have suffered all nations to walk in their own ways, Acts xiv. 16. that is, not to restrain or prevent the breaking forth of corruption, as he might have done; and elsewhere, to have winked at, chap. xvii. 30. that is, as it may be rendered, over-looked the greatest part of the world, which is no other than his rejecting or passing them by; and in this sense we are to understand that difficult mode of speaking used by the apostle, Whom he will he hardeneth, Rom. ix. 18. by which nothing else is intended but his purposing to leave many to the hardness of their own hearts. God forbid that any one should think that there is a positive act contained in those words, as though God infused hardness into the hearts of any; for the meaning is only this, that he determined to deny heart-softening grace to that part of mankind, whom he had not fore-ordained to eternal life. That there was such a purpose relating hereunto, is evident, because whatever God does in the methods of his providence, is the result of an eternal purpose. This no one, who observes the dispensations of God’s providence, and allows as every one must do, that all that he does was pre-concerted by him, can justly deny.

But that which must be farther enquired into, as to this matter, is, whether God’s determining to pass by a part of mankind, be an act of sovereignty or of justice. And this may also be judged of, by the external dispensation of his providence; so far as there is sovereignty, or justice, visible in them, we are to conclude that this purpose, relating thereunto, was the result of one or other of these perfections. In some respects it is an act of sovereignty: As, for instance, that God should give one nation the gospel, or the means of grace, and deny it to another; it is not because he sees any thing in one part of the world, that obliges him thereunto, more than in the other; but the reason is, as was observed in the scripture but now mentioned, because it seemed good in his sight, Matt. xi. 26. Moreover, his giving special grace, whereby some are effectually called and sanctified; and denying it to others, is an act of sovereign pleasure.

But on the other hand, God is said sometimes, in the external dispensations of his providence, to leave men to themselves, to give them up to their own hearts lust, in a judicial way, which supposes not only the commission of sin, but persons being obstinate and resolutely determined to continue in it. Thus God saith concerning his people; Israel would none of me; so I gave them up to their own hearts’ lusts, and they walked in their own counsels, Psal. lxxxi. 11, 12. and the Psalmist says elsewhere, Add iniquity to their iniquity, Psal. lxix. 27. which words I would rather consider as a prediction than a prayer, or as an expression of the church’s acquiescence in God’s righteous judgments, which they had ground to conclude, that he would inflict on an impenitent, incorrigible people; these are expressed, by adding iniquity to iniquity, not as though he designed to infuse any habit of sin into them, for that is inconsistent with the holiness of his nature; but that he would reject, and leave them to themselves, in a judicial way, as a punishment inflicted on them for their iniquities, the consequence whereof would be their own adding iniquity to iniquity. Thus, in different respects, the purpose of God, in passing by a part of mankind, may be considered, either as the result of his sovereign pleasure, or as an act of justice.

2. We shall now proceed to consider the other branch of reprobation, which some call pre-damnation, or (to use the scripture-expression before referred to) God’s fore-ordaining those who shall not be saved, to that condemnation, which they shall fall under, as exposing themselves to it by their own wickedness; which is nothing else but his determining, from all eternity, to punish those, as a judge, who should, by their own crimes, deserve it, and thereby to vindicate the holiness of his nature and law. Here let it be observed, that when this doctrine is reproached or misrepresented, it is described as an act of divine sovereignty, but that we are as ready to deny and oppose as they are, since, according to the description we have given of it, it can be no other than an act of justice; for, if to condemn, or punish, be an act of justice, then the decree, relating hereunto, must be equally so, for one is to be judged of by the other. If God cannot punish creatures as such, but as criminals and rebels, then he must be supposed to have considered them as such, when, in his eternal purpose, he determined to punish them. No man can style this an act of cruelty, or severity in God, but those who reckon the punishing of sin to be so, and are disposed to charge the Judge of all with not doing right, or offering an injury to his creatures, when he pours forth the vials of his wrath on them, who, by their bold and wilful crimes, render themselves obnoxious thereunto.

Here let it be considered, that God, in his actual providence, is not the author of sin, though he suffer it to be committed in the world. And, since his permitting, or not hindering it, cannot be said to be the cause of its being committed, there being no cause thereof, but the will of man; it follows, from hence, that God’s punishing sin, is not to be resolved into his permission of it, as the cause thereof, but into the rebellion of man’s will, as refusing to be subject to the divine law; and thus God considered men, when, in his eternal purpose, he determined to condemn those, whose desert of this punishment was foreseen, by him, from all eternity. And is this a doctrine to be so much decried?

I cannot but wonder the learned author, whom I have before referred to, as opposing this doctrine,[213] should so far give into the common and popular way of misrepresenting it, unless he designed, by this way of opposing it to render it detested; when he speaks concerning them, mentioned in Jude, ver. 4. who were before, of old, ordained to this condemnation, he says, “This cannot be meant of any divine ordination, or appointment of them, to eternal condemnation, because it cannot be thought, without horror, that God doth thus ordain men to perdition, before they had a being.” If he had expressed his horror and resentment against God’s ordaining men to perdition, as creatures, it had been just; but to express this detestation against God’s ordaining men to perdition, who are described as these are, is to expose this doctrine without reason; and it is still more strange that he should cast this censure upon it, when he owns in his farther explication of this text, “That God ordaineth none to punishment but sinners, and ungodly men, as these persons here are styled, and that these were men of whom it was before written, or prophesied, that they should be condemned for their wickedness;” since there is not much difference in the method of reasoning, between saying that the condemnation of sinners, for their wickedness, was before written, or prophesied, and saying, that God fore-ordained them to eternal punishment.

I am sensible that many are led into this mistake, by supposing that we give a very injurious and perverse sense of that text, in which the doctrine of reprobation is contained, which, it may be, has occasioned this reproach to be cast upon it. For when the apostle says, in Rom. ix. 22. What if God willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, some suppose that we understand this text, as though these vessels of wrath were, from all eternity, prepared for destruction by God, and that his eternal purpose, is his fitting them for it, as intending to bring about that end, viz. his destroying them. But if any have expressed themselves in such a way, as is equivalent thereunto, let them be accountable for their own sense of the text; though this I may say, that some, even of them, who give into the Supralapsarian way of explaining the doctrine of predestination, have not understood it in this sense;[214] and the sense which I would give of it is this, that those, whom the apostle speaks of as vessels of wrath, are persons whom God had rejected, and from the foresight of the sins which they would commit, he had appointed them to wrath, which is an expression the apostle uses elsewhere, 1 Thess. v. 9. but they were appointed to wrath, not as creatures, but as sinners; they are described as fitted to destruction, not by God’s act, but their own, and that is the reason of their being fore-ordained to it.[215]

There is another scripture, which is generally cited by those who treat on this subject, that we are to use the utmost caution in explaining, lest we give just occasion, to those who oppose it, to express their abhorrence of it, as inconsistent with the divine perfections, namely, what the apostle says concerning those that were not elected, whom he calls the rest of the Jewish nation, in Rom. xi. 7-10. that they were blinded, and that God had given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear; and he speaks of their table being made a snare, and a trap and a stumbling-block, and a recompense to them; let their eyes be darkened, that they may not see, and bow down their back always. The sense which they, who misrepresent this doctrine, suppose that we put upon this scripture, is, that they, who are reprobated, have, as a consequence thereof, occasions of sin laid in their way, some things designed to blind their minds, cast a mist before their eyes, and so lead them out of the way, and other things, that prove a snare to them, a trap, and occasion of sin, and all this with a design to bring about that damnation which God had ordained for them, in this decree of reprobation; which sense of this scripture never was, nor could be given, by any one, who has a due regard to the divine perfections.

And shall this doctrine be judged of hereby, when it is very hard to find any, how unguarded soever they are in their modes of speaking, that understand this text as they represent it? We shall therefore consider what is probably the meaning of this scripture, with which the doctrine we have laid down is very consistent. It is not to be understood as though God were the author of these sins, which they are said to be charged with; but this blindness and stupidity, which is called, A spirit of slumber as it is connected with the idea of their being rejected of God, and his determining not to give them the contrary graces, is considered, as the consequence, not the effect thereof, and that not the immediate, but the remote consequence thereof, in the same sense as stealing is the consequence of poverty, in those who have a vicious inclination thereunto. Thus when a person, who has contracted those habits of sin, that tend to turn men aside from God, is destitute of preventing and restraining grace, the consequence thereof, is, that these corruptions will break forth with greater violence; and God is not obliged to give this grace to an apostate, fallen creature, much less to one who has misimproved the means of grace, by which a multitude of sins might have been prevented; so that nothing is intended hereby but this, that they are left to themselves, and permitted to stumble and fall, and to commit those abominations, which, if they had not been thus judicially left, would have been prevented, and as the consequence thereof, they run into many sins, which they might have avoided; for though we suppose that it is not in a man’s own power, as destitute of the grace of God, to bring himself into a regenerate or converted state, (as will be farther considered, in its proper place) nevertheless, we do not deny but that men might, in the right use of the gifts of nature, avoid many sins, which they, who are said to be thus blinded, and hardened, run into, and so increase their guilt and misery, especially where they are not prevented by the grace of God, which he may, without any impeachment of his providence, deny to those whom he has not chosen to eternal life, as he might, had he pleased, have denied it to the whole world, and much more to those who have not improved the common grace, which they received, but have, through the wickedness of their nature, proceeded from one degree of sin unto another.

There is another scripture, which, some suppose we understand in such a sense, as gives the like occasion of prejudice to many against this doctrine, in 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12. For this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness; the meaning whereof is this, that God suffered them to be deluded, who, in the following verse, are represented as not receiving the love of the truth; not that God was the author of these delusions, or deceived them by a false representation of things to them, or by exciting or inclining them to adhere to the suggestions of those who lie in wait to deceive; but, since he did not design to give them grace under the means of grace, or to enable them to receive the truth in the love thereof, which he was not obliged to do to any, much less to those who rebelled against the light that had been already given them; hereupon, through the blindness of their own minds, they became an easy prey to those who endeavoured to ensnare or delude them; so that the decree of God only respects his denying preventing grace to those, who, through the corruption of their own nature, took occasion, from thence, to run greater lengths in their apostasy from, and rebellion against God. And as for that mode of speaking here used, that God shall send them strong delusions, that only respects his will to permit it, and not his design to delude them.

There is another scripture to the same purpose, in Psal. lxxxi. 12. So I gave them up unto their own heart’s lust, and they walked in their own counsels; the meaning of which is, that God left them to themselves, and then lust, or the corrupt habits of sin, which they had acquired, conceived, and, as the apostle James speaks, brought forth sin, chap i. 15. or greater acts of sin, which exposed them to a greater degree of condemnation; and all this is to be resolved into God’s permissive will, or purpose, to leave man, in his fallen state, to himself, which he might do, without giving occasion to any to say, on the one hand, that he is the author of sin; or, on the other, that he deals injuriously with the sinful creature.

And to this we may add our Saviour’s words concerning the Jews, in John xii. 39, 40. Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them. The sense which they, who misrepresent this doctrine, suppose we put upon them, and conclude, that no other is consistent with the argument we are maintaining, is, that the unbelief, which the Jews are charged with, was principally, if not altogether, resolved into God’s eternal purpose, to blind their eyes, and harden their hearts, namely, by some positive act, as a cause producing this effect, with this view, that they should not be converted, and saved, that thereby his decree to condemn them, might take effect. It is no wonder to find persons prejudiced against this doctrine, when set in such a light; but as this is very remote from the explication we have given thereof, so our Saviour’s design, in this text, is to give an account why those miracles, which he wrought before the Jews, were ineffectual for their conviction; the more immediate cause whereof was the blindness of their mind, and the hardness of their hearts, inasmuch as they had shut their eyes against the light, and, through the corruption of their nature, had hardened their own hearts. As to what God is said to have done, in a judicial way, agreeable to the mode of speaking here used, when it is said, He hath hardened their hearts, it imports nothing else but his leaving them to the hardness of their own hearts, or denying them heart-softening grace, which would have been an effectual remedy against it. And may not God deny his grace to sinners, without being charged as the author of sin, or the blame thereof devolved on him, and not themselves? And, since this judicial act of providence cannot but be the result of an eternal purpose, is there any thing, in this decree, that reflects on his perfections, any more than there is in the execution thereof?

There is another scripture, in Prov. xvi. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil; from whence they infer, that the doctrine of reprobation, which they suppose to be founded on a perverse sense given of it, includes in it the divine purpose to make man to damn him; for they conclude that we understand it in that sense; and they proceed a little farther than this, and pretend that we infer from it, that God made men wicked, or that he made them wicked for his glory, as if he had need of sinful man for that end. I should never have thought that so vile a consequence could be drawn from this doctrine, if the learned writer, before mentioned, had not told the world that we infer this from it;[216] and, to give countenance to this suggestion, he quotes a passage out of Dr. Twiss;[217] his words are these: “That all, besides the elect, God hath ordained to bring them forth into the world in their corrupt mass, and to permit them to themselves, to go on in their own ways, and so finally to persevere in sin; and, lastly, to damn them for their sin, for the manifestation of the glory of his justice on them.”

I am not ashamed to own my very great esteem of this excellently learned and pious writer, who was as considerable for that part of learning, which his works discover him to have been conversant in, as most in his day; though I cannot think myself obliged, in every respect, to explain this doctrine as he does; and Dr. Whitby knew very well, that if such an inference, as what we have been speaking of, were to be deduced from the writings of any, who maintain the doctrine of reprobation, it must be from one who gives into the Supralapsarian way of explaining it; and this expression, which, it may be, was a little unguarded, seems to bid as fair for it as any other he could have found out: But any one that reads it, without prejudice, and especially that compares it with what is connected therewith, would not suppose that any thing is intended hereby, that gives the least ground to conclude that God made men wicked for the manifestation of his justice. The most obnoxious part of this quotation, is, God ordained to bring forth into the world the non-elect, in their corrupt mass, that is, that persons, who are every day born into the world, are the seed of corrupt and fallen man, and so have the habits of sin propagated with their nature, which many other divines have endeavoured to maintain. What my sentiments are concerning this matter, I shall rather choose to insist on, under a following answer, in which we shall be lead to speak of the doctrine of original sin, and of that corruption of nature, which is the consequence of it; therefore, passing this by, there is nothing, in what remains of this quotation, but what is very defensible, and far from making God the author of sin; for we may observe, that all he says, concerning the providence of God relating to this matter, is only, that he permits, or leaves them to themselves, and he supposes them finally to persevere in sin, without which they cannot be liable to damnation, or the display of the justice of God therein; and if the author, who brings this quotation, had duly considered the words immediately before, he might have seen the reason to have saved himself the trouble of making this reflection upon it; for Dr. Twiss, who, though a Supralapsarian, says, “That he reckons that controversy, relating to the order of God’s decrees, to be merely Apex Logicus, as he calls it, a logical nicety;” and adds, “That his opinion about it is well known, namely, that God doth not ordain any man to damnation, before the consideration of sin;” and, a few lines after, he says, “That God, of his mere pleasure, created all, but, of his mere pleasure, he damneth none; but every one that is damned, is damned for his sin, and that wilfully committed, and contumaciously continued in by them that come to ripe years.” And if nothing more than this is intended by the doctrine of reprobation, it ought not to be so misrepresented, with a design to cast an odium upon it.

But to return to the scripture but now mentioned: When God is said to have made the wicked for the day of evil, the meaning is not that man’s damnation was the end designed by God, in creating him, for there are some other ideas that intervene between God’s purpose to create and condemn him; he must be considered not barely as a creature, but as a sinner; now, as God did not create man that he might sin, he could not be said to create him, that he might condemn him. Accordingly, the sense which some give of this text, is, that God is said to have made all things for himself, to wit, for his own glory. And inasmuch as some will be ready to object, that God will have no glory from the wicked, who oppose his name and interest in the world; the answer to this is, that in them, from whom he shall have no glory, as a Saviour, he will, notwithstanding, be glorified as a Judge; which judicial act, though it be deferred for a time, while his long-suffering waits upon them, yet it shall fall heavily on them, in the day of evil: which is very remote from that supposition, that God made man to damn him. And there is a sense given of it by some, who are on the other side of the question, which seems equally probable, or agreeable to the mind of the Holy Ghost, and is not in the least subversive of the doctrine we are maintaining, namely, “That the Lord disposeth all things throughout the world, to serve such ends as he thinks fit to design, which they cannot refuse to comply withal; for if any man be so wicked as to oppose his will, he will not lose their service; but when he brings a public calamity upon a country, employ them to be the executioners of his wrath: Of this there was a remarkable instance in the destruction of Jerusalem, by the Roman soldiers, whom our Saviour used, to punish his crucifiers, not that they undertook that war out of any design or desire to do our blessed Saviour right, but out of an ambition to enslave the world; yet God made use of them for another design, as public executioners, by whom he punished the ungodly[218].” So the Assyrian is said, in Isa. x. 5, 6. to be the rod of God’s anger, and to be sent against the people of Israel, and to lead them captive, and therein to tread them down, like the mire in the streets[219]. And as to what concerns the purpose of God, on which these judicial proceedings depend, this is to be judged of by the execution thereof, as is evidently to be inferred from thence. And this is the sense in which we understand the doctrine of reprobation, as in the foregoing argument.

Thus we have endeavoured to prove the doctrine of election and reprobation, and defend it from the reproaches and misrepresentations cast upon it by considering it, not only as agreeable to the divine perfections, but as founded on scripture. We shall therefore proceed,

VI. To enquire, whether the contrary doctrine as defended by some, be not derogatory to the divine perfections, and therefore does not contain greater absurdities; or, if expressions of detestation were a sufficient argument to set it aside, whether we have not as much reason to testify our dislike that way, as they have against the doctrine we are maintaining? As to that part of the charge brought against us, as though we represented God as severe and cruel to his creatures; or that it is inconsistent with his goodness to suppose that he leaves any to themselves in their fallen state, so as not to give them the means of grace, when he knew that being destitute thereof, they could not believe, and so would fall short of salvation, pursuant to his eternal purpose relating thereunto: can this be said to be inconsistent with his goodness, any more than all his other displays of vindictive justice? If they suppose that it is, we might easily retort the argument upon them since they will not assert, that the whole race of fallen man shall be saved; and, if so, must we not suppose that God certainly fore-knew this, otherwise where is his infinite understanding? And if he knew that this would be the consequence of their being born, and living in the world, where is his goodness in bringing them into it? If it be said that they have a free-will to choose what is good, and so had a power to attain salvation; therefore their not attaining it, is wholly owing to themselves. Suppose this were taken for granted, without entering on that subject at present; yet it must be farther enquired whether they will allow that God fore-know that they would abuse this freedom of will, or power to make themselves holy or happy; and, if so, could he not have prevented this? Did he make a will that he could not govern or restrain? Could he not have prevented the sin that he knew they would commit? And, if he could, why did he not do it, and thereby prevent their ruin, which he knew would be the consequence hereof? So that if men are disposed to find fault with the divine dispensation, it is no difficult matter to invent some methods of reasoning to give umbrage to it; and, indeed this objection is not so much against God’s fore-ordaining what comes to pass, as it is a spurning at his judicial hand, and finding fault with the equity of his proceedings, when he takes vengeance on sinners for their iniquities; or charging severity on God, because all mankind are not the objects of his goodness, and consequently not elected to eternal life.

But passing by this, we shall proceed to consider how, in several instances, the methods used to oppose the doctrine, which we are maintaining, are attended with many absurd consequences, derogatory to the divine perfections; which farther discovers the unreasonableness of their opposition to it; particularly,

1. It represents God as indeterminate, or unresolved what to do, which is the plain sense of their asserting that he has not fore-ordained whatever comes to pass. To suppose him destitute of any determination, is directly contrary to his wisdom and sovereignty, and it would argue that there are some excellencies and perfections belonging to intelligent creatures, which are to be denied to him, who is a God of infinite perfection: but if, on the other hand, they suppose that every thing, which comes to pass, is determined by him; nevertheless, that his determinations, as they respect the actions of intelligent creatures, are not certain and peremptory, but such as may be disannulled, or rendered ineffectual as taking his measures from the uncertain determinations of man’s will; this is, in effect to say, that they are not determined by God; for an uncertain determination, or a conditional purpose, cannot properly be called a determination. Thus for God to determine, that he that believes shall be saved, without resolving to give that faith which is necessary to salvation, is, in effect, not to determine that any shall be saved; for, since they suppose that it is left to man’s free-will to believe or not, and liberty is generally explained by them, as implying that a person might, had he pleased, have done the contrary to that which he is said to do freely; it follows that all mankind might not have believed, and repented, and consequently that they might have missed of salvation, and then the purpose of God, relating thereunto, is the same as though he had been indeterminate, as to that matter. But, if, on the other hand, they suppose that to prevent this disappointment, God over-rules the free actions of men, in order to the accomplishment of his own purpose, then they give up their own cause, and allow us all that we contend for; but this they are not disposed to do; therefore we cannot see how the independency of the divine will can be defended by them, consistently with their method of opposing this doctrine.

Again, if it be supposed, as an expedient to fence against this absurd consequence, that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and that his determinations were the result thereof, and, consequently, that the event is as certain as the divine fore-knowledge, this is what is not universally allowed of by them; for many are sensible that it is as hard to prove, that God fore-knew what must certainly come to pass, without inferring the inevitable necessity of things, as it is to assert that, he willed or determined them, whereby they are rendered eventually necessary. And if they suppose that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and, particularly, that they would convert themselves, and improve the liberty of their will, so as to render themselves objects fit for divine grace, without supposing that he determined to exert that power and grace, which was necessary thereunto; this is to exclude his providence from having a hand in the government of the world, or to assert that his determinations rather respect what others will do, than what he will enable them to do, which farther appears to be inconsistent with the divine perfections.

2. There are some things, in their method of reasoning, which seem to infer a mutability in God’s purpose which is all one as to suppose, that he had no purpose at all relating to the event of things: Thus, in opposing the doctrine of election, they refer to such-like scriptures as these, namely, that God will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth, 1 Tim. ii. 4. applying this act of the divine will to every individual, even to those who shall not be saved, or come to the knowledge of the truth; and they understand our Saviour’s words, How often would I have gathered thy children together as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not? Behold your house is left unto you desolate, Mat. xxiii. 37, 38. as implying, that God purposed to save them, but was obliged afterwards, by the perverseness of their actions, to change his purpose. What is this, but to assert him to be dependent and mutable?

3. They, who suppose that salvation is not to be resolved into the power and will of God, must ascribe it to the will of man, by which we determine ourselves to perform those duties, which render us the objects of divine mercy; and then what the apostle says, It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy, Rom. ix. 16. would hardly be intelligible, or a defensible proposition; and when it is said, We love him, because he first loved us, 1 John iv. 19. the proposition ought to be inverted, and it should rather be said, He loved us, because we first loved him; and that humbling question, which the apostle proposes, Who maketh thee to differ, 1 Cor. iv. 7. should be answered, as one proudly did, I make myself to differ.

4. As to what concerns the doctrine of discriminating grace, which cannot well be maintained, without asserting a discrimination in God’s purpose relating thereunto, which is what we call election; if this be denied, there would not be so great a foundation for admiration, or thankfulness, as there is, or for any to say, as one of Christ’s disciples did, speaking the sense of all the rest, Lord, how is it, that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world, John xiv. 22. Nor is there so great an inducement to humility, as what will arise from the firm belief, that, when no eye pitied the poor helpless and miserable sinner, he was singled out of a ruined and undone world, among that remnant whom God first designed for, and then brought to glory.

VII. We shall now consider those methods of reasoning, by which the contrary doctrine is defended, and enquire into the sense of those scriptures, which are generally brought for that purpose; and shall endeavour to make it appear, that they may be explained, in a different way, more consistently with the divine perfections. It is plain that the main design of those, who oppose the doctrine of election, is to advance the goodness of God; and, since all mankind cannot be said to be equally partakers of the effects of this goodness, inasmuch as all shall not be saved, they suppose that God has put all mankind into a salvable state; and, accordingly, as the gospel-overture is universal, so God’s purpose to save, includes all to whom it is made; but the event, and consequently the efficacy of the divine purpose relating hereunto, depends on the will of man; and, that there may be no obstruction which may hinder this design from taking effect, God has given him a power to yield obedience to his law, which, though it be not altogether so perfect as it was at first, but is somewhat weakened by the fall; yet it is sufficient to answer the end and design of the gospel, that is to bring him to salvation if he will, and the event of things is wholly put on this issue; so that, though there be not an universal salvation, there is a determination in God to save all upon this condition. How far this is inconsistent with the divine perfections has been already considered; and we are farther to enquire, whether there be any foundation for it in scripture, and what is the sense of some texts, which are often brought in defence thereof.

One text referred to, is, those words of the apostle, in 1 Tim. ii. 4. Who will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth; and another scripture, to the same purpose, in 2 Pet. iii. 9. The Lord is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance; and several others, from whence they argue the universality of the divine purpose relating to the salvation of mankind, or that none are rejected, or excluded from it, by any act of God’s will, and consequently that the doctrine of election and reprobation is to be exploded, as contrary hereunto.

That the sense of these scriptures cannot be, that God designed that all men should be eventually saved, or come to the knowledge of the truth, so that none of them should perish, is evident, from many other scriptures, that speak of the destruction of ungodly men, which, doubtless, will be allowed by all; therefore it follows, that the meaning of these two scriptures, is not that God purposed, or determined, what shall never come to pass, which is inconsistent with the glory of his wisdom and sovereignty, as has been before observed; but they are to be understood with those limitations, which the word all, which refers to the persons mentioned, as designed to be saved, is subject to in other scriptures; as will be more particularly considered, when we treat of universal and particular redemption, under a following answer[220]. And therefore, at present, we need only observe, that these scriptures may be set in a true light, that the word all is oftentimes taken for all sorts of men, or things; as when it is said, that of every thing that creepeth upon the earth, there went in two and two unto Noah into the ark, Gen. vii. 8, 9. that is all the species of living creatures, not every individual; so, Acts x. 12. in the vision that Peter saw of the sheet let down from heaven, in which there were all manner of four-footed beasts[221], &c. and it is said concerning our Saviour, that he went about, healing all manner of sickness, and all manner of diseases among the people[222]; and elsewhere God promises, that he will pour out his Spirit on all flesh, Acts ii. 17. that is, persons of all ages and conditions, young and old.

There are many instances of the like nature in scripture, which justify this sense of the word all; and it seems plain, from the context, that it is to be so taken in the former of the scriptures, but now referred to, when it is said, God will have all men to be saved; for he exhorts, in ver. 1. that prayer and supplication should be made for all men, that is, for men of all characters and conditions in the world, and, in particular, for kings, and all that are in authority, and thereby he takes occasion to resolve a matter in dispute among them, whether those kings that were tyrants and oppressors, ought to be prayed for, when he tells them, that all sorts of men are to be prayed for; and the reason of this is assigned, namely, because God will have all men, that is, all sorts of men, to be saved.

Moreover, they whom God will save, are said to be such as shall come, that is, as he will bring to the knowledge of the truth. Now it is certain, that God never designed to bring every individual to the knowledge of the truth; for, if he did, his purpose is not fulfilled, or his providence runs counter to it, for every individual of mankind have not the gospel; therefore it follows, that since God did not purpose that all men should come to the knowledge of the truth, the foregoing words, Who will have all men to be saved, are not to be understood in any other sense, but as signifying all sorts of men. Neither can it well be proved, whatever may be attempted in order thereto, that the following words, which speak of Christ’s being a Mediator between God and men, intend, that he performs this office for every individual man, even for those that shall not be saved; for then it would be executed in vain for a great part of them, as will be farther considered in its proper place; therefore we must conclude, that, in the former of these scriptures, nothing else is intended, but that God determined to give saving grace to all sorts of men.

And as for the latter, in which the apostle Peter says, that God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance; there the word all is expressly limited, in the context, as referring only to those who are elect and faithful; and therefore he says, including himself among them, that the Lord is long-suffering to us-ward. Now if we observe the character which he gives of the church, to which he writes, in the beginning of both his epistles, (which, as he says, in ver. 1. of this chapter, were directed to the same persons) it is as great as is given of any in scripture; and they are distinguished from those profane scoffers, who walked after their own lusts, and other ungodly men, whose perdition he speaks of, as what would befal them in the dissolution of the world, by fire, in the day of Judgment; and they are described not only as elect unto obedience, and as having obtained like precious faith with the apostles, but they were such as God would keep, through faith, unto salvation; therefore the apostle might well say, concerning them, that God determined that none of them should perish, without advancing any thing that militates against the doctrine we are maintaining.

Object. The apostle, in this verse, speaks of God, as willing that all should come to repentance; therefore they are distinguished from that part of the church, who had obtained like precious faith, and were included in the character that he gives of some of them, in both his epistles, which infers their being then in a state of salvation; therefore the word, all, in this text, is not subject to the limitation before mentioned, but must be applied to all the world, and consequently the meaning is, that God is not willing that any of mankind should perish, but that all should come to repentance.

Answ. The apostle, in this text, speaks of God’s deferring the day of judgment, and perdition of ungodly men, and so exercising his long-suffering towards the world in general; not that he designed to bring them all to repentance hereby, for that would be to intend a thing which he knew should never come to pass: But the end of his patience, to the world in general, is, that all whom he designed to bring to repentance, or who were chosen to it, as well as to obedience, and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus, should be brought to it.

There are other arguments, which they bring in defence of their sense of the doctrine of election, as supposing that it is not peremptory, determinate, or unchangeable, and such as infers the salvation of those who are the objects thereof, taken from those scriptures, which, as they apprehend, ascribe a kind of disappointment to God; as when he says, in Isa. v. 4. concerning his vineyard, to wit, the church of the Jews, Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes? and our Saviour’s words, in Luke xiii. 6. that he sought fruit on the fig-tree, meaning the church of the Jews in his day, but found none; and, speaking concerning Jerusalem, he says, in Matth. xxiii. 37, 38. How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! Behold, your house is left unto you desolate; therefore they conclude, that God’s purpose, or design of grace, may be defeated; so that these, and many other scriptures, not unlike to them, are inconsistent with the doctrine of election, as ascertaining the event, to wit, the salvation of those who are chosen to eternal life; which leads us, particularly to consider the sense thereof.

As to the first of them, in which God says, by the prophet, What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes? He condescends therein to speak of himself after the manner of men, as he often does in scripture, and is said to look for what might reasonably have been expected, as the consequence of all the means of grace, which he had vouchsafed to them; the reasonableness of the thing is called his looking for it, as though he should say, it might have been expected, from the nature of the thing, that they, who had been laid under such obligations, should express some gratitude for them, and so have brought forth some fruit, to the glory of God. And those words, which seem to attribute disappointment to him, when it is said, I looked, &c. signifying nothing else but the ingratitude of the people, that they did not walk agreeably to the obligations they were under; not that God was really disappointed, for that would militate against his omniscience. He knew, before he laid these obligations on them, what their behaviour would be; therefore, had he eyes of flesh, or seen as man seeth, their behaviour would have tended to disappoint him; but there is no disappointment in the divine mind, though the sin reproved in the people be the same as though it had had a tendency to defeat the divine purpose, or disappoint his expectation.

As for that other scripture, in which it is said, that he sought fruit on the fig-tree, but found none, that is to be explained in the same way, he sought fruit, that is, it might reasonably have been expected, but he found none, that is, they did not act agreeably to the means of grace which they enjoyed. Therefore neither this, nor the other scripture, does in the least argue, that the purpose of God was not concerned about the event, or that he did not know what it would be; for, as his providential dispensation gives us ground to conclude, that he determined to leave them to themselves, so he knew beforehand that this, through the corruption of their nature, would issue in their unfruitfulness, otherwise he is not omniscient. Therefore it follows, that neither of these scriptures have the least tendency to overthrow the doctrine of the certainty and peremptoriness of the divine purpose.

As to what our Saviour says, relating to his willingness, to have gathered Jerusalem, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but they would not, it may be taken, without the least absurdity attending the sense thereof, as referring to the end and design of his ministry among them; and it is as though he should say, your nation shall be broken, and you scattered, as a punishment inflicted on you for your iniquities, and this destruction would have been prevented, had you believed in me; so that all that can be inferred from hence, is, that Christ’s ministry and doctrine were attended with that convincing evidence, being confirmed by so many undoubted miracles, that their unbelief was not only charged on them as a crime, but was the occasion of their ruin; or (as it is said in the following words) of their houses being left unto them desolate. And this might have been prevented, by their making a right improvement of that common grace, which they had; for though it be not in man’s power,[223] without the special influence of divine grace, to believe to the saving of the soul; yet I know no one who denies that it is in his power to do more good, and avoid more evil, than he does, or so far to attend to the preaching of the gospel, as not to oppose it with that malice and envy as the Jews did; and, had they paid such a deference to Christ’s ministry, as this amounted to, they would not have been exposed to those judgments which afterwards befel them; for it is one thing to say, that men, by improving common grace, can attain salvation, and another thing to conclude, that they might have escaped temporal judgments thereby.

Therefore, if it be enquired, what was God’s intention in giving them the gospel? the answer is very plain: It was not that hereby he might bring them all into a state of salvation, for then it would have taken effect; but it was, as appears by the event, to bring those, that should be saved among them, to that salvation, and to let others know, whether they would hear, or whether they would forbear, that God had a right to their obedience, and therefore that the message which the Redeemer brought to them, ought to have met with better entertainment from them, than it did. And if it be farther enquired, whether, provided they had believed, their ruin would have been prevented? This is an undoubted consequence, from our Saviour’s words; but yet it does not follow, from hence, that it was a matter of uncertainty with God, whether they should believe or no; for it is one thing to say, that he would not have punished them, unless they rejected our Saviour; and another thing to suppose that he could not well determine whether they would reject him or no. So that the purpose of God must be considered, as agreeing with the event of things, and the design of Christ’s ministry, as being what it really was; yet he might, notwithstanding, take occasion to charge the Jews’ destruction upon their own obstinacy.

There are many other scriptures, which they bring to the like purpose, which I pass over, because the sense they give of them differs not much from that, in which they understand the scriptures before-mentioned, and their reasoning from them, in opposition to this doctrine is the same, and the same answer may be given to it.

However, I cannot but observe, that as, from some scriptures, they attribute disappointment to God, they represent him, from others, as wishing, but in vain, that it had happened otherwise, and as being grieved at the disappointment; so they understand those words, in Psal. lxxxi. 13, 14. Oh! that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways! I should soon have subdued their enemies, and turned my hand against their adversaries; and that, in Luke xix. 42. If, or, Oh! that thou hadst known, even thou at least, in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes.

As for the sense of these, and such-like scriptures, it is no more than this, that the thing which they refused to perform, was, in itself, most desirable, or a matter to be wished for, and not that God can be said to wish for a thing that cannot be attained. And when our Saviour laments over Jerusalem, as apprehending their destruction near at hand, whether the words are to be considered in the form of a wish, that it had been otherwise, or an intimation, that if they had known the things of their peace, their destruction would not have ensued, it is only to be understood as a representation of the deplorableness of their condition, which, with a tenderness of human compassion, he could not speak of, without tears: Yet we are not to suppose that this mode of expression is applicable to the divine will; so that, when the misery of that people is hereby set forth, we are not to strain the sense of words, taken from human modes of speaking, so far, as to suppose that the judicial acts of God, in punishing a sinful people, are not the execution of his purpose relating thereunto.

Again, when the Spirit is said to be grieved, Eph. iv. 30. or resisted, Acts vii. 15. nothing else is intended hereby, but that men act in such a way, as that, had the Spirit of God been subject to human passions, it would have been matter of grief to him. But far be it from us to suppose that the divine nature is liable hereunto, or that any disappointment can attend his purposes, which has a tendency to excite this passion in men. And when he is said to be resisted, it is not meant as though his will, or design, could be rendered ineffectual, but it only implies, that men oppose what the Spirit communicated by the prophets, or in his word. This a person may do, and yet it may be truly said, that the counsel of the Lord standeth for ever, the thoughts of his heart to all generations, Psal. xxxiii. 11.

VIII. We shall proceed to consider several objections that are made against the doctrine we have endeavoured to maintain, and what reply may be given to them. Some have been occasionally mentioned under several foregoing heads, and there are others which require a distinct reply.

Object. 1. That the doctrine of absolute Election and Reprobation was altogether unknown by the Fathers in the three first centuries, and that it was first brought into the Christian world by Augustin; before whose time, the only account we have of it, is, that God foreknowing who would live piously, or believe and persevere to the end, accordingly predestinated them to eternal life, or determined to pass them by, and so is said to have rejected them.[224]

Answ. This objection, were it literally true, cannot have any tendency to overthrow this doctrine, in the opinion of those, who depend not on the credit of Augustin, as defending it, on the one hand, nor are staggered by the opposition made to it by some of the Fathers, who lived before his time, on the other; and therefore we might have passed it by, without making any reply to it. However, since it contains a kind of insult, or boast, which will have its weight with some, it may be expected that a few things should be said, in answer to it.

We will not deny but that the Fathers, before the Pelagian heresy was broached in the world; expressed themselves, in many parts of their writings, in so lax and unguarded a manner concerning the doctrines of predestination, free-will, and grace, that, had they lived after those doctrines began to be publickly contested, one would have thought that they had verged too much towards Pelagius’s side; but, since they were not the subject-matter of controversy in those ages, it is no wonder to find them less cautious in their modes of expressing themselves, than they might otherwise have been; and therefore it is a just observation, which one[225] makes of this matter, that they had to do with the Manichees, and some of the heathen, who supposed that men sinned by a fatal necessity of nature, as though there were no wicked action committed in the world, but some would be ready to excuse it, from the impotency or propensity of human nature to sin, which rendered it, as they supposed, unavoidable; and others took occasion, from hence, to charge God with being the author of sin. It is very probable the Fathers, in those ages, were afraid of giving countenance to this vile opinion, and therefore they were less on their guard, in some respects, than they would have been, had they been to encounter with Pelagius, or his followers.

And indeed, Augustin himself, before he took occasion to enquire more diligently into the state of this controversy, gave into the same way of expressing his sentiments about the power of nature, or the grace of God, as some others of the Fathers had done, and concluded that faith was in our power, as well a duty incumbent on us, but afterwards retracted such modes of speaking as the result of more mature deliberation.[226] But notwithstanding though he expressed himself in a different way from them, yet he often takes occasion, from some passages which he purposely refers to in their writings, to vindicate them as holding the same faith, though not always using the same phrases. And, after he had thus defended Cyprian and Ambrose, in that respect, he puts a very charitable construction on their unguarded way of expressing themselves, and says, that this arose from their not having any occasion to engage in that controversy, which was on foot in his day.[227] The same might be said to Gregory Nazianzen, Basil, Chrysostom, and several others, whom some modern writers defend from the charge of favouring the Pelagian scheme, by referring to some places in their writings, in which they acknowledge, that the salvation of men is owing to the grace of God, whereby all occasions of glorying are taken away from the creature,[228] or expressions used by them to the like purpose. And the learned Vossius, though he acknowledges, that the Fathers, before Augustin, expressed themselves in such a way, as is represented in the objection, yet he vindicates them from the charge of verging towards the Pelagian, or Semi-Pelagian heresy; inasmuch as he concludes, that when they speak of God’s predestinating men to eternal life, on the foresight of good works, they only intend those good works, which God would enable them to perform; and this will clear many of those expressions which they use, from this imputation.[229] But if all these endeavours to establish our claim to those Fathers, who lived before Augustin, as not being opposers of this doctrine, appear to be to no purpose, yet this will not weaken the truth thereof; for we suppose it to be founded on scripture, and several consequences plainly deduced from it, and therefore it doth not want the suffrage of human testimony to support it.

But if it be said, that this is a very desirable thing as doubtless it is, we might consider this doctrine, as obtaining very much in, and after Augustin’s time, being examined and defended by very considerable numbers of men, who have transmitted it down to posterity, throughout the various ages of the church. Notwithstanding, by whomsoever it is defended, or opposed, we lay no great stress on human authority, as a judicious divine well observes[230]. We shall therefore proceed to consider some other objections, which it will be more necessary for us to give a particular answer to.

Object. 2. To the doctrine of God’s purpose’s ascertaining all events, it is objected that he has not determined the bounds of the life of man, but that it may be lengthened, or shortened, by the intervention of second causes. This is nothing else but the applying one branch of this controversy, relating to the decrees of God, to a particular instance. And it was very warmly debated in the Netherlands, towards the beginning of the last century.[231] This objection is managed in a popular way, and is principally adapted to give prejudice to those who are disposed to pass over, or set aside, these necessary distinctions, which, if duly considered, would not only shorten the debate, but set the matter in a clearer light, which we shall endeavour to do; but shall first consider their method of reasoning on this subject, and the sense they give of some scriptures, which as they suppose, give countenance to this objection.

They therefore thus argue, that if the term of life be immoveably fixed by God, then it is a vain thing for any one to use those means that are necessary to preserve it, and the skill of the physician, as well as the virtue of medicine, is altogether needless; and the good advice which is often given to persons, to take heed that they do not shorten their lives by intemperance, will be to no purpose; for they have a reply ready at hand, namely, that they shall live their appointed time, do what they will. And that, which is still more absurd, is, that if a person attempts to lay violent hands upon himself, it will be to no purpose, if God has determined that he shall live longer; or if he has determined that he shall die, then he is guilty of no crime, for he only fulfils the divine purpose.

They add, moreover, that this not only renders all our supplications to God to preserve our lives, or to restore us from sickness, when we are in danger of death, needless; but our conduct herein is a practical denial of the argument we maintain; for what is this, but to suppose that the bounds of life are unalterably fixed.

As to what concerns the countenance, which they suppose, scripture gives to this objection, they refer us to those places in which the life of man is said to be lengthened or shortened; accordingly, there are promises of long life given to the righteous who love God, and keep his commandments, Exod. xx. 12. Deut. iv. 40. 1 Kings iii. 14. and Solomon says expressly, The fear of the Lord prolongeth days; but the years of the wicked shall be shortened, Prov. x. 27. and elsewhere he speaks of the wicked’s dying before their time, Eccl. vii. 17. and the Psalmist says, that bloody and deceitful men shall not live out half their days, Psal. lv. 23.

They also refer to that scripture in which Martha tells our Saviour, that if he had been with her brother Lazarus, before his death, he had not died, John xi. 21. which either contradicts the argument we are maintaining, or else Martha was mistaken; which, had she been, our Saviour would have reproved her, for asserting that which was false.

Moreover, they add, that when the old world was destroyed in the deluge, and so died before their time, they might have prolonged their lives, had they repented in that space of time, wherein Noah as a preacher of righteousness, gave them warning of this desolating judgment, and Christ, by his Spirit, in him, preached to them, as the apostle says, 1 Pet. iii. 20. which, doubtless, was with a design to bring them to repentance, and save them from this destruction.

And when Abraham pleaded with God in the behalf of Sodom, God tells him, that if he found but ten righteous persons in the city, he would spare it for their sake, Gen. xviii. 32. which is inconsistent with his determination, that they should all die by an untimely death, if the bounds of their lives had been fixed.

And lastly, they refer to that scripture, in which God first told Hezekiah, that he should die, and not live, and afterwards, that he would add to his days fifteen years, Isa. xxxviii. 1. compared with 5.

Answ. To prepare our way for a reply to this objection, let us consider that the contrary side of the question, which we are maintaining, is equally supported by express texts of scripture: thus it is said His days are determined, the number of his months are with thee; thou hast appointed him bounds that he cannot pass, Job xiv. 5. than which, nothing can be more express, where he speaks concerning that decree of God, which respects all mankind, without exception, and sets forth his absolute sovereignty, and the irreversibleness of his purpose herein; and the apostle Paul, in reasoning with the Athenians concerning the decree and providence of God in whom we live, move, and have our being says, that he hath determined the times before appointed, and fixed the bounds of their habitation, Acts xvii. 26. As he has placed men upon the earth, by his decree and providence, so he has determined not only the place where they should live, but the time of their continuance in the world. This was no new doctrine; for the heathen had been instructed in it by their own philosophers and therefore the apostle speaks their sense, especially that of the stoicks, about this matter.[232] When he mentions the times are determined, it is not to be understood of the seasons of the year, which God has fixed to return in their certain courses, but the seasons appointed for every work, or for every occurrence of life; and, among the rest, the time of life, and of serving our generation therein, as Solomon expressly says, in Eccl. iii. 1, 2. To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose; a time to be born, and a time to die. Several other scriptures might be brought to the same purpose, as a farther proof hereof, namely, those in which God has foretold the death of particular persons, 2 Sam. xii. 14. 1 Kings xiv. 12. chap. xxii. 28.

Moreover, if the providence of God is conversant about all the actions of men, and the hairs of their head are all numbered, Matt. x. 30. so that the smallest changes in life do not come by chance, but are subject thereto; then certainly the time of life must be subjected to his providence, who is styled, Our life, and the length of our days, Deut. xxx. 20. He must therefore certainly be considered as the sovereign Arbiter thereof, which doctrine none that own a providence, can, with any shadow of reason, gainsay; so that this doctrine is agreeable not only to several scriptures, but to the very nature and perfections of God.

This being premised we return to the arguments laid down against it, and the scriptures cited to give countenance to them. It is certain, that two contradictory propositions cannot be both true in the same sense; and the scriptures, which are exactly harmonious, as well as infallibly true, no where contradict themselves. Therefore we must consider what answer may be given to the objections before-mentioned; and, that our work herein may be shortened, we may observe, that the bounds of life are twofold; either such as men might have lived to, according to the common course of nature if nothing had intervened to ruin the constitution, or no disease, or violent death, had broken the thread of life before; or that time which God has ordained that men shall live, whether it be longer or shorter: the former of these respects the lengthening or shortening of life, by the influence of second causes; and, in this respect, we do not suppose that the terms of life are immoveably fixed, but that in some, it is longer, and, in others shorter; for it is certain, that by intemperance, or other methods, men may shorten their days; or, by laying violent hands on themselves, not live the time that otherwise they would have done. But if we consider the over-ruling, or disposing providence of God, as conversant about this matter, there is nothing happens without the concurrence thereof. Therefore persons, who shorten their days by intemperance, do this by the permissive providence of God; though he be not the author of their intemperance, which is sinful, yet he permits, or determines not to hinder it, and consequently though he has fixed the bounds of life, which can neither be lengthened or shortened, yet knowing what men will do, in a natural way, to shorten them, he determines that this shall put an end to their lives.[233] And when we read, in scripture, of God’s delivering him, who dies a violent death, into his hands, who is the immediate cause of it, Exod. xxi. 13. God is not the author of the sin of the murderer; yet providence is not wholly to be exempted from that action, so far as it is not sinful, but purely natural, or the effect of power; and, when this is said to have a tendency to shorten the life of man, it does not detract from the time that he had in his own purpose affixed to it. We must also consider, that his decree and providence respects the means, as well as the end, which are always inseparably connected, and equally subject thereunto.

These things being premised, we proceed more particularly to answer the arguments brought against this doctrine. And,

1. When it is said, that God’s fixing the bounds of life, renders all means for the preservation thereof unnecessary, that depends upon a false supposition, namely, that God does not ordain the means as well as the end. If God had determined that persons shall live, he has determined to give them the supports of life, and to prevent every thing that might tend to destroy it; so, on the other hand, when he takes them away, by a disease, this is ordained by him, as a means conducive thereunto. If health is to be supported, or recovered, by means, and thereby life preserved, God has ordained that these means shall be used, as well as the end attained.

2. As to persons shortening their lives by intemperance, this has a natural tendency to do it; so that, though God be not the author of the sin, he certainly knows, before-hand, what methods the sinner will take to hasten his end, and leaves him to himself; so that, though the sin be not from God, the punishment, which is the consequence thereof, may truly be said to be from him, and therefore this was determined by him.

And when it is farther objected, that they, who destroy their health, or lay violent hands on themselves, cannot be said to sin in so doing, because they do that which tends to fulfil the divine will, provided God has determined the fatal event; herein they oppose this doctrine, without taking the words in the same sense in which it is maintained; for it is well known, that the will of God is sometimes taken for that prescribed rule that he has given us, which is the matter of our duty, in which sense we readily allow, that he that fulfils it, cannot be said to sin. But, besides this, it is sometimes taken for his purpose to permit sin; or, to give the sinner up to his own heart’s lusts, to act that which he hates, and is resolved to punish. In this sense, the sinner is said to do that which God would not have suffered him to do, had he willed the contrary; but it is a very groundless insinuation, to suppose that this exempts him from the guilt of sin.

3. To say, that God’s fixing the bounds of life, is inconsistent with our praying, that our lives may be prolonged, or that we may be delivered from sickness, or death, when we are apprehensive that we are drawing nigh to it, is no just consequence; for as we do not pray that God would alter his purpose, when we desire any blessing of him, but suppose this to be hid from us, and expect not to know it any otherwise than by the event; so a person, who prays to be delivered from sickness, or death, is not to address the divine Majesty, as one who presumptuously, and without ground, supposes that God has decreed that he shall immediately die, but as one who hopes, or who has no ground to conclude otherwise, but that he will make it appear, by answering his prayer, that he has determined to spare his life. For the secret purpose of God, relating to the event of things, is no more to be a rule of duty, inasmuch as it is secret, than if there had been no purpose relating thereunto; but yet it does not follow from hence, that this matter is not determined by him.

4. As to those scriptures, that seem to give countenance to this objection, they may, without the least absurdity, be understood consistently with other scriptures, which have been before produced, whereby it is proved, that God has fixed, or determined the bounds of life. As for those promises, which God has made of a long life, to those that love him, and keep his commandments, the meaning thereof is this, that he will certainly bestow this blessing, either in kind or value, on those whose conversation is such as is therein described; this none can deny, who rightly understand the meaning of that scripture, in which it is said, that godliness hath the promise of the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come, 1 Tim. iv. 8. But, so far as it affects the argument we are maintaining, we must consider, that that efficacious grace, whereby we are enabled to love God, and keep his commandments, is as much his gift, and consequently the result of his purpose, as the blessing connected with it; therefore if he has determined that we shall enjoy a long and happy life in this world, and to enable us to live a holy life therein; if both the end and the means are connected together, and are equally the objects of God’s purpose, then it cannot justly be inferred from hence, that the event, relating to the lengthening or shortening our lives, is not determined by him.

As for those scriptures that speak of the wicked’s dying before their time, or not living half their days, these are to be understood agreeably to that distinction before-mentioned, between men’s dying sooner, than they would have done according to the course of nature, or the concurrence of second causes thereunto, in which sense it is literally true, that many do not live out half their days; and their dying sooner than God had before determined. May not the sovereign Disposer of all things inflict a sudden and immediate death, as the punishment of sin, without giving us reason to conclude that this was not pre-concerted, if we may so express it, or determined beforehand?

As for that other scripture, referred to in the objection, in which Martha tells our Saviour, that if he had been with Lazarus, when sick, he had not died, she does not suppose Christ’s being there, would have frustrated the divine purpose, for then, he would, doubtless, have reproved her for it; whereas, in reality, he did not come to visit him, because he knew that God had purposed that he should die, and be afterwards raised from the dead; so that this does not argue that he has not fixed the bounds, or term of life.

Again, as for that argument, to support this objection, taken from the destruction of the world in the flood, or that of Sodom, by fire from heaven, that they might have prolonged their lives, had they repented, we do not deny but that this would have been the consequence thereof, but then their repentance would have been as much determined by God, as their deliverance from that untimely death, which befel them.

The last scripture mentioned, in which God, by the prophet Isaiah, tells Hezekiah, that he should die, and not live; notwithstanding which, fifteen years were added to his life, which is very frequently insisted on, by those who deny the unalterable decree of God, relating to life and death, as that which they apprehend to be an unanswerable argument to support it: to this it may be replied, that when God says, Set thine house in order, for thou shalt die, and not live, he gave Hezekiah to understand, that his disease was what we call mortal, namely, such as no skill of the physician, or natural virtue of medicine, could cure, and therefore that he must expect to die, unless God recovered him by a miracle; and Hezekiah, doubtless, took the warning in this sense, otherwise it would have been a preposterous thing for him to have prayed for life, as it would have been an affront to God, to have desired to have changed his purpose. But God, on the other hand, designed, by this warning, to put him upon importunate prayer for life; therefore when he says, I will add to thy days fifteen years, the meaning is only this, though thou mightest before have expected death, my design in giving thee that intimation, was, that thou shouldest pray for life, which might be given thee by a miracle, and now I will work a miracle, and fulfil, in this respect, what I before purposed in adding to thy life fifteen years.

Object. 3. It is farther objected, against the doctrine of election and reprobation, and particularly the immutability of God’s purpose therein, that it tends to establish a fatal necessity of things, and overthrow that known distinction that there is between things, as necessary, or contingent, as though nothing in the whole series of causes and effects could happen otherwise than it does, and God himself were confined to such a method of acting, that it was impossible for him to have done the contrary; which is nothing else but the Stoical doctrine of fate applied to, and defended by some scriptures, though it be contrary to others, which speak of the uncertainty of future events.

Thus God speaks of the Jews, turning from their iniquities, and his bestowing pardoning mercy, as the result thereof, as an uncertain event, when he says, in Jer. xxxvi. 3. It may be that the house of Judah will hear all the evil, which I purpose to do unto them, that they may return every man from his evil way, that I may forgive their iniquity and their sin. So when God gave the Jews a sign, immediately before the captivity, taken from the prophet Ezekiel’s personating one that was removing his stuff, or household-goods, as signifying, that the nation in general should soon remove to other habitations, when carried captive into Babylon, he adds, upon this occasion, It may be they will consider, though they be a rebellious house, Ezek. xii. 3. And the prophet Zephaniah exhorts the people to seek righteousness and meekness, and, as the consequence thereof, says, It may be ye shall be hid in the day of the Lord’s anger, Zeph. ii. 3. And the apostle speaks of the uncertainty of the divine dispensations of grace, when he advises Timothy, in meekness, to instruct those that oppose themselves, if God, peradventure, will give them repentance, to the acknowledging of the truth, 2 Tim. ii. 25. which is directly contrary to the unalterable necessity of events, depending upon the divine purpose, according to the doctrine of election.

Answ. 1. As to the former part of this objection, in which this doctrine is pretended to have taken its rise from, and to be agreeable to, that of the Stoics, concerning fate and destiny, it will not be much to our purpose to enquire what was the opinion of that sect of philosophers concerning it; and, indeed, it will be difficult to fix on a just sense thereof, in which they all agree. Some are of opinion, that many of them intended nothing else thereby, but the immutability of God’s purposes, but the dispensation of his providence, being a necessary execution thereof; and when he is said to be bound by the laws of fate, they mean, that he cannot act contrary to what himself has determined.[234] And, had it been universally explained by them in this sense, it would not have done them much service, who oppose the doctrine of election, to have compared it therewith; for it would only have proved the agreeableness of the doctrine of the immutability of God’s purpose, relating to all events, to the light of nature, as some of the heathen were thereby instructed in it. But since this does not appear to be the sense of all the Stoicks about the doctrine of fate, but some of them understood it in the same sense as it is represented in the objection, this we cannot but militate against, and assert the doctrine of election to be very remote from it.

Therefore we need only, in answer to this part of the objection, explain what we mean, when we maintain the necessity of events, as founded on the will of God. We are far from asserting that there is a necessary connexion between second causes, and their respective effects, in which some are produced arbitrarily, by the will of intelligent creatures; and when we call any thing a necessary cause, producing effects, according to its own nature, we suppose that this is agreeable to the order, or course of nature, which was fixed by God. All that we pretend to prove, is the dependence of things on the divine will, and the necessity of God’s purposes taking effect; so that that which is arbitrary or contingent, which might be, or not be, as depending on, or relating to second causes, is eventually necessary, as it is an accomplishment of the divine purpose. Therefore we always distinguish between things being contingent, with respect to us, and their being so, with respect to God; and, consequently, though it may be, or peradventure, may be applied to the apparent event of things, these words can never be applied to the fulfilling of the divine will; and this leads us to consider the latter part of the objection; therefore,

2. As to the scripture’s speaking concerning the uncertainty of future events, in those places mentioned in the objection, these, and all others of the like nature, in which such a mode of speaking is used, may be explained, by distinguishing between what might reasonably have been expected to be the event of things, supposing men had not been given up to the blindness of their mind, and hearts, to act below the dictates of reason, without consulting their own safety and happiness, or expressing their gratitude to God; and what would be the real event of things, which God was not pleased to reveal, and therefore was unknown to them. Thus, when the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel represented the repentance and reformation of Israel as an uncertain event, as well as their forgiveness, and deliverance from the captivity, connected with it, in such dubious terms, It may be they will consider and return, every man from his evil way; it implies, that this was what might have been reasonably expected by men, though it was no matter of uncertainty to the heart-searching God, who knoweth the end from the beginning, and perfectly foresees what will be the event of things, which, in various respects, are under the direction of his providence. Though it could hardly be thought, by men, that such an admonition should be treated with such contempt, yet God knew how they would behave themselves; there was no peradventure with respect to his judgment thereof; he knew that they would not repent, otherwise he would have inclined their wills, and effectually have persuaded them to exercise this grace, and thereby have prevented his expectation, or determination, from being disappointed, or frustrated.

If it be objected, that, according to this sense of the text, the prophet’s message to the people would have been to no purpose, and his ministry, among them, exercised in vain; or that it was contrary to the wisdom and goodness of God to make this overture to them, when he knew it would not be complied with.

To this it may be replied, that the great God is not bound to decline the asserting his right to man’s obedience, or requiring that which is a just debt to him, though he knew that they would not comply with his demand thereof; and, indeed, this objection cannot be maintained, without supposing, that, when the gospel is preached to man, the glory of the divine wisdom and goodness therein cannot be secured, unless we conclude either that God doth not know whether man will embrace it, or no, which is contrary to his omniscience; or that he determines, that all, to whom the gospel is preached, shall embrace it, which is contrary to matter of fact. But there may be a medium between both these, which vindicates the divine perfections, in ordering that the gospel should be preached, and thereby asserting his sovereignty, and unalienable right to their obedience; accordingly, there might be a small remnant among them, in whom God designed that this message should take effect. And will any one say, that because the goodness of God was not herein demonstrated to all, that therefore no glory was brought to that perfection?

And if it be farther said, that supposing there were some who turned from their evil ways, the captivity, which was threatened, was not hereby prevented, and therefore the promise, relating thereunto, did not take place; to this it may be replied; that as God did not give them ground to expect this blessing, unless this repentance should be more universal, than it really was, so he had various ways to testify his regard to those who should receive advantage by this message, for whose sake it was principally intended.

As for that other scripture, in which God advises his people to seek righteousness and meekness, and, as the consequence hereof, says, it may be ye may be hid in the day of the Lord’s fierce anger; the meaning is, that they, who were enabled to exercise these graces, should either have some instances of temporal deliverance vouchsafed to them; or if not, that they should have no reason to complain that the exercise thereof was altogether in vain.

As for that scripture, in which the apostle bids Timothy to exhort those that oppose the gospel, if, peradventure, God would give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth; the meaning is, that it was uncertain to Timothy whether God would give this grace or no; and therefore he must preach the gospel, whatever were the event thereof: Nevertheless, it was no matter of uncertainty, with respect to God, who must be supposed to know what grace he designs to bestow, and therefore the event of things may be dubious to us, and yet be certain with respect to him.

Object. 4. Another objection, against the doctrine of election and reprobation, is, that it is altogether inconsistent with the preaching of the gospel; for if God has determined the final state of man, so that his purpose cannot be altered, then it is a preposterous thing, not to say illusory, for grace to be offered to the chief of sinners, which must certainly argue, that it is impossible to be attained by them; and, since the overture is universal, we must conclude that God has put all mankind into a salvable state, and consequently not excluded any from salvation by his peremptory and unchangeable decree. To what purpose are the promises of the gospel held forth, to all that sit under the sound thereof, if it be impossible for them to attain the blessings promised therein? Or what regard could men be supposed to have to the promises, if they were not a declaration of God’s purpose? And, on the other hand, the threatnings denounced would be as little regarded, as an expedient to deter men from sinning, if their state were unalterably fixed by God, according to this doctrine of election, as it has been before considered.

Answ. That we may proceed with greater clearness in answering this objection, we shall first shew what we mean by preaching the gospel, which is nothing else but a declaration of God’s revealed will, and our duty pursuant thereunto, which is to be made known, particularly what is contained in the word of God, relating to the salvation of men, and the way which he has ordained in order to their attaining it. Therefore,

1. When this salvation is said to be offered in the gospel, we intend nothing else thereby, but that a declaration is made to sinners, that there are many invaluable privileges which Christ has purchased for, and will, in his own time and way, apply to all those whom God has purposed to save; and, since we cannot describe them by name, and no unregenerate person has ground to conclude that he is of that number, therefore there is a farther declaration to be made, namely, that God has inseparably connected this salvation, which he has chosen them to, with faith and repentance, and the exercise of all other graces, which, as they are God’s gift, and to be prayed for, and expected, in a diligent attendance on all his ordinances; so they are to be considered as the mark and evidences of their being chosen to salvation, without which, it is certainly a vain and presumptuous thing for any one to pretend that he has a right to it, as the object of God’s eternal election.

2. No one, who preaches the gospel, has any warrant from God to tell any individual person that whether he repents and believes, or no, he shall be saved; or, to direct his discourse to him, as one that is chosen thereunto, much less to give the impenitent sinner occasion to conclude, that, though he obstinately, and finally, remain in a state of rebellion against God, notwithstanding he may hope to be saved, because there is a number of mankind chosen to salvation; for this is not to declare God’s revealed will, but that which is directly contrary to it, and therefore not to preach the gospel. Therefore,

3. All, who sit under the sound of the gospel, ought to look upon it as a declaration of God’s design to save a part of mankind, under the preaching thereof, and among them the chief of sinners, which they have a sufficient ground to conclude themselves to be; but yet a door of hope is so far opened hereby, that they have no reason to conclude that they are rejected, any more than that they are elected; and, while they wait on God’s instituted means of grace, they have, at least, this encouragement, that, peradventure, they may be of the number of God’s elect; and, when they find in themselves that faith, which is the evidence thereof, then they may determine their interest in, and lay claim to this privilege, when they are enabled to make their calling, and thereby their election sure.

And as for the promises and threatnings, these are to be considered by unregenerate persons, without determining their right to the one, or falling under the other, as elected or rejected; for that is still supposed to be a secret; therefore they are to regard the promise, as a declaration of God’s purpose, relating to the connexion that there is between faith and salvation, as an inducement to perform the one, in expectation of the other. And as for the threatnings, though they determine the present state of impenitent sinners to be such, in which they are undone and miserable, yet they are not to be extended to those events, which are hid in the purpose of God, so as to give any one ground to conclude that he is thereby finally excluded from salvation, since such an exclusion as this is inseparably connected with final impenitency and unbelief.

Object. 5. It is farther objected, that this doctrine is, in many instances subversive of practical religion. And,

1. That it is inconsistent with the duty of prayer; for if God has determined to save a person, what need has he to ask a blessing, which is already granted? and, if he has determined to reject him, his prayer will be in vain.

2. It is farther supposed, that it leads to presumption, on the one hand, or despair, on the other; election, to presumption; reprobation, to despair. And,

3. They add, that it leads to licentiousness, as it is inconsistent with our using endeavours that we may be saved: for to what purpose is it for persons to strive to enter in at the strait gate, when all their endeavours will be ineffectual, if they are not elected? or to what purpose is it for persons to use any endeavours to escape the wrath of God, due to sin, if they are appointed to wrath, and so must necessarily perish?

Answ. This objection is, beyond measure, shocking; and it is no wonder, that a doctrine, that is supposed to have such consequences attending it, is treated with the utmost degree of detestation: but as the greatest part of the objections against it, are no other than misrepresentations thereof, so it is no difficult matter to reply to them, to the conviction of those who are disposed to judge impartially of the matter in controversy between us. We shall therefore proceed to reply to the several branches of this objection. And,

1. As to what concerns the duty of prayer; when we are engaged in it, we are not to suppose that we are to deal with God, in such a way, as when we have to do with men, whom we suppose to be undetermined, and that they are to be moved, by intreaties, to alter their present resolutions, and to give us what we ask for; for that is to conceive of him as altogether such an one as ourselves; accordingly, we are not to conclude, that he has not determined to grant the thing that we are to pray to him for; for that would be presumptuously to enter into his secret purpose, since he has no where told us we shall be denied the blessings we want; but rather that there is forgiveness with him, and mercy for the chief of sinners, as an encouragement to this duty; and, besides this, has given us farther ground to hope for a gracious answer of prayer, where he gives a heart to seek him. Therefore we are to behave ourselves, in this duty, as those who pretend not to know God’s secret purpose, but rather desire to wait for some gracious intimation or token for good, that he will hear and answer our prayer; therefore his secret purpose is no more inconsistent with this duty, than if, with those that deny the doctrine we are maintaining, we should conclude that this matter is not determined by him.

2. As to this doctrine’s leading to presumption, or despair, there is no ground to conclude that it has a tendency to either of them. It cannot lead to presumption, inasmuch as election is not discovered to any one till he believes; therefore an unconverted person has no ground to presume and conclude, that all is well with him, because he is elected; for that is boldly to determine a thing that he knows nothing of; the objection therefore, with respect to such, supposes that to be known, which remains a secret. And, on the other hand, they have no ground to despair, on a supposition that they are finally rejected; for it is one thing to be the object of the decree of reprobation, which no one can, or ought to determine, concerning himself, so long as he is in this world, much more if we consider him as enjoying the means of grace, and a door of hope is open to him therein; and God has pleased to declare, in the gospel, that he will receive sinners that repent and believe in him, how unworthy soever they are; therefore such are not to conclude that their state is desperate, though it be exceeding dangerous, but to wait for the efficacy of the means of grace, and those blessings that accompany salvation.

And as for those that are in a converted state, this doctrine is far from having a tendency, either to lead them to presumption, or despair; but, on the other hand, to thankfulness to God, for his discriminating grace, which, when persons experience, they are not only encouraged to hope for farther blessings, but to perform those duties whereby they may express their gratitude to him. As for presumption, which is the only thing that election is pretended to lead them to, that cannot be the natural consequence or tendency thereof; for if they presume that they shall be saved, this is not to be reckoned a crime in them; for that presumption which is supposed to be so in the objection consists in a person’s expecting a blessing without reason; but this is contrary to the supposition that he is a believer; and it would be a strange method of reasoning to infer, that he, who has ground to conclude that he has a right to eternal life, from those marks and evidences of grace, which he finds in himself, is guilty of a sinful presumption, when he is induced hereby to lay claim to it; and therefore the sense of the objection, must be this, that a believer having been once enabled to conclude himself elected, may, from hence, take occasion, supposing that his work is done, and his end answered, to return to his former wicked life, and yet still presume that he shall be saved; whereas that would be a certain indication that he had no ground to conclude this, but was mistaken, when he thought that he had; so that this doctrine cannot lead a believer, as such, to presumption, and consequently the objection, in which it is supposed that it does, is founded on one of these two mistakes, viz. that every one, who is elected to salvation, knows his interest in this privilege, as though it were immediately revealed to him, without inferring it from any marks and evidences of grace that he finds in himself; or else, that it is impossible for any one, who thinks that he believes, and, from thence, concludes that he is elected, to appear afterwards to have been mistaken in the judgment, which he then passed upon himself; but either of these contain a misrepresentation of the consequences of the doctrine of election; neither is there any regard had to that necessary distinction that there is, between a person’s being chosen to eternal life, and his being able to determine himself to be interested in this privilege; and it is contrary to what we have before considered, that whenever God chooses to the end, he chooses to the means, which are inseparably connected with it, which is the only rule whereby we are warranted, when applying it to ourselves, to conclude that we shall be saved.

3. It cannot, in the least, be proved that this doctrine has any tendency to lead persons to licentiousness; nor is it inconsistent with our using the utmost endeavours to attain salvation. If it be said, that many vile persons take occasion, from hence, to give the reins to their corruption; that is not the natural, or necessary consequence thereof; since there is no truth but what may be abused. The apostle Paul did not think the doctrine of the grace of God, which he so strenuously maintained, was less true, Or glorious, because some drew this vile consequence from it, Let us continue in sin, that grace may abound, Rom. vi. 1.

And as for those means, which God has ordained to bring about the salvation of his people, we are obliged to attend upon them, though we know not, before-hand, what will certainly be the event thereof; and if through the blessing of God accompanying them, we are effectually called and sanctified, and thereby enabled to know our election, this will (agreeably to the experience of all true believers,) have a tendency to promote holiness.

Object. 6. It is farther objected, that more especially against the doctrine of reprobation, that it argues God to be the author of sin; and particularly in such instances as these, viz. with respect to the first entrance of sin into the world, and in God’s imputing the sin of our first parents to all their posterity, and afterwards suffering it to make such a progress as it has done ever since; and, most of all, when it is supposed that this is not only the result of the divine purpose, but that it also respects the blinding men’s minds, and hardening their hearts, and so rendering their final impenitency and perdition unavoidable.

Answ. To this it may be answered,

1. As to what concerns the first entrance of sin into the world, it cannot reasonably be denied, that the purpose of God was concerned about it, before it was committed, in the same sense as his actual providence was afterwards, namely, in permitting, though not effecting it; notwithstanding this was not the cause of the committing it, since a bare permission has no positive efficiency in order thereunto; the not hindering, or restraining a wicked action, does not render him the author of it. It is true, God knew how man would behave, and particularly, that he would mis-improve and forfeit that original righteousness, in which he was created, and that, by this means, he would contract that guilt, which was the consequence thereof, and thereby render himself liable to his just displeasure; to deny this, would be to deny that he foreknew that, from eternity, which he knew in time. And, so far as the actual providence of God was conversant about what was natural therein, so far his purpose determined that it should be; but neither does this argue him to be the author of sin. But this will be farther considered, when we speak concerning the actual providence of God under a following answer.[235]

2. As to that part of the objection, which respects the imputing the sin of our first parents to all their posterity, that is more frequently brought against this doctrine than any other; and it is generally represented in the most indefensible terms, without making any abatements as to the degree of punishment that was due to it; and, accordingly, they think that we can hardly have the front to affirm, that our arguments, in defence hereof, are agreeable to the divine perfections, as we pretend those others are, which have been brought in defence of this doctrine. But, I hope, we shall be able to maintain the doctrine of original sin, in consistency with the divine perfections, as well as scripture, in its proper place, to which we shall refer it.[236] Therefore all that I shall add, at present, is, that if the doctrine of original sin be so explained, as that it does not render God the author of sin, his purpose relating thereunto, which must be supposed, in all respects, to correspond with it, does not argue him to be the author of it.

3. As to the progress of sin in the world, and the proneness of all mankind to rebel against God; this, as before was observed, concerning sin in general, is the object of his permissive, but not his effective will; though there is this difference between God’s suffering sin to enter into the world at first, and his suffering the continuance, or increase of it therein, that, at first, he dealt with man as an innocent creature, and only left him to the mutability of his own will, having before given him a power to retain his integrity. But the fallen creature is become weak, and unable to do any thing that is good in all its circumstances, and afterwards is more and more inclined to sin, by contracting vicious habits, and persisting therein. Now, though God’s leaving man to himself at first, when there was no forfeiture made of his preventing grace, must be reckoned an act of mere sovereignty, his leaving sinners to themselves may be reckoned an act of justice, as a punishment of sin before committed, and neither of these argue him to be the author of it; neither does the purpose of God, relating thereunto, give the least occasion for such an inference.

Again, we must distinguish between the occasion and the cause of sin. God’s providential dispensations, though unexceptionably holy and righteous, are often-times the occasion thereof: thus his afflictive hand sometimes occasions the corruptions of men to break forth, in repining at, and quarrelling with his providence; and his giving outward blessings to one, which he withholds from another, gives occasion, to some, to complain of the injustice of his dealings with them; and the strictness, and holiness of his law, and gives occasion, to corrupt nature to discover itself in the blackest colours; the apostle plainly evinces this truth, when he says, Sin taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence, Rom. vii. 8. and, indeed, there is nothing in the whole compass of providence, or in the methods of the divine government therein, but what may be, and often is, an occasion of sin, in wicked men. But certainly it is not the cause of it; even as the clemency of a prince may occasion a rebellion among his subjects; but it is the vile ingratitude, and wickedness of their nature, that is the spring and cause thereof; so the providence, and consequently the purpose of God, which is executed thereby, may be the occasion of sin, and yet the charge brought in this objection, as though God hereby was argued to be the author of sin, is altogether groundless.

4. As to what is farther objected, relating to the purpose of God, to blind the minds, and harden the hearts of men, and that final impenitency, which is the consequence thereof, God forbid that we should assert that this is a positive act in him; and, so far as it contains nothing else but his determining to deny that grace, which would have had the contrary effect, or his providence relating thereunto, this does not give any countenance to the objection, or weaken the force of the arguments that we have before laid down, which is very consistent therewith.

Object. 7. There is another objection, which is generally laid down in so moving a way, that, whether the argument be just or no, the style is adapted to affect the minds of men with prejudice against this doctrine, and that is taken from the inconsistency thereof with God’s judicial proceedings against the wicked in the day of judgment, and that it will afford the sinner a plea, in which he may say to this effect: Lord, I sinned by a fatal necessity; it was impossible for me to avoid that which thou art now offended with me for; it was what thou didst decree should come to pass. I have been told, that thy decrees are unalterable, and that it is as impossible to change the course of nature, or to remove the mountains, which thou hast fixed with thy hand, as to alter thy purpose; wilt thou then condemn one, who sinned and fell pursuant to thy will? Dost thou will that men should sin and perish, and then lay the blame at their door, as though they were culpable for doing what thou hast determined should be done?

Answ. This objection supposes that the decree of God lays a necessary constraint on, and enforces the will of man to sin; which, if they could make it appear that it does, no reply could be made to it. But this is to represent the argument we are maintaining in such a way, in which no one, who has just ideas of this doctrine, would ever understand it, and it is directly contrary to the foregoing method of explaining it. We have already proved, in our answer to the third objection, that sin is not necessary in that sense, in which they suppose it to be, or that, though the decree of God renders events necessary, yet it does not take away the efficiency of second causes, and therefore the purpose of God, relating thereunto, is not to be pleaded, as an excuse for it, or as a ground of exemption from punishment. We read of the Jews, that, with wicked hands, they crucified our Saviour; the crime was their own; but this is expressly said to have been done by, or, in pursuance of, the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God, Acts ii. 23. He fore-knew what they would do, and purposed not to prevent it; but yet he did not force their will to commit it. And elsewhere God says, concerning Israel, Thou heardest not; yea, thou knewest not; from that time thine ear was not opened; and then he adds, I knew that thou wouldest deal very treacherously, Isa. xlviii. 8. Israel might as well have pleaded, that God knew, before-hand, how they would behave themselves, and so have thrown the blame on him, for not preventing this foreseen event, but suffering them to go on in this destructive way, with as much reason, as the sinner is supposed, in the objection, to have, when taking occasion so to plead, as he is represented, as having ground to do, in the day of judgment, as a consequence from the doctrine we are maintaining.

Again, whatever has been said concerning the immutability of the divine purpose, yet this does not give the least countenance to any one’s charging his sin on God; as we have, in answer to the last objection, proved that it does not render him the author of sin; and therefore man’s destruction must lie at his own door. It is one thing to say, that it is in the sinner’s power to save himself, and another thing to say, that the sin he commits is not wilful, and therefore that guilt is not contracted thereby; and, if so, then this affords no matter of excuse to the sinner, according to the import of the objection.

IX. We are now to consider some things that may be inferred from the doctrine we have been insisting on, and how it is to be practically improved by us, to the glory of God, and our spiritual advantage. And,

1. From the methods taken to oppose and decry it, by misrepresentations, which contain little less than blasphemy, we infer, that however unjust consequences deduced from a doctrine may be an hindrance to its obtaining in the world; yet this method of opposition will not render it less true, or defensible; nor ought it to prejudice the minds of men against the sacred writings, or religion in general. We cannot but observe, that while several scriptures are produced in defence of this doctrine and others in opposition to it, and the utmost cautions have not been used to reconcile the sense given thereof with the natural ideas which we have of the divine perfections; and many, in defending one side of the question have made use of unguarded expressions, or called that a scripture-doctrine which is remote from it; and others, in opposition hereunto, have, with too much assurance, charged the defenders thereof with those consequences, which are neither avowed by them, nor justly deduced from their method of reasoning; the unthinking and irreligious part of mankind have taken occasion, from hence, with the Deists, to set themselves against revealed religion, or to give way to scepticism, as though there were nothing certain, or defensible, in religion; and take occasion to make it the subject of satire and ridicule. But, passing this by, though it is a matter very much to be lamented we will consider this doctrine as rendered less exceptionable, or more justly represented; and, accordingly,

2. We may infer from it, that as it is agreeable to the divine perfections, so it has the greatest tendency to promote practical godliness. For,

(1.) Since God has fore-ordained whatever comes to pass; this should lead us to an humble submission to his will, in all the dispensations of his providence. When we consider that nothing, in this respect comes by chance; this should have a tendency to quiet our minds, and silence all our murmuring and uneasy thoughts, whatever afflictions we are exposed to. We are too apt to complain sometimes of second causes, as though all our miseries took their rise from thence; and, at other times, to afflict ourselves beyond measure, as apprehending that those proper means have not been used, which might have prevented them; as Martha tells our Saviour, If thou hadst been here, my brother had not died, John xi. 21. whereas we ought rather to consider, that all this befalls us in pursuance of God’s purpose: had he designed to have prevented the affliction, he would have directed to other means conducive to that end, or would have attended those that have been used, with their desired success. We use the means as not knowing what are the secret purposes of God, with respect to the event of things; but, when this is made known to us, it should teach us to acquiesce in, and be entirely resigned to the divine will.

(2.) When we cannot see the reason, or understand the meaning of the dispensations of divine providence, and are not able to pass a judgment concerning future events, whether relating unto ourselves, or others; and, when all things look with a very dismal aspect, as to what concerns the interest and church of God in the world, we must be content to wait till he is pleased to discover them to us; what he oftentimes does, we know not now, but shall know hereafter, as our Saviour said to one of his disciples, John xiii. 7. It is no wonder that we are at a loss, as to God’s purposes, since secret things belong to him; and therefore all that we are to do, in such a case, is, to rest satisfied, that all these things shall, in the end, appear to have a tendency to advance his own perfections, and bring about the salvation of his people.

(3.) Since the purpose of God respects the means, as well as the end, this should put us upon the use of those proper means, in which we may hope to obtain grace and glory; and therefore this doctrine does not lead us to sloth, and indifference in religion; for that is to suppose, that the ends and means are separated in God’s purpose: and when, through his blessing attending them, the ordinances, or means of grace, are made effectual for the working of faith, and all other graces, these being connected, in God’s purpose, with glory, it ought to encourage our hope relating to the end of faith, even the salvation of our souls.

(4.) Let us take heed that we do not peremptorily, without ground conclude ourselves elected unto eternal life, on the one hand, or rejected on the other. To determine that we are chosen to salvation, before we are effectually called, is presumptuously to enter into God’s secret counsels, which we cannot, at present, have a certain and determinate knowledge of; but to lay this as a foundation, as to what concerns the conduct of our lives, is oftentimes of a very pernicious tendency. If, as the result of this conclusion made, we take encouragement to go on in sin, this will cut the sinews of all religion, and expose us to blindness of mind, and hardness of heart, and a greater degree of impenitency and unbelief, as the consequence of this bold presumption and affront to the divine Majesty.

Neither, on the other hand, are we to conclude that we are not elected; for though we may be in suspense about the event of things, and not know whether we are elected or rejected, this is not inconsistent with our using endeavours to attain a good hope, through grace; yet to determine that we are not elected, is to conclude, against ourselves that all endeavours will be to no purpose; which we have no ground to do, since it is one thing to conclude that we are in a state of unregeneracy, and another thing to determine that we are not elected. The consequence of our concluding that we are in an unconverted state, ought to be our praying, waiting, and hoping for the efficacy of divine grace, which extends itself to the chief of sinners, as a relief against despair, though such can have no ground to say, they are elected; therefore the safest way, and that which is most conducive to the ends of religion, is to be firmly persuaded, that though the final state of man be certainly determined by God, yet this is to be no rule for an unregenerate person to take his measures from, any more than if it were a matter of uncertainty, and, in all respects, undetermined by him.

(5.) Let us, according to the apostle’s advice, Give diligence to make our calling and election sure, 2 Pet. i. 10. It is certainly a very great privilege for us, not barely to know, that some were chosen to eternal life, but to be able to conclude that we are of that happy number; and, in order hereunto, we must not expect to have an extraordinary revelation thereof, or to find ourselves described by name in scripture, as though this were the way to attain it; for the rule by which we are to judge of this matter, is, our enquiring whether we have those marks, or evidences thereof, which are contained therein; and therefore we are, by a diligent and impartial self-examination, to endeavour to know whether we are called, or enabled, to perform the obedience of faith, which God is said to elect his people to; or whether we are holy, and without blame, before him in love? whether we have the temper and disposition of the children of God, as an evidence of our being chosen to the adoption of children, and as such, are conformed to the image of Christ?

(6.) If we have ground to conclude that we are chosen to eternal life, this ought to be improved to the glory of God, and our own spiritual advantage; it ought to put us upon admiring and adoring the riches of discriminating grace, which is herein eminently illustrated; and such are under the highest obligation to walk humbly with God, as well as thankfully; for it is owing to his grace, not only that they are chosen to eternal life, but that they are enabled to discern their interest in this privilege.[237]

Footnote 183:

“Certainly, it is not to be understood, in a literal or strict sense, that He does, all that is done. ‘Far be it from God,’ says Elihu, ‘that he should do wickedness: and from the Almighty, that he should commit iniquity.’ Doing wickedness, and committing iniquity, are synonymous phrases: but to impute to the Most High, any thing like what is commonly meant by either of these phrases, is evident blasphemy.

“Nor are we to imagine, certainly, that God makes his creatures do, whatever is done by them, in any such manner as is inconsistent with their own proper agency. Rational creatures certainly act; and act as freely, as if there were no being above them to direct their steps, or to govern their actions. When God works in men, to will and to do that which is good; they, nevertheless will and do it themselves; and are really praise-worthy. And he does not, surely, so influence any to evil, as to render them unactive, involuntary, or undeserving of blame.

“Nor do I believe it true, literally and strictly speaking, that God creates, whatsoever comes to pass; particularly darkness, and moral evil.

“But this must not be taken for granted, nor hastily passed over: because, however indisputable, it is disputed. There are some among us, and some who are deservedly in reputation for wisdom, and general soundness in the faith; who appear to be of opinion, that God is the direct Author—the immediate Cause—the proper Creator, of all evil, as well as of all good—of all sin, as well as holiness, in heart and life—in thought, word, and deed.

“This opinion, however, notwithstanding my high esteem and particular friendship for some of the holders of it, I am not yet ready to adopt, for several reasons.

“1. To suppose that the actions of men, whether virtuous or vicious, are created, seems to confound all distinction between creation and Providence; or rather, wholly to exclude the latter.

“The work of creation, we used to think, was God’s making creatures and things, at first; or giving the beginning of existence to matter and minds, with their various properties, instincts and organizations. And that God’s works of Providence, were his preserving things already made, and governing all their operations. But according to this new philosophy, creation is all; Providence is nothing. For what preserving and governing of creatures or actions can there be, when every creature and every action, is every moment created anew? An action, a thought, or volition, whether good or evil, is a new and strange kind of creature, or created thing. But, in a theological view, the question before us is of chief importance, as it respects moral evil. I add, therefore;

“2. It appears to me, that to suppose God the Creator of sin, whether in principle or action, is hardly reconcilable with his perfect holiness. ‘Doth a fountain send forth, at the same place, sweet waters and bitter?’ Can darkness proceed from Him, as its proper source, in whom there is no darkness at all?

“It is true, God has created many things which are of a different nature from himself; as the bodies of men and beasts, and all parts of the world of matter: but nothing, I conceive, directly opposite to his own nature; as is sin. The sun is the immediate cause of the growth of vegetables; though these are essentially different from the sun itself: but it is not thus the cause of ice and darkness; which are no more of a contrary nature to it, than sin is to the nature of God.[184]

“I am sensible it has been said, there is no more inconsistency with the holiness of God, in supposing him the efficient, immediate cause of sin, for necessary good purposes; than in supposing he only permits it, for wise ends, and so orders things that he knows it will be committed.

“But these two ways of accounting for the existence of moral evil, appear to me materially different. There are supposable cases in which it would be right for a man, not to hinder another from sinning, when he could hinder him; and also to place him in circumstances of temptation, expecting that he would sin. For instance, a parent may leave money in the way of a child suspected of being given to theft; and may conceal himself and let the child steal it; with a view to correct him, in order to reclaim him, or as a warning to his other children. All this might be perfectly right in the parent; however certainly he might know, that the child would be guilty of the expected crime. But I question whether any case can be supposed in which it would not be wrong, directly to influence another to do evil, that good might come. Exciting one to sin by power or persuasion; and placing one in circumstances of trial, wherein he would be tempted to sin, without restraining him from it, are surely different things, although the certainty of his sinning may be the same.

“3. I dare not think that God creates sin, and all kinds of evil, because this seems plainly contrary to the general current of the holy scriptures.

“In the first chapter of Genesis, it is said, ‘God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good.’ Of his making two great lights, we are told; and that he made the stars also: but no account is there given of his creating darkness. Respecting our own species, the inspired historian particularly informs us, that ‘God created man in his own image: in the image of God created he him: male and female created he them.’ Nor do we find in that book, or in all the Bible, that he hath since ever created them otherwise. Solomon three thousand years after the fall, having made diligent search among men and women, to find out their true character, and the cause of their so universal depravity, says; ‘Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.’ Wicked practices, and deceitful inventions to conceal their criminality, are ever ascribed in scripture to mankind themselves, or to other fallen creatures, and never to God, as their efficient cause.

“In the New-Testament, christians are said to be ‘created unto good works:’ and we read of ‘the new man, which after God, is created in righteousness and true holiness’. But no where do we read of any one that was created unto evil works; or after Satan in unrighteousness and sin. It is written, 1 Cor. xiv. 33, ‘God is not the author of confusion, but of peace.’ And James i. 13-17, ‘Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: but every man is tempted when he is led away of his own lust and enticed.—Do not err, my beloved brethren. Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights.’ Can any thing be more express to teach us, that a distinction ought carefully to be made between the origin of good and evil; and that we should not conceive them both alike to come from God?

“For scripture proof that God is not the efficient author of sin, I will only add, that the fruits of the Spirit, and works of the flesh, are set in contrast and spoken of as diametrical opposites: whereas, did God create sinful propensities in men, or directly influence them to evil actions, the works of the flesh would be as real and immediate fruits of the divine Spirit, as the holiest exercises of the best saints.

“4. I see no occasion for the supposition of God’s being thus the author of all evil: nor any good ends that it can answer.

“Could it be seen how evils might be accounted for, without supposing them any part of the creation of God; and how God might have an absolute dominion over all events, without being the immediate cause of bad things; no good man, I conclude, would wish to conceive of Him as being thus the proper source of darkness and evil. And indeed, were it so, that our weak minds were unable to comprehend how God can work all things after the counsel of his own will, or how natural and moral evil could ever have been, without believing that God is as much, and as immediately, the cause of evil as of good; yet it might be more modest, and more wise, to leave these among other incomprehensibles, than to have recourse to so bold an hypothesis for the solution of them. But, I apprehend, there is no need of this hypothesis in order to account for the existence of evil, or in order to an understanding belief of the universal government of the Most High.

“Evils, of most if not all kinds, are such negative things—such mere defects, in their origin at least, as do not need creation, or require a positive omnipotent cause. This is the case, evidently, with respect to natural darkness: it is only the want of light. This is the case, also, with respect to natural death: it is only the cessation, the loss, the want of life. And this may be the case, with respect to spiritual darkness, and spiritual death. It has heretofore been the orthodox opinion, that all moral evil consists radically in privation; or, that unholiness, at bottom, is the mere want of holiness. And, notwithstanding all the floods of light, from various quarters, which have come into the world in this age of new discoveries, possibly this one old opinion may yet be true. ‘God made man upright.’ That is, He formed him with a disposition impartially just and good: He created in him a principle of universal righteousness. When man fell, by eating the forbidding fruit, this principle had not been preserved in perfect strength and exercise. In consequence of that disobedience, the divine internal influence was so withdrawn, that this principle was entirely lost. But we are not told, nor need it be supposed, that any opposite principle was then created in him. Our first parents had, I believe, in their original formation, all the radical instincts of nature which they had after the fall; or which any of their posterity now have. Such as a principle of self-preservation, a desire of self-promotion, and a propensity to increase and multiply; together with all the more particular appetites and passions, subservient to these purposes. All these are innocent in themselves, though not in themselves virtuous. But these private instincts, when left to operate alone, without the governing influence of a public spirit, or a just regard for other beings, will naturally lead to all manner of iniquity, in heart and life. To avarice and ambition; to envy and malice; to intemperance and lewdness; to frauds and oppressions; to wars and fightings.

“There is no need of supposing any other divine agency, than only to uphold in existence creatures that have lost their virtue, amidst surrounding temptations, in order to account for all the evil affections which we ever feel, and for all the external wickedness that is ever committed. Nor, in order to the holiest creatures losing their virtue, need any thing more be supposed on God’s part, than only his leaving them to themselves; or not upholding in them, and constantly invigorating, a virtuous disposition.

“And as, in this way, we can account for the existence of all manner of evil; so we can thus understand how it is possible for God to bring about whatsoever comes to pass, without his being the actor, or maker, or instigator, of any thing that is not perfectly good. When He does not cause light, there will be darkness. When He does not make peace, there will be evil. The darkness takes place according to his appointment, with the same exactness and certainty, as if He actually created it; and so does evil of every kind. What He determines to permit, knowing perfectly the circumstances and dispositions of every agent concerned, will as infallibly come to pass, as what he determines to do himself, or to effect by his own positive influence. The king’s heart, and the rivers of water; the waves of the sea, and the tumults of the people, are in the hand of the Lord, to all important intents and purposes, if it be only true that He restrains them, or lets them run; stilleth them, or suffereth them to rage, just as he sees fit.

“In this sense, I conceive, it is to be understood, that God forms the light, and creates darkness; makes peace, and creates evil. He has the absolute government—the perfect control—the entire superintendency, of all these things.

“When any folly has been committed or any mischief has been done, some are ready to say, It was so ordered; as if therefore nobody was to be blamed. But this is a false inference, from just premises. True, it was so ordered of God; and ordered righteously and wisely: but it was so ordered by the doer of the mischief also; and ordered carelessly, perhaps, or wickedly. You will say, It must have been so, and the actor could not have done otherwise: but, I say, he might have done otherwise, if he would. It is true, there is a kind of necessity in the actions of men. They necessarily act according to their own choice; and they necessarily choose to act according to their own disposition. Under this kind of necessity God himself acts. It is impossible for him to do, because it is impossible for him to will that which is contrary to his own nature. He necessarily wills and does, what is agreeable to his moral perfections. But such a necessity as this, is so far from being inconsistent with freedom, that it is essential to all free agency. Actions which can and do take place, contrary to the inclination of the agent, are not his actions. He has no command over them; and therefore can deserve no praise or blame for them.

“The necessity of acting according to our own minds, is all the necessity which need be supposed, when we suppose that all our actions were decreed, and are ordered of God. A creature that acts according to any laws of nature, and not at perfect random, without any self-government, acts in such a manner that He who knows what is in him, may fore-know all his actions; and in such a manner that He in whose hand his times are, may govern all his volitions. Men follow their several courses, as freely as the rivers of water, and with a higher kind of freedom; yet, since they run agreeably to their own inclination, and cannot do otherwise, a Being omniscient and omnipotent, can calculate before hand all their motions; can keep them in the channels decreed for them, and can turn them whithersoever he will. If any do not comprehend this, yet let them not think they so fully comprehend the contrary, as to feel certain, that either man cannot be free, or God cannot govern the world. Certainly the providential government of God, over the hearts and ways of men, though most absolute, is not such but that, if they do well, they are praise-worthy; and if they do not well, the sin lieth at their own door.

“Neither let it be imagined that the criminality of a bad action is taken away, or at all extenuated, because it will be over-ruled for good. Actions are good or evil, according to the nature of them, and the intention of the agent, and not according to undesigned consequences. When we act wickedly, and with a wicked mind, its being productive of happy effects, alters nothing in regard to our blame-worthiness. In the divine decrees, and in the divine providence, ‘Whatever is, is right:’ but in the conduct of creatures, many things that are, are not at all the less wrong. God’s governing all things, so as to make them subserve his wise and holy designs, should not lead us to think any more favourably of our own, or of our neighbour’s foolish and sinful actions.”

SMALLEY’S SERMONS.

Footnote 184:

“There is a vast difference between the sun’s being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and of the brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence; and its being the occasion of darkness and frost in the night, by its motion whereby it descends below the horizon. The motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of events; but not the proper cause, efficient, or producer of them.—No more is any action of the divine Being, the cause of the evil of men’s wills. If the sun were the proper cause of cold and darkness, it would be the fountain of these things, as it is the fountain of light and heat: and then something might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness of nature in the sun; and it might be justly inferred that the sun itself is dark and cold: but from its being the cause of these, no otherwise than by its absence, no such thing can be inferred, but the contrary. It may justly be argued that the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold and darkness are found to be the consequence of its withdrawment; and the more constantly and necessarily these effects are connected with and confined to its absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun to be the fountain of light and heat. So, in as much as sin is not the fruit of any positive influence of the Most High, but on the contrary, arises from the withdrawment of his action and energy, and under certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of his influence, this is no argument that he is sinful, or his operation evil; but on the contrary, that he and his agency are altogether holy, and that he is the fountain of all holiness. It would be strange arguing indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves them to themselves; and necessarily sin when he does so, that therefore their sin is not from themselves, but from God: as strange as it would be to argue, because it is always dark when the sun is gone, and never dark when he is present, that therefore darkness is from the sun, and that his disk and beams must be black.”

Edwards on the Will.

Page 259. Boston Ed. 1754.

Footnote 185:

Dr. Whitby, in his discourse of election, &c.

Footnote 186:

See his discourse concerning election, page 36. 37. &c.

Footnote 187:

See the contrary opinion defended by Whitby in loc.

Footnote 188:

See Whitby’s discourse, &c. page 40, & seq.

Footnote 189:

See Twiss. Vind. Grat. & de Prædest. and his riches of God’s love, against Hord; and also that part of the writings of some others, in which they treat of predestination, viz. Beza, Gomarus, Piscator, Maccovius, Rutherford, Whitaker, and Perkins.

Footnote 190:

Among these were bishop Davenant, and other divines, who met in the synod of Dort; also Calvin, P. Du Moulin, Turrettin, and, indeed, the greater number of those who have defended the doctrine of predestination; and there are many others, who, when they treat of it, seem to wave the particular matter in controversy, as thinking it of no great importance or that this doctrine may be as well defended, without confining themselves to certain modes of speaking, which have been the ground of many prejudices against it, whose prudence and conduct herein cannot be justly blamed.

Footnote 191:

Ου μονον εξ Ιουδαιων. non solum ex Judæis; that is, those who are called from among the Jews, as distinguished from the rest of them that were rejected.

Footnote 192:

זגקבצו

Footnote 193:

See Questions lxvii, lxviii, lxxii, lxxv, lxxvi.

Footnote 194:

ειναι ἡμας ἁγιους.

Footnote 195:

See Prov. viii. 23.

Footnote 196:

ειναι.

Footnote 197:

Vid. Grot. in loc.

Footnote 198:

Τεταγμενοι.

Footnote 199:

Vid. Whitby in loc.

Footnote 200:

Vid. Beza in loc.

Footnote 201:

The principal text that Dr. Whitby refers to, as justifying his sense of the word, is in Acts xx. 13. We went to Assos, there intending to take in Paul, for so had he appointed, minding himself to go afoot; the words are, ουτω γαρ ην διατεταγμενος μελλων αυτος πεζευειν; which he understands as though the meaning was, that the apostle was disposed, in his own mind, to go afoot; but that sense is not agreeable to the scope of the text, for the meaning of it seems to be this: That it was determined, ordered, or preconcerted by them, before they set sail; that Paul should be taken in at Assos, since he was to go there afoot; so that this makes nothing to that author’s purpose, but rather to the sense that we have given of the word.

Footnote 202:

See Grot. in loc.

Footnote 203:

See Dr. Whitby in loc.

Footnote 204:

See Quest. xliv, lxviii.

Footnote 205:

See Dr. Goodwin, vol. 2. of election.

Footnote 206:

προεθετο.

Footnote 207:

See page 137.

Footnote 208:

This is what is meant by that axiom, used by the school-men, Decretum Dei, nihil ponit in esse.

Footnote 209:

Thus the school-men distinguish between necessitas consequentis, and consequentiæ; so that that, which is not in itself necessary, is rendered eventually so, as the consequence of God’s purpose, that it shall be.

Footnote 210:

“There is no necessity for supposing a predestination to death, in the same sense as unto life, that is to the means and the consequent end: For the occurrence of sin may be satisfactorily accounted for on other principles; though without pretending to the removal of every difficulty in a subject the entire comprehension of which is probably unsuited to our present state and faculties.”[211]

SMITH’S LETTERS TO BELSHAM.

Footnote 211:

It is acknowledged that this view of the subject is different from that which most Calvinistic writers have given. Yet several eminent divines have laid down the fundamental principles, at least, of this sentiment, and have opened the way to it: particularly Augustine, Theophilus Gale, and a class of German Theologians who may be termed the school of Leibnitz. A short time ago an attempt was made to excite the attention of thinking men to his doctrine, by a Sermon on the Divine glory, displayed by the Permission of Sin. But, since the publication of that pamphlet, the subject has been more ably and fully treated by my reverend tutor, the Rev. Dr. Williams, in his Discourse on Predestination to Life, published very lately.

Footnote 212:

αδοκιμοι.

Footnote 213:

See Whitby’s Paraphrase, &c. on Jude, ver. 4.

Footnote 214:

Thus Beza in loc. calls them vessels, because, as creatures, they are the workmanship of God, the great potter, but vessels prepared for destruction by themselves, and therefore adds, Exitii veras causas minime negem in ipsis vasis hærere juxta illud perditio, tua ex te est.

Footnote 215:

It ought to be observed, that the word, here used, is κατηρτισμενα εις απωλειαν, and not προκατηρτισμενα; nor is there any thing added to the word, that signifies, that this preparation thereunto was antecedent to their being; or as though it took its rise from God, as the cause of that sin for which he designed to punish them; whereas, on the other hand when the apostle in the following verse, speaks of God’s making known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, to wit, the elect, they are described as those whom he had afore prepared unto glory, ἁ προητοιμασεν εις δοξαν. What should be the reason that the apostle alters the phrase, but that we may hereby be led to consider, that when God chose the elect to glory they are considered in his purpose as those whom he designed, by his grace, to make meet for it! So that the vessels of wrath are considered as fitting themselves for destruction; the vessels of mercy, as persons whom God would first prepare for, and then bring to glory.

Footnote 216:

See Whitby’s Discourse, &c. page 10.

Footnote 217:

See his Riches of God’s love, against Hord. Part II. page 50.

Footnote 218:

See Bishop Patrick in loc.

Footnote 219:

This agrees with the sense given of it by Grot. in loc. and Whitby in his discourse, &c. page 11. and it agrees very well with the sense of the Hebrew words, פעל למענרה which does not so much signify to make, as to dispose, and adapt one thing to another, which the lxx. render, φυλασσεται ὁ ασεβης, &c. the wicked is reserved to the day of evil.

Footnote 220:

See Quest. xliv.

Footnote 221:

The words are, παντα τετραποδα, that is, all four-footed beasts.

Footnote 222:

Matt. iv. 23. The words are, θεραπευων πασαν νοσον και πασαν μαλακιαν, every sickness, and every disease; and so the same words are translated, in Matt. ix. 35.

Footnote 223:

It is improper to say we have no power, when we can do the thing if we will; and criminal to take the glory, which is God’s.

Footnote 224:

See Whitby of Election, Chap. 5. Limborch. Amic. Collat. page 242.

Footnote 225:

Vid. Sixt Senens. Bibliothec. Lib. V. Annotat 101. Annotavit quidam Chrytostomum interdum naturæ nostræ vires plus æquo extulisse ex contentione disceptandi cum Manichæis & Gentilibus, qui hominem asserebant, vel natura malum vel fati violentia ad peccandum compelli.

Footnote 226:

Vid. Aug. Retrac. I. Cap. 25.

Footnote 227:

Vid. Aug. de Prædest. Sanet. Cap. 14. Quid igitur opus est, ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui prius quam ista hæresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quæstione versari: quod proculdubio facerent, si respondere talibus cogerentur.

Footnote 228:

Vid. Forbes. Instruct. Historico-Theol. Lib. VIII. Cap. 28. § 16, &c. & Joh. Jacobi Hottingeri, Fata Doctrinæ de Prædestinat. Lib. I. § 35, &c.

Footnote 229:

Vid. G. J. Vossii Hist. Pelag. Lib. VI. Thes. 8, 9, 10.

Footnote 230:

Vid. Calv. Instit. Lib. III. Cap. 22. § 1. Certior est hic Dei veritas, quam ut concutiatur, clarior quam ut obruatur hominum authoritate.

Footnote 231:

See the epistles that passed between Berevov, a physician at Dort, and several divines at that time, in Lib. de Term vitæ.

Footnote 232:

Seneca de Consol. ad Marciam, cap. 20. Nemo nimis cito moritur, qui victurus diutius quam vixit non fuit, fixus est cuique terminus, manebit semper ubi positus est, nec illum ulterius diligentia aut gratia promovebit. Et Cicero de Senect. Quod cuique temporis ad vivendum datum, eo debet contentus esse. Virg. Æn. X. Stat sua cuique dies. Serv. Fixum est tempus vitæ.

Footnote 233:

Evil as well as good actions are links in the chain of providence, and yet do not impeach Divine holiness.

Footnote 234:

Vid. Senac. de Prov. cap. 5. August, de Civ. Dei, Lib. V. cap. 1, & 8. Lips Phys. Stoic. Lib. J. Diss. 12.

Footnote 235:

See Quest. XVIII.

Footnote 236:

See Quest. XXI, XXII.

Footnote 237:

When we contend for this doctrine as a truth, it should be viewed in connexion with its real importance. These two objects are extremely different in things natural, civil, and religious. There are many things true in history, in philosophy, in politics, and even in theology, which no sober person deems important. There are other things hypothetically important, whether actually true or not. And of this kind is the subject before us. Such is the nature, the connexion, and consequences of it, that if it be true, it cannot fail of being of the first importance.

But how are we more particularly to estimate the importance of this subject? By the influence which the admission or the denial of it has on the very foundations of religion. For instance, if it be NOT true, either man himself or mere chance has the principal share in effecting our actual salvation, and investing us with eternal glory. Some indeed are so lost to modesty and self-knowledge, and so unacquainted with the leading truths of christianity, that they do not scruple to ascribe the eventual difference in our future state, whether good or bad, to man himself, but attended with some verbal, unmeaning compliment to divine mercy. Such persons should first learn the rudiments of christianity, before they have a right to expect any deference shewn to their opinions. On the other hand, if this BE true, its utility is plain; it will hide pride from man; it will exclude chance from having any share in our deliverance; it will exalt the grace of God; it will render salvation a certain, and not a precarious thing; and, in a word, it will secure to them who have the Spirit of Christ the greatest consolation.

This was the view which our episcopal reformers had of the doctrine, both as to its truth, and the importance of it. ‘Predestination to life’ say they, ‘is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby, before the foundations of the world were laid, he hath constantly decreed by his counsel, secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour.—The godly consideration of Predestination and our election in Christ is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their minds to high and heavenly things; as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of eternal salvation, to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God.’—Another observation I would make is,

2. That it is highly proper, in order to investigate the present subject with success, to keep it perfectly distinct, and free from all impure mixtures. This is what some of our early reformers, and many of the modern defenders of this doctrine have not done. For want of this, many bitter enemies have opposed it. Dr. WHITBY, for instance, and most who have written on the same side of the question since his time, place predestination to death, or reprobation to misery, as the very foundation of Calvinism, and inseparable from predestination to life. But so far is predestination to death from being true, that nothing can be more untrue. It is but an arbitrary assumption; a foreign, impure mixture, having no foundation either in the real meaning of holy writ, or in the nature of things; except indeed we mean by it, what no one questions, a determination to punish the guilty.[238] But is not one man’s misery as certain as another man’s happiness? Yes; equally certain. What then; must they therefore be equally predestinated? No. But how can a thing be certain, if it be not predestinated? Have a little patience and I will tell you. The previous question is, Does God predestinate to sin as the means, and to death or misery as the end, in the same way as he predestinates to holiness as the means, and eternal glory as the end? This we deny, as it would be infinitely unworthy of God, making him the author of sin, or doing evil that good may come. Some indeed have distinguished between being the author or the cause of sin, and being a sinner. But the distinction itself is not solid, nor could it fully satisfy those who have made it in clearing the divine character.[239]

In fact, sin and holiness are not only different, but opposite effects, and their causes equally opposite; but as God is the sole cause, the sole exclusive cause of holiness, the creature, in some way, must be the sole and exclusive cause of sin. If you ask how? I reply, by exercising his liberty, which is a mere natural instrument, on himself, rather than on God. But how came he to do that? By his passive power. What is passive power? In general, it is that which distinguishes the creature from the Creator. But more particularly, it is that tendency to nothing as to being, and to defection as to well being, which is essential to every created existence. If every creature have, and must of necessity have this passive power, you will ask, how came the holy angels, and the spirits of the just, not to sin? The answer is, because divine grace upholds them. These things duly considered, though briefly stated, will shew, that as God is not the author of sin, so neither has he predestinated sin. He is the author and cause of good only. He is the author of our liberty; but that in itself is not evil. And he is the author of our nature as limited; that also of itself is no moral evil. But when our liberty unites with this limited nature, or terminates on passive power, when this latter is not controuled by grace, their offspring is imperfect, or sinfulness attaches to our moral acts.

Hence you may learn, that sin and future misery are events perfectly certain, though not predestinated. It has been often assumed, but without propriety or truth, that an event is foreknown only because it is decreed. In reality all good is foreknown, because it is decreed; for there is no other ground of its existence. But sin, as before shewn, has another ground of existence, namely, passive power, which can no more be an object of divine predestination or decree than its perfect opposite, the all-sufficiency of Jehovah. Yet, observe attentively, this has its proper nature, and God sees all things, and all essences, in their proper nature. What! Does not God foreknow the sinfulness of any event in its deficient cause, as well as the goodness of another in that which is efficient? Beside, passive power in union with liberty is an adequate, a fully adequate ground of sin and death; and therefore to introduce a predestination of sin and death, is to ascribe to God what is equally impious and needless.[240]—Let us, therefore, keep this doctrine free from all impure mixtures, and now proceed to a

3rd Observation, that is, When the end is maintained to be infallibly certain, the means to promote that end are included. Thus you may suppose a chain suspended from a great height, and to the lowest link a weight is fixed, which is borne by it. You do not suppose that this link is unconnected with the next, and so on till you come to the highest. Every one of the links is equally necessary with that which is next the weight; and the whole is connected with something else which is stronger than the weight, including that of the chain also, however long and heavy.

Thus also in the cultivation of our land, though it is decreed that on such a field there shall be this very season a crop of wheat, this was not independent of providential virtue giving the increase, the genial showers, the solar warmth, and the vivifying air. It is not unconnected with the proper seed sown, needful tillage, plowing and harrowing, and the quality of the soil. And the same holds true as to the health of the body, and the prolongation of life to an appointed period. He who dies must first have life; he who grows to manhood must arrive at it through the previous stages of youth, childhood and infancy. So likewise an the education of our children; if learning be the end, that supposes the previous means of application; and if it is determined who shall be the first scholar of the age in which he lives, it is equally determined that he shall begin with the rudiments of letters, and diligently prosecute his literary studies. And respecting religious attainments the matter is equally plain; if life or eternal glory be the end predestinated, the previous steps of purity of heart, justification and a new birth unto righteousness, preservation in Christ, and every individual event and circumstance preceding, is included in the decree, as far as there is any goodness in them. As to the evil with which any events or circumstances are blended, that has been already accounted for on another principle. Nothing can be more true or plain, God had predestinated an everlasting righteousness to be brought in by the Lord Jesus Christ. But is it not equally true and plain that the birth of Jesus, and of his virgin mother, the existence of David, the call of Abraham, the preservation of Noah, and the creation of Adam and Eve were predestinated?—Let us therefore guard against separating the end and the means; and what God joins together in his predestinating care and love, let no man put asunder.—We now come

II. To consider some proofs of this doctrine.—That the scriptures, especially those of the New Testament, appear, at least, to maintain the doctrine in question, no person of common modesty will deny. Thus, for instance, Rom. viii. 29, 30. “Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son.” Again, Eph. i. 4-6. “According as he hath chosen us in him, before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love; having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace.” And again, ver. 11. “In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.” Believers are said to be “called according to God’s purpose;” and certain discriminations are made between man and man, between nation and nation, “that the purpose of God according to election, might stand, not of works but of him who calleth.” “The election hath obtained it.” “So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.” “Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?”—“I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion.”

These are some of the many passages of holy writ which at least seem to hold this doctrine. But it is of importance to observe, that to establish this very doctrine is the main drift of the apostle Paul’s elaborate argument in a considerable part of his epistle to the Romans. See Rom. ix.-xi.—But more particularly,

1. It is evidently inconsistent with God’s infinite perfection to suppose that he has no purposes, designs, or aims in his operations; or, which is virtually the same thing, to suppose that he decrees or predestinates nothing. Wherein would he then differ from blind, unmeaning chance, which hath neither wisdom, power, nor properties? An intelligent spirit without any plan or purpose, is inconceivable; much less is the infinitely perfect Jehovah such a being.

But if he purposes any thing, what can be conceived of in this world of higher importance, or more worthy of his predestinating care, than the salvation of his people, that is, of those who are eventually saved? Shall he purpose from eternity to give his Son to appear in the form of a servant, to suffer an ignominious death, and to be head over all things to the church, at an uncertainty? Does he bestow his Holy Spirit without knowing, or without intending, who shall be ultimately changed into the divine image from glory to glory, and made meet for the inheritance of the saints in light? Truly, if in time he draws with loving-kindness, it is because he has loved with an everlasting love.

2. What scripture and experience teach of man’s condition as a sinner, utterly excludes every other cause of salvation but God’s predestinating love. From our very birth we are sinful, guilty, and without strength. The carnal mind is enmity against God. The graceless heart is a heart of stone; in spiritual concerns unfeeling and impenetrable. Well may our Lord say to his disciples, Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you. If then those who were dead in trespasses and sins have been quickened, if persecutors have been arrested and alarmed, if those who were fully bent on rebellion have been instantly rendered humble, meek, loving and obedient, to what can we rationally ascribe it but to the discriminating and sovereign pleasure of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will? If such are not predestinated, how came they to be called, converted, and regenerated?

Consult the good man’s experience. Will he coolly and deliberately arrogate any thing to himself? Follow him to the throne of grace; what is his language before God? Listen to his most holy, happy, and animated praises in the church. Attend to him in his happiest frames—or, when emerging from the deep waters of affliction—when restored from backslidings—or with faltering speech on the brink of eternity; and you will find him steady to one point; “Behold, God is my salvation.” My recovery from sin and woe is all of grace. Yea, follow him to heaven, when he joins the noble army of martyrs, and the countless myriads of the redeemed from among men, and there he shouts aloud in chorus, “Unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God and his Father; to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. Amen.”—“Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.” If we search eternally into the origin and cause of our deliverance from sin, and our exaltation to happiness and glory, none can be found but God’s predestinating love.

3. Nothing short of eternal predestination could secure that which is demonstrably the most worthy, the most glorious, the most real end of God in the salvation of man, that is, the praise of the glory of his grace. No end can be compared to this in excellence; it is expressly the end which God has proposed to himself in the salvation of his people; “having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace.” If there be no predestination, how can such an end ever be proposed, and how infallibly secured? Can there be any effect without an adequate cause? Or can the invention of men or angels discover any other cause than predestination?

On any other supposition, how can divine love, grace, and mercy be glorified, infallibly glorified? Is the honour of these glorious and blessed perfections of Jehovah to be suspended on a feeble peradventure? Or is the spiritual temple constructed of some materials which come by chance, or approach of themselves, while others are brought forth by a divine hand out of the quarry of nature, and placed on the living foundation? Is the glory of the Creator to depend upon the precarious will of man? The supposition is too absurd to admit a thought.—Again,

4. Predestination to life is essentially necessary to secure the full end of the death of Christ and the efficacy of divine influence. What though he laid down his life for his sheep, if after all he do not bring them into his fold? For him to lay down his life a ransom for many, and then leave it to them whether they should come for life, and all the benefits of his death, righteousness and grace, is to suppose them possessed of more power than Adam had before the fall. For the power he needed was only that which might keep him from falling; but the power which fallen man requires is that by which he may rise from his fallen state, and enter into the favour of God, into union with Christ, into spiritual sensibility and life, into wisdom, righteousness and holiness, and into eternal glory. Now what can be adequate to this but omnipotent power helping our infirmities?

If it be said, Though we cannot of ourselves do this, may we not through Christ and his holy Spirit assisting us? I reply, assistance is of two kinds; it is either affording us proper means, such as the holy scriptures, the ministry of the word, ordinances of religion, and precious promises by way of encouragement;—or, it is actually to influence the mind by supernatural agency. If this latter assistance be afforded, the event is secured; for nothing is requisite to secure the volitions, and all the exercises of the will, in faith, repentance, love, hope, and even perseverance therein unto the end, but this kind of influence to a certain degree. But does God impart any gracious influence without purposing to do so? And does he not know what influence is necessary to secure the end? Without predestination to life, what security can there be, that the death of Christ will not prove abortive and unavailing?

The notion that a sufficient degree of grace is given to all, but that a degree more than sufficient is given to the elect; that all the elect are certainly and infallibly saved, but the others left at uncertainty, with a perhaps that some of them may be saved in addition to the elect—this notion is neither founded in revealed truth, nor capable of rational consistency.[241]

Without predestination to life, the influences of the Holy Spirit, which, it is confessed, are given to some, might be given in vain, or without effecting any saving purpose in any one of the human race. Where then could be the wisdom of a dispensation of the Spirit, or of communicating the influence of grace? Does God foresee that some will be so good and pliable as to improve a common favour in such a way and to such a degree as to constitute the difference between them and others that perish? But where is this divinity taught, and by whom is it sanctioned? It is not sanctioned by the patriarchs and prophets, by Christ and his apostles, nor is it contained in the words of inspiration, or even in the tablet of unsophisticated reason.

5. Setting aside this doctrine, or supposing it not true, what room is left for a covenant of grace between the Father, Son, and Spirit? Has not the Father given to the Son a people for whom he should be obedient unto death, for whom he should give his life a ransom, for whom he should rise, live, and reign till all his enemies be subdued, and to whom Christ has engaged to give eternal life? If we reject predestination to life, what meaning is there in his office of surety? Is not Jesus a surety for his people? But what is a surety? It is one who undertakes for another. What does Jesus undertake to do? He undertakes not only to become incarnate for them, to obey the law, to endure the contradiction of sinners and cope with the rigid demands of equity, but also to justify many, to give them life, to keep them from every rapacious hand, to purify them by his blood, to save them from sin and hell, and to bring them to the beatific vision of his glory.

In a word, take away this doctrine, and you take away the foundation of God—the foundation of his covenant—the foundation of his temple, the church—the foundation of the saints’ hope and joy. But, blessed be God, his foundation standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his. Known unto God are all his ways, and all his people from the beginning. Blind chance and impotent free will shall never be the partners of his throne.

We next come to notice

III. Some objections which may be, and often are, made to this doctrine. And

1. If this doctrine be true, it is urged by some, God would then be an arbitrary and partial being. This objection supposes that God has no right to be so; but on the contrary, nothing appears more worthy of him than to exercise arbitrary power, and to manifest partiality. No such right is vested in man, as to do what he pleases, while he disdains to consult any other will than his own. But whose will beside his own can the infinitely perfect God consult? Who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor? Or, who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and to him are all things; to whom be glory for ever.

Let us appeal to facts. Are there not marks of high sovereignty and holy partiality through universal nature? Are they not visible in the heavens above, and in this lower world? Is there not a greater light that rules the day, and the lesser lights that rule the night? And does not one star differ from another star in glory? Are not these marks visible in the operations of providence, in the persons of men, their corporeal forms and mental endowments? Are they not constantly seen in the history of nations, the changes of empires, and the dispensations of grace to different tribes of men? How conspicuous is this in God’s conduct towards Abraham and his posterity for a series of ages, and afterwards in the calling of the Gentiles? And how becoming in us to adopt the same language with the apostle Paul on that occasion: “O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!” And is not the same partiality visible at this very day? Yet is he holy in all his works, and righteous in all his ways.

2. It is objected, If this doctrine be true, then is man reduced to a mere machine. No, a mere machine has no sensibility, no consciousness, no reason, and no will. But he is acted upon, they say, and therefore not an agent. Is it then essential to an agent not to be acted upon? Then there is but one agent in the universe; for every thing but the first cause is acted upon more or less. The fact is, there is no contrariety in these two things. Angels and men are acted upon, yet they are moral agents. The holy agency upon them respects chiefly their disposition itself, but the agency they exert is the exercise of their faculties, will, and disposition. Whether their disposition be good or bad, still they are agents. If this be made good, it must be by sovereign influence; and then the agency and choice will be good: but if this be bad, the agency is bad too.

But granting to the objector that the objects of predestination are, in the sense now mentioned, machines, or instruments in the hand of divine sovereignty; what then? I fain would know what better lot can be assigned us than to be instruments in the hand of a predestinating God? I solemnly protest that I desire no better, no other lot. And who can describe the nature of this high privilege! This people have I formed for myself, they shall shew forth my praise. O the blessedness of being entirely passive in the hand of that God who predestinates nothing but good? Was Paul obliged to the Lord, or was he not, for arresting him in the midst of his wicked career? Has that man any reason to complain, who is restrained from wickedness, but compelled to embrace happiness? Then, say some, his will would be forced. O no! this by no means follows. My people, saith the Lord, shall be willing in the day of my power. Surely God can put his Holy Spirit in either man or child without forcing the will. And let there be but the active, regenerating renewing presence of this divine agent, the choice of good will be no more compelled, or the will no more forced, than in the most free acts of which the human mind is capable.

3. This doctrine, it is said, tends to licentiousness.—This is an assertion which has been often made, but, I apprehend, never fairly proved; for it is contrary to universal experience. Turn your eyes to a vast army, headed by experienced officers—what is the language of nature and experience? You uniformly find great generals anxious to impress the sentiment on the minds of their troops that they are destined to victory. What gives rise to this kind of oratory? What is the philosophy of such rhetoric? It is founded in the nature of man, and confirmed by the experience of ages, that confidence in a favourable issue animates exertion.

Consult a serious christian, who, through a long pilgrimage, has believed this doctrine. Will he deliberately tell you that it has this tendency, or that he has found this effect in his own experience? No, he will tell you nothing gives him more courage and vigour against sin.—It is not when in a dry, backsliding frame of mind, or when verging to licentiousness, that he can rest in this doctrine; but when he is most resolved for God and heaven—when most diligent in the high way of holiness. Then, indeed, he can say, I know that all things work together for my good—my predestination includes conformity to Christ, my calling, my justification, and warfare against sin. If God be for me, who can be against me? Who shall lay any thing to my charge? It is God that justifieth. Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died, is risen, and maketh intercession. Who shall separate me from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or famine, or persecution, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? Nay, in all these things I am more than conqueror through him that loved me. For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate me from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus my Lord.

4. Some would insinuate, that though this doctrine be true, yet it should not be preached, because it is a secret in the mind of God. But I hope it has been proved, that as a doctrine it is not a secret, but is revealed in the holy scriptures, and supported by the soundest arguments. The objects, indeed, or the persons who are predestinated, are known to God only before they bear fruit, By their fruits WE can come to know them, in the ordinary course of things; nor is it any part of the doctrine asserted, that it belongs to man to ascertain the individual objects any farther than by character.

But there are other ends to be answered by this doctrine.—To be in the way to eternal glory is an unspeakable privilege; and it is the proper part of a christian to enquire into the cause of it. His own humility and gratitude are involved in it. The honour of God, the wisdom of his counsel, and the lustre of his grace; the offices of Christ, the surety of a better covenant, and the good Shepherd of the sheep; his powerful intercession, and his government over all things to the church—all are involved in the proper declaration of this truth.—Once more,

5. This doctrine, it may be said, is dangerous, in proportion as it is insisted upon, in that it prevents the more needful enquiry, “Am I born again!” Yes, there would be danger, if all the attention of ministers and people, or even a disproportionate share of it were confined to this. But, thou mistaken objector, because there are some who will take the bread of children and cast it away, are the children not to be fed? Because there were corrupt men disposed to turn the grace of God into lasciviousness, would you rob any child of God of this holy triumph. He will choose our inheritance for us! The Lord will not cast off his people, neither will he forsake his inheritance. For the Lord is our defence, the Holy One of Israel is our King. I will trust and not be afraid, for the Lord Jehovah is my strength and my song, he also is become my salvation.——For the same reason that we ought not to be ashamed of the gospel of Christ, we need not, we ought not to be ashamed of this doctrine.

I would now offer

IV. A few practical uses of the subject. And,

1. This doctrine is a source of great comfort, when contrasted with the fickleness of men, and the perpetual vicissitudes of the world. The lot may be cast, but the Lord is the disposer of it. He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. His counsel shall stand, and he doeth, and will do, all his pleasure. The wrath of man shall praise him, and the remainder of wrath he will restrain. All things work together for good to them who love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. He doeth all things well.

After viewing the present perturbed state of the world, the revolutions of empire, the devastations of war, the alarms of invasion, the degradation of some, and the exaltation of other characters—how pleasing and consolatory to view a steady hand over-ruling, guiding, and influencing all! Providence is “as it were a wheel in the middle of a wheel.”—As for their rings, they are so high that they are dreadful, and are full of eyes round about them. But how delightful to reflect, that within these perpetually revolving wheels there is an immoveable centre! God’s aim is steady, he is of one mind, who can turn him?

2. As the predestination for which we contend is only to good, it affords the most pleasing view of the divine character. God is love. In him is no such inconsistency as is but too frequently found among men. He is not a fountain sending forth at the same place both sweet water and bitter, yielding both salt water and fresh. With the utmost safety and confidence may a humble soul commit itself into the arms of such a being. No one has any thing to fear from God but the proud and rebellious, the unbelieving and impenitent. And surely bad must be the doctrine that speaks peace to the wicked.

3. As in the present case the end, and the way leading to it, are inseparable; every reason and argument, every alarming topic, every scriptural exhortation, and every obligation to duty, are in full force. They who represent these things as inconsistent with predestination, either have a wrong view of the subject, or care not what they say nor whereof they affirm. Obligation to duty is founded on widely and totally different considerations.[242]

God sustains, with respect to man, a twofold character, the one is that of an equitable governor, the other that of a sovereign disposer. Answerably to this, man sustains a twofold character also; that of an accountable agent, and that of a disposable subject. As passive in the hand of a sovereign God, he is necessitated to good, in proportion as goodness attaches to him; and in the heirs of salvation this is predestination to life. As active, or a moral agent, man is treated according to the rules of reason and equity, yet mingled with undeserved favours. So that every man is, in these different respects, at once the subject of liberty and necessity.

Equally vague and unprofitable, therefore, is all controversy on the subject now alluded to while one side contends for liberty and the other for necessity to the usual exclusion of the opposite. Neither can be wholly right. For, as sure as God disposes of a man for final good, the doctrine of necessity is true; and as sure as a man is a transgressor of divine law, and thus is fitted for destruction, he is free from all decretive necessity. Therefore,

4. Here is no room for the impious inference, that when we do evil we are predestinated to it. Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for as God cannot be tempted with evil, so neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin when it is finished, bringeth forth death. Do not err, my beloved brethren; every good gift, and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.—But evil, in whatever person, in whatever place, at whatever time, in whatever form or degree, is from a quarter diametrically opposite.—On the contrary,

5. When at any time we are engaged in the work of God, in any thing whatever that is morally good, then are we employed in the execution of the divine purposes; for there is no good done in time but was decreed to be done, in all its circumstances, from eternity. Even all the actions of the wicked, except the deformity or sinfulness which is in them, are also worthy of God to predestinate. This consideration, every one must allow, is a great incentive to virtue and holiness. This remark is applicable both to ministers and people. Are ministers engaged in preaching the law for conviction, the promises for encouragement, and the unsearchable riches of Christ for consolation; are they urging, according to scripture commands and example, repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ; do they enforce christian duties, teaching the disciples all things whatsoever our Lord and lawgiver has commanded; do they warn sinners to flee from the wrath to come, or invite the burdened and heavy laden to seek rest in the meek and lowly, the merciful and loving Saviour? They are in all this only the instruments of a sovereign God, or the appointed means whereby he executes his eternal purposes. Again, has God enjoined the necessity of repentance, faith, holiness, obedience, and perseverance; poverty of spirit, holy mourning, purity of heart, love to enemies, &c? our personal compliance, which is evermore of grace, is only the decreed method of bringing us to that eternal glory which is the end. Once more,

6. This doctrine properly guarded, and rightly understood, shews with peculiar force the true ground of repentance, and the obligations of gratitude and holiness.—If the sinfulness of no action is decreed, but proceeds wholly from that in us which is opposite to God and his will, whether secret or revealed, rectoral or decretive, what can be more binding and reasonable than repentance toward God? And if all good, whether natural, supernatural, moral or spiritual, in ourselves and others, in time and to eternity proceed from God’s predestination, what a foundation is there laid for gratitude! Put on, therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering. Give all diligence to make your calling and election sure. And let the peace of God rule in your hearts, to the which also ye are called in one body, and be ye thankful. And whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by him. Amen.

DR. WILLIAMS.

Footnote 238:

Predestination to Death or misery, as the end, and to sin as the means, I call “an impure mixture;” a mixture, because its connexion with Predestination to life is arbitrary and forced;—impure, because the supposition itself is a foul aspersion of the divine character. St. Augustine, Calvin, Perkins, Twisse, Rutherford, &c. &c. though highly valuable and excellent men, upon the whole, were not free from this impure mixture of doctrine. But of all modern authors, if we except the philosophical Necessarians, Hobbes, Collins, Hume, Hartley, Priestly, &c. Dr. Hopkins, of America seems the most open in his avowal of the sentiment, that sin and misery are decreed in the same manner as holiness and happiness, in order to produce the greatest general good. The substance of his reasoning is thus expressed by himself: “All future existences, events, and actions, must have a cause of their futurition, or there must be a reason why they are future, or certainly to take place, rather than not. This cause must be the divine decree determining their future existence, or it must be in the future existences themselves. But the future existences could not he the cause of their own futurition; for this supposes them to exist as a cause, and to have influence, before they have any existence, even from eternity.—The cause therefore can be nothing but divine decree, determining their future existence, without which nothing could be future, consequently nothing could be known to be future.”—See his System of doctrines, 2 vol. 8vo. especially Vol. i p. 110-217.

On the sentiment itself, by whomsoever held, I would offer the following strictures:

1. It is a mere assumption, that sin, which the above proposition avowedly includes, has no possible cause of its futurition but either the divine decree, or the future existences themselves. For though God’s decrees are the cause of our being, faculties, and volitions, none of these, nor any thing else that can he traced to divine causation, will constitute sin. Nor yet is it true that sin is the cause of itself; for then sin would be self-existent. It follows therefore that it must have another origin than either the divine decree or its own existence.

2. It is equally plain that the cause of sin is not itself morally evil; For this would involve a contradiction, making cause and effect to be the same thing. Nor yet can the cause be morally good. For as from truth nothing but truth can legitimately proceed, so from good nothing but good can flow. Evil, indeed, is related to good, but not as cause and effect. Though evil could not follow were there no infinite good, no creature, no will, no freedom, yet something else must be sought as the matrix, where the monster sin is generated and fostered, and which, morally considered, is neither good nor evil.—Therefore,

3. We assert, that the origin of moral evil is to be found in the union of two principles, neither of which considered alone partakes of a moral character. These two principles are Liberty and Passive Power. Liberty, it is manifest is morally neither good nor bad, but is a mere natural instrument, if I may so speak, and may be termed a natural good of which God is the author and decreer. On the contrary, Passive Power is a natural evil of which God is not the author or decreer, yet morally considered is not evil. But this term, being little understood, requires further explanation; at least it is incumbent on me to shew in what sense I use it. My design is not to vindicate the use of it by others, but I adopt it to convey a specific idea, for which I find no other word or phrase more appropriate. By ‘Passive Power,’ then, I mean, That which is of unavoidable necessity found in every creature, as such, in direct opposition to the self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency of God. In other words, It is that tendency to nihility, physically considered, and to defection, morally considered, which of absolute necessity belongs to every dependent or created nature. That there is such a principle is self-evident, nor is it probable that any reasonable being will ever controvert its existence. Now, it is demonstrable that this, from the definition, cannot be the object of divine decree, or of will; for it is stated to be of absolute or unavoidable necessity; besides, it is absurd to suppose that God has decreed, or produces, any thing the existence of which stands in direct contrariety to himself. That it is not a moral evil is plain, for the holiest creatures are subjects of it—God alone is exempt.

4. Let it be further observed, that the First Cause, being goodness itself, impels, whether decretively or efficiently, to good only; and of this character is even our being necessitated to exercise our volitions. Yet, when the exercise of liberty, in itself innocent, unites with passive power, the fruit or offspring of this union is moral evil. This, I am fully persuaded, is the true solution of this question, Whence cometh moral evil? If any person shall think proper candidly to assign his reasons to the contrary, due regard shall be paid to them,

5. If it be asked, where lies the difference between decreeing and permitting sin to take place? I answer, the difference is, that the one would be an act of injustice, the other is doing nothing. So that until it can be shewn that there is no difference between injustice and doing nothing, there is no force in the objection. That to necessitate sin decretively would be an act of injustice, and therefore incompatible with the divine character, is, I think, demonstrable; for, it would be to decree to destruction antecedently to desert—to annihilate the sinfulness of any act, making its evil nature to consist in its effects—and to destroy the immutable essences of good and evil. Whereas to permit, or to suffer to take place without prevention, is not to act not to decree. To ‘decree to permit,’ therefore, is a contradiction in terms.

6. But, it has been said, the event is the same to the sinner, whether he hurried on to sin and misery by a decretive impulse, or these effects are not prevented when in the power of omnipotence to interpose. This objection would have some weight, if the happiness of the creature were the only, or even the principal end of God in creation. But this not being the case, its weight vanishes. To illustrate this we may suppose, that the event of a man’s execution is well known to a judge; but, instead of proceeding on the principles of law and equity, and to effect conviction and condemnation according to legal evidence, he orders the man to be executed clandestinely without any equitable process, under pretence that it could make no difference to the sufferer, for the event of his execution was certain! Besides, the spirit of the objection reflects on God’s actual dealings with his creatures, in every instance of their sufferings; because it is in the power of omnipotence to interpose. And in fact, it must be allowed, either that the happiness of the Creature is not the chief end of creation, or that the permission of sin is an act of injustice. But the case is plain, that his own glory is the chief end of creation and government, and that there is no injustice in the permission of sin.

7. It may be said, If the union of liberty with passive power be the origin of moral evil, and if the holiest creatures in heaven are both free and the subjects of passive power, how is it that they do not sin! If both are united in the same persons, does the one never terminate upon; or unite itself to the other? In answer to this enquiry, we must distinguish between having the principle, and being under its influence without control. Though the spirits of the just, and holy angels, have in them the principle, as the condition of their created existence, yet it is counteracted by sovereign favour. They may say, as well as Paul, by the grace of God we are what we are. The object of divine support is the disposition, or the seat of moral action; this being made good, or pure, or holy, prior to all acts of the will, effectually counteracts the influence of passive power. The Liberty and choice of a heavenly being therefore, terminating on such a disposition, no acts but such as are holy can ensue. Hence,

8. If we would know how this is consistent with the actual fall of beings who were once in this condition, we must attend to another important consideration; which is, that when God at any time deals in mere equity with a moral agent, without the counteracting influence of sovereign favour, the inevitable consequence is, that his liberty, or free choice, will terminate upon his passive power. Hence the certainty of the futurition of moral evil, in all possible degrees and circumstances, without any decretive efficiency in its production.—If it be asked, why the exercise of equity is assigned as the occasion of this union, rather than sovereignty; or, why leaving a free agent to the influence of his passive power should not be considered a sovereign rather than an equitable act? The best answer to this enquiry, is a definition of the two terms. By equity then I mean the principle that gives to each his due; by sovereignty, a right to do whatsoever is not inconsistent with equity. And from this definition it must appear that there may he a two-fold deviation from equity, viz. giving more than is due, or less than is due; more good and less evil, or more evil and less good than is equitable. The former of these, more good and less evil, must needs be for the advantage of the creature; and therefore it may be called a gracious deviation. Without it, there would be no room for either mercy or grace. The latter, more evil and less good than is due, is properly called injustice, and is such a deviation from equity as is not compatible with the divine character. Therefore, to do us good beyond our claim is an act of sovereignty; but to give us neither more nor less than is our due is to deal with us in pure equity.

9. Hence it follows, that when God deals with angels or men in sovereignty, according to the definitions, he does them good beyond their claim. But to make this to be the immediate cause of the sin of men and angels is absurd. On the other hand, it is incompatible with the divine character, as before observed, to give them less good and more evil than is their due; and therefore this cannot be the cause of sin, as sure as God is incapable of exercising injustice.—Wherefore, it remains that then alone can moral agents fall into sin when dealt with in pure equity. In the act of defection, or becoming sinful, they are equally free from being impelled by injustice, and upheld by sovereign favour.

COROLLARIES.

1. All the good and happiness in the universe of created beings are the fruit of Sovereignty and Decree.

2. All the moral evil and misery in the universe are the offspring of liberty, a natural good, terminating or acting upon, or united to passive power, a natural evil not counteracted by sovereignly gracious acts on the disposition, or the seat of the moral principle, which may be called analogically the heart.

3. As every act and degree of liberty is perfectly fore-known to God, as the effect of his own decree, and every hypothetical tendency of passive power, though itself not an object of decree, is equally fore-known, it follows, that every sin is as accurately fore-known as if decreed, and has an equally infallible ground of certain futurition.

Footnote 239:

It is allowed that there is a difference between the cause of sin, as a principle, and being a sinner; but when applied to an agent, to be the author or the cause of sin, and to be a sinner, is the same thing. Therefore, when applied to God, in no proper sense whatever can it be said that he is the author of sin.—“If by the author of sin is meant (says President Edwards) the permitter, or a not hinderer of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin infallibly follows: I say, if this be all that is meant by the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin, though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense.” Edwards on the Will, Part iv. Sect. xi.

But though this acute and excellent writer disavows the use of the phrase, he no where assigns the true ground why it should not be used. The truth is, he does not seem to have been aware of any alternative between the certain futurition of sin and its being decreed. And his only method of warding off the most ruinous consequences appears to have been adopted for want of a better, and not from the satisfactory nature of that method. His view, in brief, is this: God is a being of infinite goodness and wisdom; he can will nothing but good; the system he hath adopted is the best; now, says he, “if the will be good, and the object of his will be, all things considered, good and best, then the choosing and willing it, is not willing evil. And if so, then his ordering according to that will is not doing evil.”

It is very seldom that this eminent author fails in his reasoning; but here certainly he does fail. The phrases willing evil, and doing evil, are not used in the same sense in both parts of the premises, from whence the conclusion is inferred. A system, all things considered, being best, is no good reason why each individual part of it is good. And it may be forcibly retorted; a system which includes an infinite evil as a part of its institution cannot be from God. Nor can it be said that this is arguing against fact, without begging the question, that God has appointed the evil which is blended with the good.—On the subject itself let the following things be considered:

1. If choosing and willing a system in which sin is a decreed part is not willing evil, because the system is good and best, all things considered then it would inevitably follow, that sin, because such a part of that system is not an evil. But, it may be said, It is willing it for a good end. Does then a good end or intention destroy the nature of sin? Was the sin of Paul or any other saint anihilated because he sincerely aimed at the Glory of God? Or has any design, however comprehensive, exalted or sincere, the least tendency to alter the nature of sin?

2. Allowing as incontrovertible that the present system of things is the best, all things considered, and that sin is actually blended with it, it does not thence follow that the sin itself is decreed, or is any part of divine appointment. For not to hinder sin, is extremely different from being the cause or author of it. The one is perfectly consistent with equity, the other would be an act of injustice.

3. It is a sentiment so repugnant to all analogical propriety, to do evil that good may come, that it cannot be supposed a man of Mr. Edwards’ piety would have adopted any thing like it, but from what appeared to him an inevitable necessity. And indeed whoever assumes the principle, that every event comes to pass from decretive necessity, sin not excepted, must of course be driven to his conclusion. But this valuable author had no need to recur to that opinion, in order to establish his theory of hypothetical necessity; for this will stand on a rock, immoveably, without such aid.

4. In reality, the certain futurition of good, and that of evil, arises from different, yea from diametrically opposite causes. The one flows from the operative will of God, and is fore-known to be future because decreed, the other flows from a deficient or privative cause, passive power, when united to liberty, as before explained, which exists only in created beings, and in all these, as a contrast to self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency. Yet this is the subject of hypothetical tendencies and results no less than the good to which it stands opposed, in all the boundless varieties of its blendings; therefore no case can be so complicated, but to infinite prescience the event must appear with equal certainty as if decreed.

Footnote 240:

“Equally impious and needless.” Needless, because the existence of sin is fairly and fully accounted for on another principle; impious, because it ascribes to God the worst of all principles, the causation of sin. That God superintends, directs, and over-rules the actions of men is worthy of him; and equally so that he does not hinder the existence of moral evil; but that he is a positive and efficacious cause of moral evil, or that this is consistent with either his justice or holiness can never be proved. Dr. Hopkins, indeed, says, that “the attempt to distinguish between the sinful volitions or actions of men as natural and moral actions; and making God the origin and cause of them considered as natural actions, and men the cause and authors of the depravity and sin which is in them, is, it is believed, unintelligible—unless by making this distinction it be meant, that in every sinful action, God is not the sinful cause of it.” The author, however, candidly adds, “But if the contrary can be made to appear, this doctrine, with all that is implied in it, shall be given up and renounced.” As the removal of this principle, and the establishment of the other, appear to me of the highest importance in theology, a few remarks, in addition to those already made, may not be superfluous, as tending to exhibit the principle here maintained in different lights and connexions; and when all are properly examined, it is probable they will not be wholly “unintelligible.”

1. God, JEHOVAH, is the infinite and eternal Essence, which is of absolute necessity—the self-existent, independent, and all-sufficient Being—from eternity to eternity generating his own light and joy, called his only begotten Son; not from mere will, but of the same necessity.

2. God in his boundless all-sufficiency views all possibles with all their positive and privative tendencies. That all possibles have their positive tendencies is as plain as that two added to three make five. Were there no positive tendencies, there could be no hypothetical certainty, no law of nature, no connexion between cause and effect. And it is equally true, though not equally plain, that there are privative tendencies in all beings but that one who exists of absolute necessity. To suppose the contrary, is the same as to suppose that a creature may be made independent, and all-sufficient. But that is, every reasonable being must allow, absolutely impossible, as implying the grossest contradiction. On this demonstrated fact rests unavoidably the existence of that principle in every created nature which I call Passive Power. Yet.

3. It does not follow that the mere collateral existence of these two principles in the same subject must needs produce moral evil. Then alone does this take place when the one terminates upon, or is united to the other, without the interposition of sovereign favour. It is not in the power of equity to assist. For the exercise of equity is to give each his due; but to prevent sin is not due to the subject of it, otherwise no one could ever sin but on condition of injustice in God.

4. After all, it may be objected, that the scriptures ascribe to God the causation of moral evil; as, hardening the heart of Pharaoh—hardening whom he will—making the wicked for the day of evil—appointing to destruction—determining the death of Christ—delivering him by determinate counsel—doing all evil in a city—making vessels to dishonour—fitting them for destruction, &c.—In reply to this objection it must be considered, that whatever the import of such representations may be, no interpretation which is unworthy of God can be the true meaning—that the idioms of the sacred languages ascribing cause or operation to God must be understood according to the nature of the subject—and, what is particularly to our purpose, that active verbs which denote making, doing, causing, and the like, often denote a declaration of the thing done, or that shall take place; or a permission of it.

Take a few specimens. Thus Acts x. 15. “What God hath cleansed,” means, what God hath declared to be clean.—Isai. vi. 9, 10. The prophet is commanded to tell the people, “understand not, perceive not;” and he is ordered to “make the heart of this people fat, to make their ears heavy, and to shut their eyes.” And what can this mean more than to declare a fact, either what they then were, or what they would be?—So Jer. i. 10. The Prophet’s declaration of what should be, is called his rooting out pulling down, &c.—Ezek. xliii. 3. The prophet says, “when I came to destroy the city;” his meaning undoubtedly is, When I came to prophecy or declare that the city should be destroyed.—Exod. v. 22. “Lord, wherefore hast thou evil entreated this people?” Moses means, Wherefore hast thou permitted them to be evil entreated?—Jer. iv. 10. “Lord God, thou hast greatly deceived this people;” that is, permitted or not hindered them to be deceived by the false Prophets.—Ezek. xiv. 9. “I the Lord have deceived that prophet.” Can any thing else be meant than suffering him to deceive himself?—Matt. xi. 25. “Thou hast hid these things” i. e. not revealed.——Thus also, Rom. ix. 18. “Whom he will he hardeneth,” he suffereth to be hardened.—Rom. xi. 8. “God gave them a spirit of slumber,” i. e. permitted them to slumber. 2 Thes. ii. 11. “God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie;” i. e. shall permit them to be deluded so that they shall believe a lie.—Exod. vii. 3. &c. “And I will harden Pharaoh’s heart,” i. e. I will suffer it to be hardened. Matt. x. 34, 35. “I am not come to send peace, but a sword; For I am come to set a man at variance against his father,” That is, my coming shall be the innocent occasion of wars and variance.—Jude 4. “Who were before of old ordained to this condemnation;” i. e. foretold, or forewritten, as the word signifies; announced in the sacred pages, and proscribed by divine law.

But the passage above all others, which appears to countenance the notion, that God is the cause of sin, is 1 Pet. ii. 8. “A stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even in them which stumble at the word, being disobedient, whereunto also they were appointed.” i. e. unto which thing, their stumbling, they were appointed because disobedient. The Greek participle includes the cause of their falling; as Heb. ii. 3. Neglecting so great salvation, how shall we escape? To which not escaping, they were appointed, for neglecting so great salvation. A striking contrast to this we have, John vii. 17. “If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine;” but the disobedient shall, according to an awful but equitable appointment, “stumble, and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and be taken.”—(Isa. viii. 15.) We have a further illustration of this meaning in Heb. iii. 18. “To whom sware he that they should not enter into his rest, but to them that believe not?” i. e. Who were appointed to destruction? The answer is, the disobedient; for the original word is the same here as in Peter, under a different inflection. And it is added, ver. 19. “So they could not enter in because of unbelief.”—Thus also Rom. xi. 7. “The rest were blinded, or hardened;” i. e. were suffered to be blind or hard. And that this is the meaning is decided by ver. 20. “Because of unbelief they were broken off.”

Upon the whole, Peter intimates, that none should be offended at such characters, men of learning and eminence rejecting the Messiah and his gospel. Their end is what might be expected, as foretold by the prophets, according to God’s righteous government, and his eternal appointment, or determination, respecting all such offenders. Their habitual unbelieving disobedience was the cause, but their actual stumbling at the word to their destruction was the natural, the righteous, the appointed effect. To this they were appointed, placed, or set forth (as Pharaoh was raised up) by the righteous judgment of God, who resisteth the proud and disobedient; in order to shew forth the glory of his justice in them. They were personally appointed to exalted situations, being civil and ecclesiastical builders; they were suffered to reject Christ, in pure equity; and thus were deservedly constituted awful warnings to others.

Footnote 241:

This notion, perhaps more than any other, has been termed Baxterianism, and yet it is not easy to say that Mr. Baxter ever maintained it. He says indeed “all have so much (grace) as bringeth and leaveth the success to man’s will;” and this in a discourse wherein he allows that God hath “positively elected certain persons by an absolute decree to overcome all their resistances of his Spirit, and to draw them to Christ, and by Christ to himself, by such a power and way as shall infallibly convert and save them.” He moreover says, “What if men cannot here tell how to resolve the question, whether any or how many are ever converted or saved by that mere grace which we call sufficient, or rather necessary, and common to those that are not converted; and whether man’s will ever make a saving determining improvement of it?”—“And yet,” he adds, “this question itself is formed on false suppositions and is capable of a satisfactory solution.” Baxter’s Works, Vol. ii. p. 929.—On the subject of this Note the author begs leave to refer his readers to Doddridge’s Works, Vol. v. p. 238, 239, Notes.

Footnote 242:

The nature of God, his holy will, and our peculiar relation to him, form an adamantine chain of obligation to duty which cannot with impunity be broken; from which predestination is so far from releasing us, that it forms another chain of gold that shall finally prevail; and divine grace personally experienced is a silken cord to draw the soul along in the path of duty. But do these powerful ties render useless God’s reasoning with sinners, his exhortations to repentance, to believing, to obedience, and to every particular branch of duty? No: for these methods are the very means to attain the end, and form a part of the decree itself.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

Transcriber’s Notes:

Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected. The author's archaic punctuation and spellings have been retained.

End of Project Gutenberg's A Body of Divinity, Vol. 1 of 4, by Thomas Ridgley

A Body of Divinity

A BODY OF DIVINITY:

WHEREIN THE DOCTRINES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION ARE EXPLAINED AND DEFENDED.

BEING THE SUBSTANCE OF SEVERAL LECTURES ON THE ASSEMBLY’S LARGER CATECHISM.

BY THOMAS RIDGLEY, D. D.

WITH NOTES, ORIGINAL AND SELECTED, BY JAMES P. WILSON, D. D.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

FIRST AMERICAN, FROM THE THIRD EUROPEAN EDITION.

PHILADELPHIA:

PRINTED BY AND FOR WILLIAM. W. WOODWARD, CORNER OF CHESNUT AND SOUTH SECOND STREETS.

1815.

THE CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

QUEST. XIV, XV. Of the work of Creation.

CREATION, the word explained Page 5

It was not from eternity 7

This proved from the invention of things 13

By the power and for the glory of God 14

Performed in six days 16

Each day’s work 19

Of instantaneous production 17

The condition and season of the year in which things were created 24

Antiquity of nations vainly boasted of 10

QUEST. XVI. Of Angels.

Of their existence 26

Nature and properties 28

Work and employment 30

Worship. Harmony therein, but no Hierarchy 31

How they impart their Ideas to one another 33

QUEST. XVII. Of the creation of Man.

Man was created male and female 34

Excellency of his make 40

Origin of the soul, in a note 41

Of God’s image in man 44

No men before Adam 37

QUEST. XVIII. Of Providence.

Providence governs all creatures 47

And all their actions ibid

His concern for man 51

How conversant about evil actions 52

Sin over-ruled for God’s glory, and his people’s good 53

Other things over-ruled by providence 59

Objections against providence answered 60

Unequal distributions of providence vindicated 61

QUEST. XIX. Of God’s providence towards the angels.

How it was conversant about the fall of apostate angels 63

These fell all at once 64

Some angels confirmed in holiness and happiness 66

Ministry of angels 68

QUEST. XX. Of God’s providence towards man in innocency.

Of Paradise 70

Man’s secular employment and food therein 72

His dominion over the creatures 74

His spiritual concerns were under the direction of providence 75

Sabbath instituted and the covenant established 76

Representation, in a note 77

Difference between a law and a covenant 78

Adam was under a covenant 82

Objections answered 83

Conditions of that covenant 84

Tree of life a seal of it 86

Of the tree of knowledge 90

QUEST. XXI. Of the fall of man.

Our first parents were endued with freedom of will 93

Were left thereunto 94

How they were tempted 96

Satan’s subtilty in the temptation 99

Eve represented by Adam, in a note 103

Aggravations of their sin 105

Its immediate consequences 104

QUEST. XXII. All mankind fell in Adam.

Adam a federal head 109

All fell in him, except Christ 112

His sin imputed to his posterity 113

Penal evils which followed 111

Appointment of his headship vindicated 114

QUEST. XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI. Of Sin.

Original sin 118

Actual transgressions proceed from it 120

Conveyed by natural generation 132

Original righteousness lost 121

Man’s nature inclined to sin 123

Propensity to sin not put into our nature by God 124

Not harmless even in childhood 125

Origin of moral evil 127

The notion of two first causes exploded ibid

Pre-existence of souls a mere fancy 126

Corruption of nature not by the soul’s traduction 128

Not from imitation ibid

Necessarily ensues on the privation of original righteousness 131

QUEST. XXVII. Of man’s misery by the Fall.

Various opinions about the salvation of infants 138

Punishment of original sin increased by actual 141

Sinners liable to God’s wrath and curse 143

Slaves to Satan 144

Sin exists in the intentions, in a note 145

QUEST. XXVIII, XXIX. Of the punishment of sin in both worlds.

Of judicial blindness of mind 146

Hardness of heart 149

Sins that lead to it 150

Difference between the hardness found in believers and judicial 152

Of strong delusions 147

A reprobate sense 152

Vile affections 153

Horror of conscience. When judicial 154

Punishment of sin in outward things 155

In the world to come 158

This will be perpetual, in a note 159, 160

QUEST. XXX. Of man’s Recovery.

God’s love the only moving cause of it 162

Covenant of grace. Its various periods 166

Opposed to that of innocency 165

QUEST. XXXI. The covenant of grace made with Christ, and, in him, with the elect.

Covenant, scriptural sense of the word 168

Between the Father and Son, explained 171

And proved 173

Of redemption distinguished by some from the covenant of grace 178

God’s covenant differs from human 170

How he covenants with man 181

How man covenants with him 183

QUEST. XXXII. Of the grace manifested in the second covenant.

Conditions of a covenant, how understood 190

Faith is a duty, in a note 193

Meritorious performed by Christ 192

Conditional promises uncertain 191

Interest in Christ, what meant by it 189

Grace glorified, in ordaining, promising, and working faith 197

Other graces promised and connected with salvation 195

QUEST. XXXIII, XXXIV, XXXV. Of the various dispensations of the covenant of grace.

Christ revealed of old by promises and prophecies 199

Ceremonial law typified Christ and the gospel 201

Types. Cautions about them 203

Rules how to judge of them 205

How the Jews knew their meaning 207

Cocceius’s sentiments about the bondage and darkness of that dispensation 208

Gospel-dispensation, when it began 212

How it excels the Legal 213

QUEST. XXXVI, XXXVII. Of the Mediator of the covenant of Grace.

Saints and angels no Mediators 218

Christ the only Mediator 217

Two distinct natures in Christ, but not two Persons 222

His human nature was united to his Person 220

It shall continue so for ever 234

How formed like ours. How not 227

It was formed of the Virgin 229

His body was truly human 224

His soul distinct from his deity 226

He was expected by the Jews 231

Born in the fulness of time 233

What meant thereby 233

QUEST. XXXVIII, XXXIX, XL. Of the necessity of the Mediator’s having two natures.

Why he should be God 235

Why man 238

Why both God and man 242

QUEST. XLI, XLII. Of the Mediator’s name and offices.

Why he was called Jesus 244

Why he was called Christ 245

His offices distinguished, but not divided 252

He was set apart and authorized to execute them 248

He was fitly qualified for them 249

QUEST. XLIII. Of Christ’s prophetical office.

He reveals the will of God 253

He was qualified for it 254

He does it in various ages 257

To whom and how he does it 255

QUEST. XLIV. Of Christ’s priestly office.

Priesthood of Christ and Aaron compared 280

Typified by Melchisedek 264

Various opinions who Melchisedek was 265

Proved that he was Christ (quære tamen) 267

Objections answered 270

Satisfaction demanded for sin, of what value and kind 275

Of Christ was necessary 273

His active obedience a part of it 283

Least degree of his sufferings not sufficient for it 281

No redemption without price 286

Death of Christ a ransom 290

Confirmation of his doctrine not its principal end 293

Christ died in our stead 290

Objections answered ibid

Modern opinions on the atonement, in a note, 276 to 280, and 292 to 297.

He offered himself

by the Spirit 297

without spot to God 297

Not for all men 301 & 276

but for his sheep and friends 316

and for his church 318 Dr. Magee’s Discourses, in a note 298-317

This evidenced

by his love to it 318

his propriety in it 322

and saving it ibid

Objections answered 319

Christ purchased grace and glory 328

Universal redemption,

its consequences 326

Arguments for it considered 327

Texts urged for it explained 343

How the word All, &c. is to be explained 341

Special Redemption,

consistent with the covenant of grace 329

and with preaching the gospel 331

It advances grace more than general does 337

It leads not to despair 331

Whether it be contrary to scripture 338

Christ intercedes not for all 324

Divine expostulations explained 333

How all should repent and believe, though Christ died not for all 335

Sacrifice of Christ sufficient for all, in a note 349

QUEST. XLV. Of Christ’s Kingly office.

As respecting his subjects

What they were, before subdued 353

How brought into subjection 354

How their subjection expressed at first 357

Their behaviour and conflicts 358

How Christ deals with them 361

As respecting his enemies 362

He governed the church before and since his incarnation 364

This office executed by him in glory 365

Of the MILLENNIUM.

Various opinions about it 366

Some have gross Ideas of it 370

What shall precede or attend it 368

Gospel shall then be more spread 373

How this doctrine to be treated 367

In what respects it is to be allowed 368

Some prophecies of the call of the Jews not yet fulfilled 376

Why Christ shall not reign visibly in his human nature 379

Temple-service not to be revived 381

Gospel-ordinances shall be continued 382

First resurrection; how understood by some 383

Its literal sense debated 384

General conflagration 387

New heavens and new earth 388

Resurrection of the church sometimes taken mystically 389

1000 years how understood by some 391

These not yet begun ibid

Mediatorial kingdom of Christ eternal 392

1 Cor. xv. ver. 24, 25, 28. explained 393

QUEST. XLVI, XLVII, XLVIII. Of Christ’s Humiliation.

This shewn in his birth and infancy 398

In his parentage 399

In the place of his birth and abode 400

In the sinless infirmities of his life 422

In his being made under the law 401

In his being exposed to indignities 402

Temptations endured by him 404

General remarks on them 406

The time and place thereof 405

His first temptation 410

His second temptation 412

Its matter explained 416

His third temptation 417

What to be observed therein 419

Temptations were mental, in a note 420

Quest. XLIX, L. Of Christ’s humiliation before and after his death.

Christ betrayed by Judas 424

Forsaken by his disciples 425

Denied by Peter 426

Scorned by the world ibid

Reviled by many 428

Inferences ibid

Prosecuted by the Jews 429

Condemned by Pilate ibid

Tormented by his persecutors 431

Bore the wrath of God ibid

Death of the cross cruel and painful 433

Shameful, servile, and cursed 434

Christ buried with respect by his friends 437

Was under the power of death till the third day 438

Of his descent into hell 440

How the Papists understand it 441

1 Pet. iii. 18. explained, in a note 442

QUEST. LI, LII. Of Christ’s Resurrection and Exaltation.

Resurrection of Christ proved 444

By credible witnesses 448

They were men of integrity 449

By the conduct of his enemies 450

By miracles 451

Properties of his risen body 452

Christ raised the third day 453

Reasons of it 454

Was not three whole days and nights in the grave 455

Socinians’ account of Christ’s resurrection 457

Christ’s own and his peoples’ concern in his resurrection 458

QUEST. LIII, LIV. Of Christ’s Ascension.

It was real and visible 464

Its necessity and design 468

Its distance from the time of his resurrection 461

How this interval was employed 463

Matter of his conversation with his disciples 464

Remarks on what preceded it 460

He ascended from mount Olivet 467

Christ’s sitting at the right hand of God 471

QUEST. LV. Of Christ’s Intercession.

Necessity of it 473

His fitness for it 474

Manner of it 477

How it differs from our prayers 476

What procured by it 479

How to be improved ibid

QUEST. LVI. Of Christ’s coming to judge the world.

The time of his appearance 481

The glory that shall attend it 482

QUEST. LVII, LVIII, LIX. Of the benefits of redemption, and the application thereof.

Benefits procured by Christ 486

These applied by the Holy Ghost 487

To all for whom they were purchased (vide 349) 488

QUEST. LX. Of the disadvantages of those who never hear the gospel.

State of the Heathen considered 491

No salvation without the gospel—tamen quære 492

Nor without faith in Christ—tamen quære ibid

Deists; falseness of their hope set forth 494

False grounds of hope in others 496

Salvation in none but Christ 498

This proved 499

Objections answered 502

Christ the Saviour only of his Body the church 508

QUEST. LXI, LXII, LXIII, LXIV. Of the Church, visible and invisible.

Church, the word how used, (515 in a note) 510

Places of worship so termed 511

Their first erection 512

Its distinction into visible and invisible 516

Invisible church described 519

This farther explained and defended 520

Visible church described 521

In what respects it is one 522

In what respects it is not one ibid

Its concern for the children of its members 526

Jewish church, its establishment ibid

Its government 527

How they promoted religion in their synagogues 529

Their Proseuchæ, or places appointed for prayer 530

A particular gospel-church described 536

Its matter 539

Its form or bond of union 540

Its subjection to Christ to be professed 542

How this to be made visible 543

Its power of admission 541

The reformed churches differ about this ibid

Terms of communion fixed by Christ ibid

Its power of exclusion 544

Causes of exclusion 545

The way of proceeding therein 547

With what temper this should be done 549

What meant by being delivered to Satan 550

and for what end 551

The first preaching and success of the gospel 532

Conduct of the Apostles in planting gospel-churches 534 Church-communion proved

from the law of nature 538

from scripture ibid

Government of churches by their officers 552

Αποστολος, Επισκοπος, Διακονος, in a note, ibid

The office of a Pastor, Bishop, or Elder 555

Bishops and Elders the same 556

Jerom’s account of the increase of the power of Bishops, in a note 558

Pastors chosen by the church 561

Χειροτονεω, in a note 563

How to be set apart ibid

How their office to be discharged 565

Whether a Teacher be a distinct officer 566

Synods, the abuse and advantage of them 566

Parishes, why churches were so called by ancient writers 567

The office of a Deacon 570

Officers of the church, in a note 571

Privileges of the visible church 572

It is under Christ’s special care 574

Wherein this consists 575

It is under Christ’s special government 576

In what respects 577

It enjoys communion of saints ibid

It has the ordinary means of grace 578

THE WORK OF CREATION.